D.R. v. Grant

• Citation: 770 F.Supp.2d 1337
• Decision Date: 21 March 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:10–CV–24 (WLS).
• Parties: D.R., et al., minor children of Korynda K. Reed, deceased, by and through Jollie Mae IGLES, their Personal Representative, and Jollie Mae Igles, as Administrator of the Estate of Korynda Reed, Plaintiffs,v.Charles G. GRANT and Laquient MacKlin, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

770 F.Supp.2d 1337

D.R., et al., minor children of Korynda K. Reed, deceased, by and through Jollie Mae IGLES, their Personal Representative, and Jollie Mae Igles, as Administrator of the Estate of Korynda Reed, Plaintiffs,

v.Charles G. GRANT and Laquient MacKlin, Defendants.

Case No. 1:10–CV–24 (WLS).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Albany Division.

March 21, 2011.

Charles A. Mathis, Jr., John D. Steel, Atlanta, GA, Chevene Bowers King, Jr., Albany, GA, for Plaintiffs.Edward Donald Tolley, Athens, GA, Robert Patrick White, Casey Gilson P.C., Atlanta, GA, William Sims Stone, Blakely, GA, for Defendants.SANDS, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Hear and Determine Their First Defense—Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (Doc. 21). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Hear and Determine Their First Defense—Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. 21) is GRANTED, and the above-captioned case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ¹

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The events underlying the above-captioned action occurred in the early morning hours of February 3, 2008, when a stray bullet fatally struck the head of Ms. Korynda K. Reed while street fights raged outside Pokey's bar on Church Street in Blakely, Early County, Georgia. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 23–41). The street fights are alleged to have been instigated by Defendant CHARLES G. GRANT, who at the time was a professional football player for the New Orleans Saints of the National Football League. ( Id. at ¶¶ 14, 28, 32). The bullet that took Ms. Reed's life is alleged to have been fired indiscriminately into the crowd of approximately 200 Pokey's patrons surrounding the affray by either Defendant Grant or Defendant LAQUIENT MACKLIN, a bodyguard of Defendant Grant's. ( Id. at ¶¶ 15–16, 36–37, 54–56). The .45 caliber weapon that law enforcement ballistics tests later confirmed had fired the fatal bullet was purchased by and registered to Defendant Grant. ( Id. at ¶ 55–56). Ms. Reed, who was unmarried, was twenty-two (22) weeks pregnant at the time of her death, and left behind three (3) surviving minor children who are Plaintiffs to this action. ( Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6, 38). Ms. Reed's mother, Plaintiff Jollie Mae Igles, was appointed Administrator of the Estate of Korynda K. Reed by the Probate Court of Early County, Georgia, and guardian and personal representative of the minor children—her grandchildren—by the same court. ( Id. at ¶¶ 7–8).

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for civil damages in this Court on February 3, 2010. (Doc. 1). The Complaint states two Georgia state-law claims against Defendants: (i) a wrongful death claim brought by Plaintiff Igles as next friend of the decedent's minor children, who are named as Plaintiffs, see O.C.G.A. § 51–4–2, and (ii) a claim for pain and suffering and expenses brought by Plaintiff Igles as legal representative of the decedent's estate, see O.C.G.A. § 51–4–5(b). (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 86–87). The Complaint asserts that diversity of citizenship exists because all of the Plaintiffs are domiciled in Alabama while Defendants Grant and MacKlin are domiciled in, respectively, Louisiana and Georgia. ( Id. at ¶¶ 1–3, 10, 13). Defendants have denied liability in their Answer. ( See generally Doc. 10).

