Early v. State
| Citation | 482 N.E.2d 256 |
| Decision Date | 05 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 585S216,585S216 |
| Parties | Mark EARLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Novella L. Nedeff, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant-Appellant Mark Anthony Early was convicted of Robbery, a class A felony, on July 30, 1982, at the conclusion of a bench trial before the Marion County Superior Court. The Honorable Charles Daugherty sentenced Appellant to thirty (30) years imprisonment. The sole issue for review is whether or not there was sufficient evidence of the element of mens rea presented at trial.
At the time of the offense Appellant was twenty (20) years old and suffered from cerebral palsy. On January 27, 1981, Appellant was visited by three friends who had obtained a gun earlier in the day. As the four young men discussed how they could raise money for marijuana, they observed Robert Wilson, a door-to-door salesman, approaching the house and decided to rob him.
The young men invited Wilson into the house and asked him to demonstrate how to set his mouse poison in the kitchen. While demonstrating, Wilson turned around and saw Appellant point a rifle at him. Appellant shouted, "Now we're going to separate you," and fired a shot which struck Wilson in the abdomen, seriously wounding him. After Wilson fell to the floor one or more of the men took Wilson's money, watch, and handgun, and then dragged Wilson into the front yard before leaving.
That night Appellant surrendered to the police. After receiving his Miranda warnings Appellant gave a statement implicating himself in the robbery and shooting, as well as the discussion and decision to rob Wilson. At trial Wilson positively identified Appellant as the man who shot him. Appellant testified the other man called him names and threatened him, compelling him to take part in the robbery.
The sole error alleged is whether or not there was sufficient evidence produced at trial on the element of mens rea.
Appellant acknowledges that this Court will not reweigh evidence, but maintains instead that this Court must "probe and sift" the evidence to ensure the facts sufficiently support the verdict. Appellant cites Terry v. State, (1984) Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1088, wherein we stated, "Any factor which serves as a denial of the existence of mens rea must be considered by the trier of fact before a guilty finding is entered."
Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-3-5(b) (Burns 1982), by stating:
"(b) Voluntary intoxication is a defense only to the extent that it negates an element of an offense referred to by the phrase 'with intent to' or 'with an intention to.' "
limited the availability of the intoxication defense. The effect of Terry was to void this language and thus broaden the use of the intoxication defense.
Presently, the defense of duress is limited by a similar statute, Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-3-8 (Burns 1985) which reads in part:
"(a) It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was compelled to do so by threat of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or another person....
(b) This section does not apply to a person who:
* * *
* * *
(2) committed an offense against the person as defined in I.C. 35-42."
Appellant maintains Terry compels that the broadening of the defense of intoxication should apply by analogy to invalidate the duress exception provision.
Appellant is forcing a comparison of two dissimilar statutes with two dissimilar rationales. This Court's rationale in Terry was the fact that in some cases intoxication may render a person so completely non compos mentis that he has no ability to form intent, and thus cannot be held accountable Terry, supra. Appellant does not contend that he lacked the ability to form the requisite mens rea. Rather, he argues the lack of mens rea arose from the criminal actions being forced upon him. The statute excepts crime against the person from the duress defense and this Court has approved this provision; in fact, we have stated previously that duress is not a defense...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Conner v. State
...trier of fact demonstrated that the defendant was able to form the intent necessary to commit the crime of murder. See Early v. State, 482 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ind. 1985). 4. We do not find Wade applicable. In Wade, the court found multiple factors that together made counsel ineffective during ......
-
Legue v. State, 61S00-9504-CR-434
...intoxicated, nevertheless had the ability to form the requisite intent, "he may not use the intoxication defense." Early v. State, 482 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ind.1985). Thus, an instruction on voluntary intoxication would not have been proper even if the defendant's trial counsel had requested it......
-
Hensley v. State, 49A02-9104-CR-143
...that the compulsion he felt from the victim's alleged harassment rose to the degree necessary to constitute duress. See Early v. State (1985), Ind., 482 N.E.2d 256, 258 (duress defense is not intended to be given a broad reading; defense is only allowed where the prohibited conduct is compe......
-
Gibson v. State, 45S00-8611-CR-956
...yet his actions show he has the ability to form the requisite mens rea, he may not use the intoxication defense." Early v. State (1985), Ind., 482 N.E.2d 256, 258. The question is not merely whether appellant was intoxicated, but rather "whether or not appellant's intoxication was sufficien......