Eastern Associated Coal v. United Mine Workers

• Decision Date: 30 September 1998
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 297-0819.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORP., Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, District 17, and Local Union No. 1503, Defendants.

Page 796

66 F.Supp.2d 796

EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORP., Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, District 17, and Local Union No. 1503, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 297-0819.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston Division.

September 30, 1998.

Forrest H. Roles, Heenan, Althen & Roles, Charleston, WV, Donna C. Kelly, Heenan, Althen & Roles, Charleston, WV, for plaintiff.

Kevin F. Fagan, District 17, UMWA, Charleston, WV, Charles F. Donnelly, Donnelly Carbone & Kettler, Charleston, WV, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

COPENHAVER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by the parties pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Plaintiff seeks vacation of an arbitration award. Defendants oppose vacation of the award and seek to have the award confirmed and enforced by the court.

I. Background

The following facts are not disputed by the parties. Plaintiff Eastern Associated Coal Corporation ("Eastern") and defendants United Mine Workers of America, District 17, and United Mine Workers of America Local Union 1503 (collectively, "UMWA"), are parties to a collective bargaining agreement known as the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1993 (the "Wage Agreement"). Article IA, Section (d) of the Wage Agreement reserves to Eastern the exclusive right to hire and discharge employees. (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Attachment 1). The right of Eastern to discharge employees is limited, however, by Article XXIV, Section (a) of the Wage Agreement, which provides that "[n]o employee covered by this Agreement may be disciplined or discharged except for just cause." (Id.). Article XXIV, Section (d)(3) of the Wage Agreement applies to those situations where an employee grieves a discharge and the case proceeds to arbitration. Under such circumstances, Section (d)(3) mandates that:

If the arbitrator determines that the Employer has failed to establish just cause for the Employee's discharge, the Employee shall be immediately reinstated to his job. If the arbitrator determines that there was just cause for the discharge, the discharge shall become effective upon the date of the arbitrator's decision.

(Id.).

Eastern employs a road crew charged with maintaining its mine haulage roads. Members of the road crew hold positions with the company known as Mobile Equipment Operators ("MEO"). Included within the duties performed by MEOs is the operation of equipment having gross vehicle weights ranging from 32,000 to 55,000 pounds on public roads and highways. Operators of such equipment are required to have a commercial driver's license ("CDL") and are subject to certain sections of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Transportation (the "DOT Regulations").¹ Eastern implemented a random drug testing policy for its MEO staff in accordance with the DOT Regulations.

In early 1996, James Smith, a drilling operator with Eastern, posted for a vacant MEO position and was eventually hired. In conjunction with his new position, Mr. Smith was required to have a CDL in order to carry out the duties of the job. Pursuant to the DOT Regulations, Mr. Smith was subjected to a random drug test on March 25, 1996. He tested positive for the presence of cannabinoids.² In accordance with Article XXIV of the Wage Agreement, Eastern initially suspended Mr. Smith with the intent to discharge and then discharged him. Mr. Smith filed a grievance challenging his discharge and the case proceeded to arbitration.

Arbitrator Jerome H. Ross heard the case and issued an award on April 18, 1996, returning Mr. Smith to work after a 30-day suspension without back pay and requiring Mr. Smith to participate in a substance abuse program. In addition, the arbitrator's award required Mr. Smith to submit to random drug testing at the discretion of either Eastern or some other approved substance abuse professional for a period of five years.

Mr. Smith was randomly tested again on April 24, 1996, October 11, 1996, and January 27, 1997; each time he tested negative for illegal drug use. On June 27, 1997, Mr. Smith was randomly tested at which time he tested positive for cannabinoids.³ Eastern again suspended Mr. Smith with intent to discharge and subsequently discharged him. Mr. Smith grieved his discharge and the case proceeded to arbitration in front of Arbitrator Jerome T. Barrett.

The issues before Arbitrator Barrett were framed as follows: (1) "Was the suspension with intent to discharge of grievant James Smith on July 14, 1997 for just cause?" and (2) "And if not, what is the appropriate remedy?" (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Attachment A at p. 2).

