Eastep v. Newman
| Decision Date | 22 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:12-cv-102 (WLS) |
| Parties | THOMAS EASTEP, Plaintiff, v. JAMES EARL NEWMAN et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (Doc. 23.) For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is DENIED.
This is a personal injury case arising out of a railroad-crossing collision in Cordele, Georgia. Plaintiff Thomas Eastep, a former train conductor, claims Defendant James Earl Newman, a truck driver, negligently failed to yield to Eastep's train at a crossing. Eastep alleges the ensuing collision injured him. Defendant Schwend owned Newman's truck and Defendant State National Insurance Company insured it.
The instant dispute involves the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants claim the Court lacks jurisdiction for two reasons. First, they argue the complaint failed to allege the Parties' citizenship and the amount in controversy. Accordingly, per Defendants, the Court lacks jurisdiction from the face of the complaint. Second, as a factual matter, Eastep and Schwend are citizens of Florida. Because Defendants assert the Parties are not completely diverse, they argue the Court must dismiss the lawsuit.
Eastep responded in two ways. On March 25, 2013, with the Court's leave, Eastep filed an amended complaint that sought to clarify diversity jurisdiction. (Doc.33.) The amended complaint alleges Eastep is a domiciled in Georgia, State National Insurance in Texas, and Newman and Schwend in Florida. (Id.) Eastep also filed a response to the factual arguments in Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Doc. 34.) He submits that, although he traveled often to Florida around the time of the incident, he and his wife rented and furnished a home in Fitzgerald, Georgia; paid utilities and Georgia taxes; attended church in Georgia; and changed his union membership to a Georgia.
As a matter of procedure, courts ordinarily assess subject matter jurisdiction on motions to dismiss. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, --- F.3d ---, No. 11-15448, 2013 WL 1285868, at *12 n.2 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2013). The Parties have followed that procedure and each has had opportunity to submit evidence in support of their arguments. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (). In summary, the evidence shows that in 2009, Eastep moved from Jacksonville, Florida, to Fitzgerald, Georgia, at the request of his employer, CSX. (Doc. 23-2 at 12, 40-41.) Prior to his transfer, Eastep lived in a Florida townhouse with his wife. (Id. at 15-16.) Before that, he lived in a four-bedroom house with his parents in Orange Park, Florida. (Id. at 13.)
Eastep claims he intends to remain in Fitzgerald. (Doc. 34-2 ¶¶ 19—20.) At the time he filed the complaint, Eastep rented a house in Fitzgerald with his wife. (Id. ¶ 8.) During the incident, he was a member of the Fitzgerald, Georgia branch of his union. (Id. ¶ 4.) He opened a checking account with Colony Bank. (Id. ¶ 14.) To Eastep's knowledge, Colony Bank primarily operates in middle and south Georgia; they do not have branches in Florida. (Id.) Additionally, Eastep pays his utilities in Georgia and listed his Georgia address on his 2009 and 2010 tax returns. (Doc. 34-2 ¶ 16; Doc. 34-2,Exs. B, C.) He notes he does not own property in Florida. (Doc. 34-2 ¶ 5.) When he moved in 2009, he could not pay the mortgage on his townhouse, and the bank foreclosed on it. (Doc. 34-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 34-3.) Additionally, although he visits Florida often and stashes some belongings in his parents' garage, he does not have a permanent place to stay there. (Doc. 34-1 ¶¶ 14, 17; Doc. 34-2 ¶¶ 12, 13, 17.) During his visits, he packs a bag of clothing and sleeps in his father's bed or, when his sister is away, in hers. (Doc. 34-1 ¶ 14.)
Eastep has also offered an affidavit from his father, Kenneth Eastep. (Doc. 34-11.) His father claims his son neither lives in Florida nor has a permanent place to stay there. He visits often, as do all of Kenneth Eastep's children. Since the incident, Kenneth Eastep has offered to let his son move back in, but, in reality, the family does not have space for him. (Id. ¶ 15.) All of the bedrooms in the Eastep home are occupied by other family members. (Id. ¶ 16.)