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) does not request that the Court evaluate the substantive merits of Plaintiffs' claims, but rather challenges whether this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the matters presented in the Complaint. The Motion to Dismiss argues that the Complaint is legally incorrect in stating that complete diversity of citizenship exists in this case. ( See Doc. 1 at ¶ 13). Specifically, the Motion to Dismiss agrees that Defendant MacKlin was legally domiciled in Georgia at the time of the filing of the Complaint ( see id. at ¶ 3), but argues that Defendant Grant was legally domiciled in Georgia, not Louisiana, at such time ( see id. at ¶ 2); the minor Plaintiffs were legally domiciled in Georgia, not Alabama ( see id. at ¶ 10); and Plaintiff Igles in her capacity as the decedent's administrator was legally domiciled in Georgia, not Alabama ( see id. at ¶ 1). The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) argues that because Plaintiffs and Defendants are all citizens of the state of Georgia, diversity of citizenship is lacking and, accordingly, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the purely state-law civil claims raised in the Complaint.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) and Brief in Support thereto (Doc. 22) was filed on July 16, 2010. Plaintiffs' Response (Doc. 26) in opposition was filed on August 23, 2010, and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 27) on September 9, 2010. Upon review of the briefs, attachments thereto, and authorities cited therein, and having conducted its own relevant research, the Court found that additional limited briefing would aid the Court in deciding the Motion to Dismiss, and on January 7, 2011 entered an Order for subsequent briefing regarding the impact of O.C.G.A. § 29–2–22 generally, and O.C.G.A. § 29–2–22(b)(1) and (3) particularly, upon the law and facts of the above-captioned matter. (Doc. 28). Defendants filed their Supplemental Brief (erroneously entitled “Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief”) on January 12, 2011 (Doc. 29), and Plaintiffs entered their Supplemental Brief on January 14, 2011 (Doc. 30).

The Court, finding that Defendants had waged a “factual attack” ² on the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over the above-captioned matter and consistent with Eleventh Circuit instructions that “[i]n a factual challenge, ‘the district court must give the plaintiff an opportunity for discovery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the motion to dismiss,’ ” In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir.2009), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 414 (5th Cir.1981) ³), held an evidentiary hearing on March 4, 2011. (Doc. 31). At the hearing, all Parties had the opportunity to present evidence and make arguments regarding the domicile and diversity issues raised in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21), being fully briefed and heard, is now ripe for ruling.

DISCUSSION

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the state-law claims raised in the Complaint due to a lack of diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs, who Defendants allege are Georgia domiciles, and Defendant MacKlin, who indisputably is a Georgia citizen.⁴ Plaintiffs claim that they are Alabama citizens, and thus that diversity of citizenship exists. Upon review of the law and the facts, the Court agrees that diversity does not exist as to any of the claims, and therefore that the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter. This action must be dismissed from this Court.

I. RULE 12(b)(1) STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to assert by motion the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(h)(3) requires the Court to dismiss an action if the Court finds that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) & 12(h)(3). This Court is mindful that “it is extremely difficult to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.'s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Simanonok v. Simanonok, 787 F.2d 1517, 1519 (11th Cir.1986)).

“A defendant can move to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by either facial or factual attack.” Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir.2008). “A ‘facial attack’ on the complaint ‘require[s] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.’ ” McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta–Richmond County, 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990)). “Factual attacks,” on the other hand, serve to “challenge ‘the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are considered.’ ” Id. In a factual attack, the Eleventh Circuit states that a “[p]laintiff must be given an opportunity to develop facts sufficient to support a determination on the issue of jurisdiction.” Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir.1982); see In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir.2009), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010) (“In a factual challenge, ‘the district court must give the plaintiff an opportunity for discovery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the motion to dismiss.’ ”); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 414 (5th Cir.1981) (instructing that in a factual challenge the district court “must give the plaintiff an opportunity for discovery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the motion to dismiss,” and further stating that “[i]nsofar as the defendant's motion to dismiss raises factual issues, the plaintiff should have an opportunity to develop and argue the facts in a manner that is adequate in the context of the disputed issues and evidence”). This Court has provided such an opportunity to Plaintiffs through the additional briefing ordered by the Court (Doc. 28; see Doc. 30 (Pls.' Supplemental Br.)), and the evidentiary hearing held before the Court on March 4, 2011. When, as the Court does infra, “the district court bases its decision on its own resolution of disputed facts it may be required, at the very least, to identify and...