East Tennessee Land Co. v. Leeson

• Citation: 185 Mass. 4,69 N.E. 351
• Parties: EAST TENNESSEE LAND CO. v. LEESON. SAME v. HOPEWELL.
• Decision Date: 07 January 1904
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

185 Mass. 4

69 N.E. 351

EAST TENNESSEE LAND CO.

v.LEESON.

SAME

v.HOPEWELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 7, 1904.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Jas. R. Dunbar, Judge.

Consolidated suits by the East Tennessee Land Company against Joseph R. Leeson and John Hopewell, Jr. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

This suit was originally instituted by one Hayward, as receiver of the East Tennessee Land Company, an insolvent foreign corporation, against these defendants, as promoters of the corporation; and in that action (176 Mass. 310, 57 N. E. 656,49 L. R. A. 725) it was found that the promoters, subsequent to the creation of the corporation, and while they were the sole stockholders, voted to issue its corporate stock to themselves in payment for services rendered in securing options on land which they assigned to the corporation. The stock so issued equaled the estimated profits to be derived from such options. Thereafter the promoters invited the public to subscribe to the stock, without disclosing the facts to the subscribers, or obtaining their consent to the payment of such remuneration, and it was there held that the promoters were guilty of fraud, and that an action could be maintained against them without returning the lands acquired under the options. It was also held that the receiver of such foreign corporation could not maintain the actions, but that there must be a substitution of the corporation as the nominal party plaintiff, and that the plaintiff might elect to sue either for the recovery of the stock, or for damages for the loss thereof. The corporation was so substituted, though the receiver continued in the active control and prosecution of the proceedings, and plaintiff elected to proceed for damages. Subsequently the receiver, as such, filed a petition in intervention, reciting that, under the orders of the United States Circuit Court directing the institution and prosecution of these suits, the petitioner had been charged with the entire burden of expense thereof, and praying that it be ordered that any recovery had as against the defendant should inure to the benefit of the petitioner as receiver, and that he alone should be entitled to collect the same.

See 66 N. E. 427.

I. R. Clark, for appellants.

W. H. Russell, W. B. Winslow, L. G. Farmer, and G. W. Easley, for appellee.

LORING, J.

This is a frivolous appeal.

1. By Rev. Laws, c. 177, § 8, a judgment bears interest from its date, although the amount of the judgment in part is made up of interest. The same rule applies to a decree in equity.

[185 Mass. 5]2. The filing of the intervening petition by the receiver did not prevent the entry of a final decree. By taking a final decree in these suits, the receiver, who is prosecuting them in the name of the East Tennessee Land Company, abandoned his intervening petition. He had a right to do so. The cases cited by the appellant as to when a case is ripe for judgment under a rule of court...