Eastburn v. State
| Decision Date | 25 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 92927.,SC 92927. |
| Parties | Sheena EASTBURN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
400 S.W.3d 770
Sheena EASTBURN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
No. SC 92927.
Supreme Court of Missouri,
En Banc.
June 25, 2013.
[400 S.W.3d 772]
Kent E. Gipson, Law Office of Kent Gipson LLC, Kansas City, C.R. Rhoades, a sole practitioner, Neosho, for Eastburn.
Shaun J. Mackelprang, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, Jonathan G. Pierce, McDonald County Prosecuting Attorney, Pineville, for The State.
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge.
Sheena Eastburn (hereinafter, “Movant”) was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, section 565.202, RSMo Supp.1992. The trial court adopted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Movant 1 to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole.
Movant appealed her conviction and sentence. While her direct appeal was pending, Movant filed a motion for post-conviction relief.2 The motion court denied Movant's post-conviction motion after an
[400 S.W.3d 773]
evidentiary hearing. In the consolidated appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Movant's conviction and denied her post-conviction relief. State v. Eastburn, 950 S.W.2d 595 (Mo.App. S.D.1997).
In September 2010, approximately thirteen years later, Movant filed a motion to re-open her post-conviction proceedings. Movant claimed that she had been abandoned by her appointed counsel and her conviction should be vacated to correct a manifest injustice. Movant presented two allegations in her motion: (1) her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony of mental health professionals, and (2) her conviction and sentence are barred by the United States Constitution and international law.
The docket sheets note that, on March 1, 2011, “by agreement of the parties, [M]ovant's motion to reopen [ sic ] her previous 29.15 proceeding is granted.” On September 2, 2011, the State filed a motion to dismiss. The motion court held a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss.
At the hearing, Movant and the State debated the terms of their “agreement to reopen.” The State argued it only agreed to re-open Movant's post-conviction case to determine whether she had been abandoned by post-conviction counsel. Movant stated she was not prepared to proceed on the issue of abandonment, but rather, she was prepared to proceed on the merits of the claims in her motion. Movant further argued she believed the State had conceded abandonment by post-conviction counsel, and hence, there was no need to present testimony about that issue. Out of an abundance of caution, the motion court decided it would hold an evidentiary hearing on Movant's motion and then determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Movant noted the United States Supreme Court granted two petitions for writs of certiorari to determine the constitutional validly of sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without parole. Accordingly, the parties agreed to keep this case open until the disposition of those cases.
On October 5, 2012, the motion court entered its final judgment. The motion court found the agreement to “re-open” was a misnomer; in reality, it found this was an attempt to file a successive Rule 29.15 motion. The motion court denied Movant relief, emphasizing this was a “successive motion,” which is prohibited by Rule 29.15(1). Movant appeals.
Appellate review of a motion court's decision to allow a motion to file a postconviction motion out of time is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Gehrke v. State, 280 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Mo. banc 2009); Nicholson v. State, 151...
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...Court declines to do so. 5. Mr. Vogl titled his pleading a “Motion to Reopen Postconviction Proceeding and Request for Hearing.” In Eastburn v. State, this Court held that the proper terminology for a motion claiming abandonment of post-conviction counsel is a motion for post-conviction rel......
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...(appointed or retained), Reuscher v. State, 887 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Mo. banc 1994), and such claims are “categorically unreviewable.” Eastburn, 400 S.W.3d at 774;State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 929 (Mo. banc 1992) (same); Lingar v. State, 766 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Mo. banc 1989) (same). With two su......
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