Earthman's Adm'rs v. Jones

• Decision Date: 31 January 1831
• Parties: EARTHMAN'S ADMINISTRATORS v. JONES.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

10 Tenn. 484

EARTHMAN'S ADMINISTRATORS

v.JONES.

Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee.

January Term, 1831.

This cause was argued by Messrs. F. B. Fogg and Geo. S. Yerger, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Thos. Washington, for the defendant. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the judges.

CATRON, Judge.

This action was in debt, founded upon the record of a judgment rendered against John Earthman, in Missouri, in the year 1823. The defendants pleaded, “that the suit in Missouri was commenced by attachment against the intestate, which was levied upon his personal property; that at the commencement of said action, and at the time of rendering the judgment, John Earthman was not an inhabitant or citizen of the state of Missouri, but then resided in, and was an inhabitant of, the state of Tennessee. And defendants aver, that John Earthman had no personal notice of any kind, served or executed upon him, notifying him of the existence, nor did he appear and defend the same, by himself or attorney.” This plea was demurred to in the circuit court, and the demurrer sustained.

Nul tiel record was also pleaded, and issue to the court taken. The court adjudged this plea for the plaintiff. The record, on exception, is set out. The proceeding was by attachment against a non-resident, levied upon property in the hands of Jones, the plaintiff, which, upon sale after judgment, produced $3.25. The judgment was for $361.45 and costs. It had been taken by default and was general.

The circuit court was of opinion “that by the constitution of the United States, and the 38th chapter of the acts of the first Congress, the record from Missouri was conclusive upon John Earthman, and could not be impeached upon plea” and gave judgment for the plaintiff.

For the plaintiff, it is insisted that the cause of Mills and Duryee, 7 Cra. 487, decided by the supreme court of the United States, is conclusive upon this court, and settles the construction of the constitution and act of congress, that no averment can be made contradicting a record from a sister state. That this court is bound to conform to the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, in cases where the construction of the constitution and laws of the United States are drawn in question, we admit. Whatever the cause of Mills v. Duryee has settled, we are bound to follow. It determined that nil debet was not a good plea to an action of debt founded upon a record from a sister state, where the defendant had been served with notice, and made defence. The supreme court decided that where the state laws gave jurisdiction to the courts of the states, and judgments were rendered in pursuance of such laws against persons within the jurisdiction of the legislature and the courts, such judgments were conclusive evidence of the rights of the parties in the state where rendered, and must have accorded to them the same faith and credit in every other state in the Union; that this was the true construction of the constitution and act of Congress. This decision meets our unqualified approbation, aside from its binding force upon this court; but that it has any controlling influence upon this case we do not apprehend. The main question here is, has the legislature of Missouri power and jurisdiction to pass laws operating directly or indirectly upon the citizens of other states beyond her territorial limits? The legislature is the principal; the courts only execute the statutes. If the principal has no jurisdiction to bind a non-resident, that none can be conferred upon the agents, is a truism. In the sovereignty of the states is to be found the principle that governs the question presented.

Before and after the adoption of the Federal constitution, the states were independent of the legislation of each other. The citizens of Tennessee cannot be affected within this state, by the laws of Missouri. She cannot control our local policy, nor we hers. Mary Dickson v. The Heirs of John Dickson, 1 Yer. Rep. 110; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 69;17 Mass. Rep. 540;14 John. Rep. 338;17 John. Rep. 4; 1 H. Black. 123, 135. Could this be, state sovereignty would be at an end. Congress has no power conferred by the constitution to subject one state sovereignty to the legislation of another, nor has the exercise of such a power been attempted by the act of 1790, ch. 38.

