Eason v. Welfare Com'r

• Decision Date: 21 September 1976
• Citation: 370 A.2d 1082,171 Conn. 630
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Dollie EASON v. WELFARE COM'R 1 .

Page 1082

370 A.2d 1082

171 Conn. 630

Dollie EASON v. WELFARE COM'R ¹.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Sept. 21, 1976.

Charles A. Pirro, III, South Norwalk, with whom were Richard L. Tenenbaum, South Norwalk, and David Branch, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Robert A. Nagy, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

LOISELLE, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing her appeal from the denial by the Juvenile Court of her motion to 'reopen' the commitment of a minor child to the welfare commissioner.

On October 10, 1974, the plaintiff filed a motion to 'reopen' commitment in Juvenile Court. That motion alleged that, in 1968, a child was placed by her mother with the plaintiff. In 1969, the plaintiff attempted to adopt the child but the natural mother did not consent. In June, 1973, the Juvenile Court, acting upon a petition of neglect against the mother, granted temporary custody of the child to the welfare commissioner who, in turn, placed the child in the plaintiff's home where the plaintiff assumed the role of a foster parent. In February, 1974, the Juvenile Court committed the child to the custody of the welfare commissioner who continued the child's placement in the plaintiff's home. On October 3, 1974, the welfare commissioner removed the child directly from school to the home of the natural mother. The motion also alleged that the plaintiff, although not the biological mother of the child, is the psychological and emotional parent of the child. The plaintiff alleged that the child had lived with her from September, 1968, to October 3, 1974. In the appeal from the Juvenile Court to the Superior Court, the plaintiff alleges that the child was represented by named counsel.

The Juvenile Court treated the motion as one made under General Statutes § 17-62(f), and considered it as a motion to revoke the commitment of the child to the welfare commissioner. Both parties have characterized the motion in this manner. The Juvenile Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's motion because § 17-62(f) fails to include a foster mother as one who may file a motion to revoke. The Superior Court denied the plaintiff's appeal from the Juvenile Court on the same grounds.

The plaintiff has assigned as error the court's failure to find that a foster parent is a 'parent' as the word is used in General Statutes § 17-62(f); that a foster parent has standing to file a motion to revoke commitment in Juvenile Court; that the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion by a foster parent to revoke commitment.

We turn initially to the plaintiff's contention that she is among those listed in § 17-62(f). General Statutes § 17-62(a) ² empowers the Juvenile Court to summon the parents or guardian of a child to appear in court when a petition is filed containing information that a child is uncared for and neglected. Subsection (d) of § 17-62 ³ provides that after a hearing and adjudication that a child is uncared for or neglected the court may commit the child to the welfare commissioner or other persons and agencies designated in the statute.

The power to revoke such commitment is controlled by § 17-62(f), ⁴ which restricts the right to file an application for revocation to a 'parent,' a 'relative' and other persons or agencies named therein.

We find without merit the plaintiff's contention that her status is to be found among those listed in § 17-62(f). The meaning to be given a statute is determined by legislative intent and that legislative intent must be determined by language actually used in the legislation. Knoll v. Kelley,142 Conn. 592, 594, 115 A.2d 678. Foster parents are not mentioned in § 17-62(f). If the legislature had intended to include a foster parent among the persons permitted the right to file an application to revoke commitment, it could easily have done so. Our statutes contain numerous instances in which a distinction is drawn between natural or adoptive parents and foster parents. ⁵ We presume that the legislature was award of the use of foster homes when it enacted § 17-62(f) since it specifically authorized the welfare commissioner to place children committed to him in foster homes in § 17-62(d). We, therefore, conclude that the legislature intentionally excluded foster parents from § 17-62(f).

The plaintiff also contends that the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion by a foster parent to revoke commitment. The Juvenile Court is a statutory court. General Statutes §§ 17-53 to 17-74. 'It is a familiar principle that a court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.' Heiser v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A.2d 44, 45. Under § 17-62(f), one of those specified persons or agencies must apply to trigger the Juvenile Court's power to revoke the commitment to the welfare commissioner. As the plaintiff did not fall within one of those categories, the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction to revoke the commitment under § 17-62(f).

The plaintiff asserts that the due process clause of the federal constitution's fourteenth amendment guarantees her the right to initiate a hearing to revoke the commitment to the welfare commissioner. The record of the proceedings of the Juvenile Court includes only a motion entitled 'motion to reopen,' the court's memorandum of decision and a transcript devoted entirely to comments of counsel. At the hearing on the motion, counsel admitted that the plaintiff was a party at the neglect hearing. The Juvenile Court's memorandum of decision also states that the plaintiff was represented by counsel at that hearing. In any event, there is no claim that the plaintiff was deprived of due process because of the hearings in June, 1973, and in February, 1974. As a result of those hearings, the welfare commissioner was made guardian of the children. The plaintiff had an opportunity to request that the child be committed to her as a person 'suitable and worthy' of the responsibility of caring for the child. See General Statutes § 17-62(d). In her 'motion to reopen,' she made no claim that was different from that which she could have made at the neglect hearing. She had an opportunity to be heard at the most critical time in the proceedings before the Juvenile Court. Due process does not require a rehearing of issues that have been litigated. See cases in 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 583.

While the principal brief is mainly concerned with the plaintiff's right to be heard upon the deprivation of her interests in the child, and while the argument is in traditional due process terms, the plaintiff's reply brief emphasizes an equal protection argument: 'Appellee has incorrectly stated in his brief that Appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of the classification by the legislature of those persons permitted to seek revocation of commitment in Juvenile Court. . . . Appellant does argue that the word 'parents' in the relevant statute, C.G.S. § 17-62(f), can be construed to include foster parents. . . . However, if this Court does not see fit to adopt this construction, then Appellant argues it has no other choice but to find C.G.S. § 17-62(f) unconstitutional.' As to her claim of lack of due process because she was not included with the other persons allowed to bring motions for revoking commitment under § 17-62(f), the argument concerns her right under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The issue, then, is not whether a foster parent should be included as one who may initiate a hearing to preserve interests in a child, but whether a foster parent should be included among those who may move to revoke a commitment to the welfare commissioner, now commissioner of children and youth services.

The requirement of equal protection of the laws does not deny a state the right to make classifications in law so long as there is no invidious discrimination. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563, reh. denied, 349 U.S. 925, 75 S.Ct. 657, 99 L.Ed. 1256. 'Under traditional equal protection principles, a State retains broad discretion to classify as long as its classification has a reasonable basis.' Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534. In the area of social welfare, a statute is not impermissible because the classifications are imperfect. So long as a classification has some reasonable basis, the statute does not offend constitutional requirements simply because a classification found therein "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369.' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, reh. denied, 398 U.S. 914, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, the court said (p. 425, 81 S.Ct. p. 1105): 'Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.' A proper classification must include all who naturally belong to the class. There must be some natural and substantial...