Early v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2022
• Docket Number: 3:19-cv-735-MMH-JBT
• Parties: STEPHEN LAMONT EARLY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

STEPHEN LAMONT EARLY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

No. 3:19-cv-735-MMH-JBT

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

January 27, 2022

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Status

Petitioner Stephen Early, an inmate of the Florida penal system initiated this action in the United States District Court Northern District of Florida on June 10, 2019, ^[1] by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). The Northern District transferred the action to the Middle District on June 17, 2019. Doc. 3. In the Petition, Early challenges a 2014 state court (Bradford County, Florida) judgment of conviction for second-degree murder. Early asserts four grounds as his basis for seeking relief. See Petition at 5-11.^[2] Respondents oppose the Petition. See Response to Federal Habeas Petition (Response; Doc. 11) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). Early filed a brief in reply. See Reply to State's Response (Reply; Doc. 16). This case is ripe for review.

II. Relevant Procedural History

On October 23, 2014, a jury convicted Early of second-degree murder, with a special finding that Early committed the offense with a weapon. Resp. Ex. 1. The trial court sentenced Early to a term of incarceration of twenty years and six months in prison. Id. Early appealed his conviction and sentence to Florida's First District Court of Appeal (First DCA). Resp. Ex. 2. In his initial brief, Early argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss; (2) denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) failed to instruct the jury that Early could not be found guilty if the killing was justifiable or excusable; and (4) failed to conduct a Nelson^[3] inquiry after Early made an unequivocal request for a hearing. Resp. Ex. 3. The State filed an answer brief, Resp. Ex. 4, and Early filed a reply brief, Resp. Ex. 5. On March 3, 2017, the First DCA, in a written opinion, affirmed Early's conviction and sentence. Resp. Ex. 6. The First DCA issued the mandate on March 21, 2017. Resp. Ex. 7.

Early filed a pro se motion to modify his sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) on April 26, 2017. Resp. Ex. 8. On May 20, 2017, the postconviction court denied relief. Id. The following month, on June 30, 2017, Early filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. 9. In the Rule 3.850 Motion, Early alleged his counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) properly preserve a sufficiency of the evidence claim for appellate review; (2) move to suppress his statements to police; and (3) request a “heat of passion” jury instruction. Id. The postconviction court initially denied relief on grounds one and three but ordered the State to respond to ground two. Resp. Ex. 10. Thereafter, the postconviction court denied relief on ground two. Resp. Ex. 15. On February 20, 2019, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of relief without a written opinion, Resp. Ex. 18, and issued the mandate on March 20, 2019, Resp. Ex. 19.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2245 (2017). “It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Early's] claim[s] without further factual development, ” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed' and ‘highly deferential.'” Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. At 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The “unreasonable application” clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal courts to grant relief only if the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)'s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1), which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the state court's factual findings “by clear and convincing evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2282, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'”^[4] Titlow, 571 U.S. at ---, 134 S.Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 2298 (2017). Also, deferential review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).

Thus “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in existing law' and ‘was so lacking in justification' that ‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.'” Thar...