At the same time, Eastep has kept ties to Florida. He drives back and forth. (Doc. 23-2 at 27.) Since 2009, he has had a Florida driver's license and had it renewed in Florida. (Id. at 26.) Additionally, Eastep bought a car in Florida and transferred the Florida registration to himself. (Id. at 25-26.) His two primary doctors are in Florida, requiring him to drive hours for frequent medical visits. (Id. at 128-30.) He claims he does not visit doctors in Fitzgerald because there are simply not many doctors in the area to choose from and he believes he would get better medical care in Jacksonville. (Id. at 128-29.) At least once, he visited a doctor in Thomasville, Georgia, because he "just was going to try to see a doctor closer to home," but he ended those visits. (Id. at 114.) He also briefly visited a physical therapist in Georgia. (Id. at 113.)
There is no dispute that federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000). A federal district court may hear cases only for which there has been a constitutional and a congressional grant of jurisdiction. Id. at 1261. Congress has granted federal district courts jurisdiction to hear cases between "citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A court may exercise diversity jurisdiction when (a) all of the plaintiffs are citizens of states different from the states where the defendants are citizens and (b) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. "The party invoking the court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting the existence of federal jurisdiction." McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002). The Parties must be diverse at the time the plaintiff files the lawsuit. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) (per curiam).
After a thorough review of the record and briefings, the Court finds that (1) Eastep's First Amended Complaint mooted Defendants' facial attack to the Court's jurisdiction and (2) Eastep was a Georgia citizen at the time he filed the lawsuit. The Court therefore denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Defendants moved to dismiss Eastep's complaint because he failed to allege all of the Parties citizenship and the amount in controversy. Generally speaking, an amended complaint supersedes its predecessor and moots any attacks to the first complaint. See Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir. 2007); Light for Life, Inc. v. Our Firm Found. for Koreans, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-38 (CAR), 2012 WL 4397421, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2012). Eastep, with the Court's leave, filed an amended complaint that superseded his first complaint. (Doc. 33.) Accordingly,Defendants' arguments regarding the facial sufficiency of Eastep's jurisdictional allegations are DENIED without prejudice as moot.
Defendants argue Eastep is a Florida citizen because he did not evince intent to remain in Georgia indefinitely. In support of this argument, Defendants argue Eastep (11) did not relocate to Georgia voluntarily, but because of work; (2) that he gets medical care in Florida; (3) he drives back and forth between the states; and (4) he retained a Florida driver's license and registered a car in Florida. Viewed against other evidence, however, the Court finds Eastep has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, he was a Georgia citizen at the relevant times.
For diversity jurisdiction, citizenship is the same as domicile. Postell v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., No. 12-14088, 2013 WL 1010292, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 15, 2013). A person is domiciled in the place he resides and intends to remain. McCormick, 239 F.3d at 1257. Stated another way, "domicile 'is the place of [a person's] true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent therefrom.'" D.R. ex rel. Igles v. Grant, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1344 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (quoting McCormick, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 1344). Natural persons, such as Eastep, have one domicile. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011).
Determining a party's intent requires courts to examine the totality of the circumstances. Slate v. Shell Oil Co., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (S.D. Ala. 2006). Both objective factors and subjective statements are relevant. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. WCDM Dev., LP, No. 5:11-cv-122 (MTT), 2012 WL 928696, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2012). Objective factors include, among other things, "payment of taxes, procurement of driver's license, exercise of voting rights, moving of personal belongings, ownership orrental of property, location of family, [and] place of employment." Duff v. Beaty, 804 F. Supp. 332, 335 (N.D. Ga. 1992). A party's subjective statements are often given less weight, particularly when they conflict with objective evidence. Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A., 633 F.3d at 1342; Duff, 804 F. Supp. at 335.
The requisite intent requires the plaintiff to show he intended to stay in his new residence for an indefinite period of time. McCormick, 293 F.3d at 1257-58. But this does not mean he must intend to remain there forever or permanently. Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972). It simply means the person has a fixed, present intent to stay for an indefinite period. S...
To continue reading
Request your trial