Arbitrator Barrett identified the pertinent portions of the Wage Agreement as follows: (1) Article 1A, Section (d) which reserves to Eastern the exclusive right to hire and discharge its working force; (2) Article III, Section (a) which grants all employees the right to a safe and healthful work environment; (3) Article III, Section (g) which requires Eastern employees to comply with reasonable rules and regulations of Eastern so long as such rules or regulations do not conflict with state and federal laws; and (4) Article XXIV, Sections (a) through (d) regarding Eastern's discharge, grievance and arbitration procedures. (Id. at pp. 2-3).

Eastern argued at the arbitration hearing that it had just cause to discharge Mr. Smith as a result of his testing positive for drug use on two separate occasions during a sixteen month period in which time he was employed as a heavy equipment operator. (Id. at pp. 3-4). Eastern argued that the DOT Regulations and its own internal drug policy were implemented to curb drug use by employees occupying safety sensitive positions. (Id. at p. 3). According to the company, Mr. Smith's drug use jeopardized the safety of other Eastern employees as well as the public at large and made his discharge just under the circumstances. (Id. at p. 4). The company further argued that it was proper to discharge Mr. Smith in order to send a clear message to all Eastern employees of the company's serious stance against employee drug use. (Id.).

The UMWA countered by citing to Mr. Smith's employment record, noting that the two failed drug tests were the only bad marks on an otherwise exemplary 17-year employment history with Eastern. (Id.). The UMWA argued that discharge was too severe a penalty given Mr. Smith's long-term service with Eastern. (Id.). Moreover, the union argued that neither Eastern's drug policy nor the DOT Regulations required mandatory discharge of an employee under these circumstances.⁴ (Id.).

After summarizing the testimony adduced at a hearing held on July 28, 1997, and the positions of the parties, Arbitrator Barrett found that:

It is understandable why the company wants to put an end to the matter by discharging grievant. The liability the company faces when an employee assigned to operate company equipment on public roads is found with drugs in his urine is very real. As is the cost of a second arbitration for the same employee on the same issue within a sixteen month period.

Having been an otherwise solid employee for a significant period of time is certainly in grievant's favor. However, grievant got full credit for his good record in the earlier arbitration. Also to his credit in the earlier case, he was found to be a recreational user of illegal drugs and not an addicted user. Being rescued by an arbitrator from losing his job in 1996 and having to face an invasive program of rehabilitation would seem to have provided unambiguous notice of the need to correct his behavior. It should have been interpreted as a clear message that drug use and secure employment do not mix.

* * * * * *

Grievant made a very personal appeal under oath to the arbitrator concerning a personal/family problem which caused this one time lapse in drug usage. The arbitrator found this testimony creditable [sic]. If the arbitrator was misled by the grievant, the arbitrator is confident that the grievant will make another misstep with drug use and be caught. The remedy provided here will assure that the company and union will not be required to use arbitration again for this grievant where drugs are involved.

(Id. at pp. 4-5).

Arbitrator Barrett issued an award suspending Mr. Smith until October 20, 1997, and then reinstating him, subject to the following conditions:

1. No back pay for any loss during this suspension.

2. The award by Arbitrator Ross in CAS No. 93-17-96-472 is reinstated.

3. Grievant will reimburse the company and the union for the arbitrators' bills in both the Ross case and the instant case.

4. Grievant will provide the union and company with a signed, undated letter of resignation which the company may date and accept if grievant tests positive for any illegal drug in the next five years.

5. During the grievant's suspension period, grievant's name shall remain in the company's random drug testing program. if grievant fails to take a required test during his suspension, the company can date and accept his resignation letter.

6. The company and union may agree that unusual or unforeseen circumstances justify waiving any conditions set forth above.

(Id. at p. 6).

In its motion for summary judgment, Eastern seeks vacation of the award on the grounds that the award is contrary to public policy and that it fails to draw its essence from the Wage Agreement. In addition, Eastern contends that Arbitrator Barrett exceeded the authority granted to him pursuant to the Wage Agreement by failing to address the issue of whether Eastern had just cause to discharge Mr. Smith. The UMWA contends in its summary judgment motion that the award did not contravene any well defined and dominant public policy and was based upon the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract so as to draw...