What is here claimed for the judgment of a court of Missouri? That blind submission shall be accorded to it, because it furnishes evidence of debt in the highest grade, and not to be gainsaid by inferior evidence. That John Earthman could not be directly reached in the state of Tennessee by the attachment law of Missouri is certain. Can it be made to reach his property and person here, individually, through the instrumentality of courts of justice? Such an assumption would want an advocate. How is the fact? Earthman was a citizen of Tennessee, Jones of Missouri. The latter filed his declaration in the clerk's office, charging Earthman with a debt; took out an attachment against his goods and lands, and caused it to be levied upon a few shillings' worth of property; this the law of Missouri declares of the same validity as personal notice. A general judgment is taken by default, without proof, for near $400. Now the process on the original judgment could only extend to the jurisdiction of the court where rendered; yet this is far from the force and effect claimed for the judgment. It is brought here, and an action of debt brought upon it in the natare of a scire facias, to have execution of it by the judgment of our courts. Our courts are not permitted to try the issue, whether Earthman owed Jones the money claimed, but they are asked for execution of the Missouri judgment, in the same manner as if the judgment had been rendered in Tennessee, and no execution had been taken out within a year. This was the duty the circuit court supposed was imposed upon it by the constitution of the United States and act of 1790. If the construction of the circuit court be the true one, the law surely requires amendment, as the most manifest injustice may, and frequently must, be done. What does the state of Missouri say to the state of Tennessee? You must execute our laws upon your citizens, of whose persons we never have had jurisdiction, not because our laws bind them, but because the judgments of our courts, rendered in pursuance of our laws, do, and that conclusively.

Missouri might well say to us, execute the judgments rendered in pursuance of our laws, by our courts, upon our own inhabitants, who have been sued and notified, but have withdrawn from our jurisdiction to yours. By inhabitants, we mean every one coming within the territorial limits of the state, to which he owes temporary allegiance while there. In such case, the laws of Missouri would operate upon the person of the defendant, and he be subject to the jurisdiction of her laws, and the process of the courts. If he withdraw beyond the reach of their influence, to our jurisdiction, it would be our duty, by the constitution of the United States and the act of 1790, to give the judgment effect by causing execution thereof. This is the point decided in Mills v. Duryee; not that a non-resident could be bound by an ex parte judgment, where there was no jurisdiction of his person. So we apprehend Judge Story to have understood the opinion. He says, in Flower v. Baker, 3 Mason 251, “No legislature can compel any persons beyond its own territory to become parties to any suits instituted in its domestic tribunals. If they voluntarily make themselves parties, that is a different business; the legislature can bind no more than their persons and property, within its territorial jurisdiction.” Such was Judge Washington's opinion, we suppose, also. Wilson v. Graham, 4 Washington, 57.

We must not be understood as reflecting upon the legislature or courts of Missouri; far from it. The attachment laws of that state are as free from exception as perhaps any in the Union; quite as much so as our own. We follow the decision of the supreme court of Missouri, in Chamberlain v. Faris and Tracy, and Overstreet v. Shannon, Misso. Rep. 517, 529, where judgments from sister states, recovered against inhabitants of Missouri by attachment, without notice or appearance, were declared to furnish no evidence of debt, and that no suit could be sustained upon them. So are are the decisions of Massachusetts, in Hall v. Williams, 6, Pick. 232, of Connecticut, in Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Con. Rep. 380; in New York, in Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. Rep. 121; of Pennsylvania, in Benton v. Burgot, 10 Serg. and Rawl. Rep. 220; and Kentucky, Rogers v. Coleman, Hard. Rep. 413.

What would be the effect of judgments rendered by the courts of sister states, on proceeding by attachment in cases of absconding debtors, where the jurisdiction of the court had attached and was fraudulently evaded, we wish to be understood as not deciding.

That no faith or credit is accorded to the judgment of other governments, where neither the legislature or the courts had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, is of course the standing rule in England. 3 Wils. 197; 9 East, 192; Starkie on Evidence, 214, sec. 68. In the case in East, Chief Justice Ellenborough well remarked, “Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the whole world? Would the world submit to such an assumed jurisdiction?” The law of the Island of Tobago provided, that the summons should be nailed up at the court house door, if there were no agent to be served with notice; and the defendant in that case was an inhabitant of London. The legislature and courts of Missouri have no more jurisdiction to bind the citizens of Tennessee, not found in Missouri, than the...