East Jefferson Coalition v. Jefferson Parish, Civ. A. No. 86-3668.
Decision Date | 12 July 1988 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 86-3668. |
Citation | 691 F. Supp. 991 |
Parties | EAST JEFFERSON COALITION FOR LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT, et al. v. The PARISH OF JEFFERSON, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
J. Anthony Moscona and Robert Schambach, Metairie, La., Ronald L. Wilson, Alice Jacobs, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs.
Harry A. Rosenberg, John P. Manard, Jr., New Orleans, La., for defendants.
Anthony S. Taormina, Metairie, La., pro se.
Plaintiffs, the East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development, the Lincoln Manor Civic Association, and a number of registered voters in Jefferson Parish brought suit against the Parish of Jefferson alleging that the current plan for apportioning the seats on the Jefferson Parish council violates § 2 et seq. of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1982. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. Plaintiffs also contend that the present apportionment plan violates their rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 and 1973j(f).
In January 1986, a number of Jefferson Parish registered voters filed suit alleging that the structure of the Parish councilmanic districts violated the one-man, one-vote principle established in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Cedric Floyd v. Parish of Jefferson, C.A. 86-0265 (E.D.La.) That suit terminated with a consent decree signed by the plaintiffs, defendants and this court on June 22, 1987. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit # 3). The consent decree ordered the Parish "to more evenly distribute the population of the Parish of Jefferson among its four councilmanic districts." Id. The Parish council proceeded to amend its Home Rule Charter and reapportion the councilmanic districts in accordance with the mandates of the consent decree. That reapportionment plan reflects the districts as they are currently drawn and is the subject of this lawsuit.
The Parish submitted the plan to the United States Attorney General for approval in accordance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Over the opposition of the plaintiffs in this suit and a number of their experts, the Attorney General indicated that he would not interpose any objection to the proposed redistricting plan.1 (See, Defendants' Exhibits #'s 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11). The Parish elected a new council in November 1987 under the current plan. Those elections are valid and shall stand, notwithstanding this decision which questions the validity of the present apportionment plan.
Jefferson Parish is sought to be governed by a seven-member council. The council members are elected through a combination of single-member, floaterial, and at-large districts.2 The Parish is apportioned into four districts. Each district elects one councilman. One member is elected at-large from Districts 1 and 2. One member is elected at-large from Districts 3 and 4. The seventh councilman, the Chairman, is elected from the Parish at-large. The consent decree did not alter this three level election scheme. It only required that the Parish reapportion the four single member districts to bring it into compliance with Reynolds v. Sims. Jefferson Parish utilizes a majority vote requirement in its councilmanic elections.3
According to the 1980 census, Jefferson Parish has a total population of 454,592 persons and a black population of 63,001. (Plaintiffs Exhibit # 5B). The voting age population is 314,323 persons, of whom 268,878 are white and 37,039 are black. (Defendants' Exhibit # 20). There are 197,376 registered voters in the Parish of whom 23,381 are black. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit # 5B).4 No black has been elected to the Parish council.
In 1982, Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act "to clearly establish the standards ... for proving a violation of that section." S.REP. NO 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 177, 178 (hereinafter S.Rep.).
Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis provided).
Any electoral mechanism which dilutes the voting strength of a minority group is as impermissible a denial of the right to have one's ballot count fully, as the denial of the right to vote. S.Rep. at 28, 1982 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS at 205. The Voting Rights Act seeks to prevent political bodies from implementing election systems or practices which operate, whether intentionally or not, to minimize, cancel, or dilute the voting strength or political effectiveness of minority groups.
Dilution of minority voting strength is caused by drawing district lines in such a way that the minority group constitutes an ineffective minority or by concentrating the minority group into districts where they are an excessive majority. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2764 n. 11, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). At-large and oversized voting districts possess the potential to minimize or dilute minority voting strength, and therefore, are subject to careful scrutiny.
At-large voting schemes and multimember districts tend to minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority to elect all representatives of the district. A distinct minority, whether it be racial, ethnic, economic, or political group, may be unable to elect any representatives in an at-large election, yet be able to elect several representatives if the political unit is divided into single-member districts.
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3275, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982). See also, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143-144, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1869-1870, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971) ( ). Neither the courts nor the legislature, however, have unequivocally determined that all at-large or oversized districts tend to dilute a minority group's voting rights, and therefore, they are not per se unlawful. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 617, 102 S.Ct. at 3275, Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1499, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2339, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1868, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971), Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir.1973), aff'd sub nom, East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed. 2d 296 (1976), S.Rep. at 33, 1982 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS at 211.
A. The Death of Bolden and The Re-Birth of the Results Test
Congress amended § 2 to remove the intent requirement established by the plurality decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), and to restore the pre-Bolden "results test" established by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). S.Rep. at 27, 1982 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS at 205. In Mobile v. Bolden, the Supreme Court declared that a minority group could prove a § 2 violation only by showing that state officials intentionally maintained or adopted a contested electoral mechanism with a discriminatory purpose. 446 U.S. at 66-67, 100 S.Ct. at 1499-1500. The Bolden decision focuses the question in the wrong place. The intent of the legislature for the most part is irrelevant although it may be helpful in proving a § 2 claim. By amending § 2, Congress sought to direct the inquiry towards the effect a contested electoral mechanism has on a minority group's ability to participate equally in the political process and away from the legislature's intent.
The amendment to the language of Section 2 is designed to make clear that plaintiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose in the adoption or maintenance of the challenged system of practice in order to establish a violation. Plaintiffs must prove such intent, or, alternatively, must show that the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Jeffers v. Clinton, H-C-89-004.
..."aggregate representation from those elections ... virtually" covers the entire district at issue. See East Jefferson Coalition v. Jefferson Parish, 691 F.Supp. 991, 999 (E.D.La.1988). Most of plaintiffs' proposed new house districts cross county lines. In some instances, the plaintiffs mig......
-
Williams v. City of Dallas
...inquiry regarding the application of § 2 standards to sample districts used for illustrative purposes. East Jefferson Coalition v. Jefferson Parish, 691 F.Supp. 991, 1007 (E.D. La.1988).313 363. Similarly, this Court rejects the City's argument that the Intervenor has the burden to prove th......
-
Aldasoro v. Kennerson, Civ. No. 91-1410-B (LSP).
...(which plaintiffs' experts admit was true). Numerous courts have disregarded such elections. East Jefferson Coalition v. Jefferson Parish, 691 F.Supp. 991, 1000-1001 (E.D.La.1988), aff'd, 926 F.2d 487, 492, 493 (5th Cir.1991); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir.1988), c......
-
LULAC v. North East Indep. School Dist.
...from the proposed district rejected by the district court in East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development v. Parish of Jefferson, 691 F.Supp. 991 (E.D.La.1998), aff'd 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.1991). There the proposed district crossed the Mississippi River, a major natural boundary,......