Easley v. State
| Decision Date | 21 June 1934 |
| Docket Number | 23648. |
| Citation | 175 S.E. 23,49 Ga.App. 275 |
| Parties | EASLEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant with a wanton and reckless disregard for human life ran his automobile over and seriously injured the prosecutor, and that such wanton and reckless disregard of human life was equivalent to a specific intent to kill. The evidence therefore, authorized the verdict of assault with intent to murder.
2. The assignments of error are without merit. The court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; C.J. Perryman, Judge.
Luther Easley was convicted of assault with intent to murder, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Otey B Mitchell, Jesse B. Simmons, and George J. Holtman, Jr., all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., J. W. Le Craw, and John H. Hudson, all of Atlanta, for the State.
Luther Easley was indicted for the offense of assault with intent to murder, L. H. Satterfield being the victim. The defendant was convicted, and, his motion for a new trial being overruled, he brought writ of error. The indictment charged that the defendant "did, with an automobile, assault, strike and injure L. H. Satterfield, and did drive said automobile over, against and upon the said L. H. Satterfield, with a reckless disregard for human life and for the life of L. H. Satterfield, which reckless disregard was the equivalent of an intent to kill and murder the said L. H. Satterfield." The indictment further sets out that the defendant was operating said car along Marietta street in the city of Atlanta in violation of the law with reference to passing street cars and speed. The state's case rests mainly on the testimony of two witnesses. They are Satterfield, the prosecutor, and Carter, a street car motorman. Satterfield was struck and run over by a car driven by the defendant. The place of the accident was at the intersection of Peachtree and Marietta streets in the city of Atlanta. His testimony shows that the defendant was driving down Marietta towards Peachtree at a rate of speed of approximately 40 miles per hour. There was a street car coming in the same direction, and just before it came to its usual stopping place, it began to slow down to take on passengers that had gathered out in the street, and the defendant, instead of bringing his car to a stop as he was required to do by an ordinance of the city of Atlanta, passed on by the street car, scattering the people that had gathered for the purpose of boarding the same, and drove on down to the intersection, which was only a short distance from the place where he passed the street car. The traffic signal was green, meaning that traffic in his direction could cross Peachtree, and, according to Satterfield, if the defendant had held a straight course on down Marietta, no accident would have happened, but instead, when he reached the intersection, he turned his car up on the curb and ran over him. Carter, the motorman of the alleged street car, testified that the defendant passed him going about 20 or 25 miles per hour; that he had not brought his car to a complete stop when the defendant passed him but that he was in the act of stopping. Although the prosecutor testified that the defendant was traveling around 40 miles per hour, other state witnesses reduce this to 15, 20, or 25. The prosecutor testified that if the defendant had kept a straight course, no accident of any kind would have happened and that it looked as if the defendant deliberately ran over him, while all other witnesses for the state and the defendant sustain the defendant's defense that he was forced to turn his car to the right and up on the curb in order to avoid hitting two ladies that had stepped out in front of his car.
The intent to do an act, where no provocation or motive appears, is necessarily hard of proof and is generally only provable by circumstantial evidence. There are certain circumstances which involve the acts of one accused of a crime, that men, from past human experience, conclude that such was his intent. If a person point a loaded gun at another and pull the trigger, he will be presumed to have intended to shoot that person. Sometimes the element of provocation appears to explain the act of one accused of crime. Motive, in most crimes, appears as the vehicle of intent and where motive to do an act is proven, and that act is done, a jury would, of course, be authorized to find that the accused was moved by such motive and that it was his intent to commit the crime. In the offense of assault with intent to murder there must be malice and a specific intent to kill the person assaulted. The law does not presume an intent to kill from the unlawful use of a deadly weapon, unless death actually results, and in the latter case this is true because the law presumes that every person of rational and ordinary judgment intends the ordinary consequences of his acts. Where death does not occur, the law does not reach into the realm of speculation and presume that the defendant intended that which did not occur. It is true that from the use of a weapon likely to produce death, in a manner likely to have that result, malice will be presumed, as malice may be inferred from the infliction of the slightest injury, and even the weapon used was not one likely to produce death. However, malice, where no killing takes place, does not necessarily include an intention to kill, for any intention to inflict slight injury on another is necessarily infected with malice, but there would not be at the same time an intent to kill that person. If death had ensued and the defendant could not have been convicted of murder, then he cannot be convicted of assault with intent to murder.
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