Eastern Assoc. Coal v. United Mine Workers

• Decision Date: 28 November 2000
• Docket Number: 991038
• Parties: EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT 17, et al.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

531 U.S. 57

121 S.Ct. 462

148 L.Ed.2d 354

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press

EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER v UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT 17, et al.

No. 99-1038

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Argued October 2, 2000

November 28, 2000

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Syllabus

The arbitration provisions in petitioner Eastern Associated Coal Corp.'s collective-bargaining agreement with respondent union specify, inter alia, that Eastern must prove in binding arbitration that it has "just cause" to discharge an employee, or else the arbitrator will order the employee reinstated. James Smith worked for Eastern as a truck driver subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring random drug testing of workers engaged in "safety-sensitive" tasks. After each of two occasions on which Smith tested positive for marijuana, Eastern sought to discharge him. Each time, the union went to arbitration, and the arbitrator concluded that the drug use did not amount to "just cause" and ordered Smith's reinstatement on certain conditions. On the second occasion, Eastern filed suit to vacate the arbitrator's award. The District Court ordered the award's enforcement, holding that Smith's conditional reinstatement did not violate the strong regulation-based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Held: Public policy considerations do not require courts to refuse to enforce an arbitration award ordering an employer to reinstate an employee truck driver who twice tested positive for marijuana. Pp. 3 9.

(a) The Court assumes that the collective-bargaining agreement itself calls for Smith's reinstatement, as the parties have granted the arbitrator authority to interpret the meaning of their contract's language, including such words as "just cause," see Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, and Eastern does not claim here that the arbitrator acted outside the scope of his contractually delegated authority, see, e.g., Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38. Since the award is not distinguishable from the contractual agreement, the Court must decide whether a contractual reinstatement requirement would fall within the legal exception that makes unenforceable "a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy." W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766. Any such policy must be "explicit," "well defined," and "dominant," and it must be "ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents, not from general considerations of supposed public interests." Ibid. The question is not whether Smith's drug use itself violates public policy, but whether the agreement to reinstate him does so. Pp. 3 5.

(b) A contractual agreement to reinstate Smith with specified conditions does not run contrary to public policy. The District Court correctly articulated the standard set out in W. R. Grace and Misco and applied that standard to reach the right result. The public policy exception is narrow and must satisfy the principles set forth in those cases. Moreover, where two political branches have created a detailed regulatory regime in a specific field, courts should approach with particular caution pleas to divine further public policy in that area. Eastern asserts that a public policy against reinstatement of workers who use drugs can be discerned from an examination of the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 and DOT's implementing regulations. However, these expressions of positive law embody not just policies against drug use by employees in safety-sensitive transportation positions and in favor of drug testing, but also include a Testing Act policy favoring rehabilitation of employees who use drugs. And the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions must be read in light of background labor law policy that favors determination of disciplinary questions through arbitration when chosen as a result of labor-management negotiation. See, e.g., California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608. The award here is not contrary to these several policies, taken together, as it does not condone Smith's conduct or ignore the risk to public safety that drug use by truck drivers may pose, but punishes Smith by placing conditions on his reinstatement. It violates no specific provision of any law or regulation, but is consistent with DOT rules requiring completion of substance-abuse treatment before returning to work and with the Act's driving license suspension requirements and its rehabilitative concerns. Moreover, the fact that Smith is a recidivist is not sufficient to tip the balance in Eastern's favor. Eastern's argument that DOT's withdrawal of a proposed "recidivist" rule leaves open the possibility that discharge is the appropriate penalty for repeat offenders fails because DOT based the withdrawal, not upon a determination that a more severe penalty was needed, but upon a determination to leave in place other remedies. The Court cannot find in the Act, the regulations, or any other law or legal precedent an explicit, well defined, dominant public policy to which the arbitrator's decision runs contrary. Pp. 5 9.188 F.3d 501, affirmed.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.

A labor arbitrator ordered an employer to reinstate an employee truck driver who had twice tested positive for marijuana. The question before us is whether considerations of public policy require courts to refuse to enforce that arbitration award. We conclude that they do not. The courts may enforce the award. And the employer must reinstate, rather than discharge, the employee.

I

Petitioner, Eastern Associated Coal Corp., and respondent, United Mine Workers of America, are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement with arbitration provisions. The agreement specifies that, in arbitration, in order to discharge an employee, Eastern must prove it has "just cause." Otherwise the arbitrator will order the employee reinstated. The arbitrator's decision is final. App. 28 31.

James Smith worked for Eastern as a member of a road crew, a job that required him to drive heavy trucklike vehicles on public highways. As a truck driver, Smith was subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring random drug testing of workers engaged in "safety-sensitive" tasks. 49 CFR §§382.301, 382.305 (1999).

In March 1996, Smith tested positive for marijuana. Eastern sought to discharge Smith. The union went to arbitration, and the arbitrator concluded that Smith's positive drug test did not amount to "just cause" for discharge. Instead the arbitrator ordered Smith's reinstatement, provided that Smith (1) accept a suspension of 30 days without pay, (2) participate in a substance-abuse program, and (3) undergo drug tests at the discretion of Eastern (or an approved substance-abuse professional) for the next five years.

Between April 1996 and January 1997, Smith passed four random drug tests. But in July 1997 he again tested positive for marijuana. Eastern again sought to discharge Smith. The union again went to arbitration, and the arbitrator again concluded that Smith's use of marijuana did not amount to "just cause" for discharge, in light of two mitigating circumstances. First, Smith had been a good employee for 17 years. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a 27a. And, second, Smith had made a credible and "very personal appeal under oath . . . concerning a personal/family problem which caused this one time lapse in drug usage." Id., at 28a.

The arbitrator ordered Smith's reinstatement provided that Smith (1) accept a new suspension without pay, this time for slightly more than three months; (2) reimburse Eastern and the union for the costs of both arbitration proceedings; (3) continue to participate in a substance- abuse program; (4) continue to undergo random drug testing; and (5) provide Eastern with a signed, undated letter of resignation, to take effect if Smith again tested positive within the next five years. Id., at 29a.

Eastern brought suit in federal court seeking to have the arbitrator's award vacated, arguing that the award contravened a public policy against the operation of dangerous machinery by workers who test positive for drugs. 66 F. Supp. 2d 796 (SDWV 1998). The District Court, while recognizing a strong regulation-based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions, held that Smith's conditional reinstatement did not violate that policy. Id., at 804 805. And it ordered the award's enforcement. Id., at 805.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the reasoning of the District Court. 188 F.3d 501, 1999 WL 635632 (1999) (unpublished). We granted certiorari in light of disagreement among the Circuits. Compare id., at **1 (holding that public policy does not prohibit "reinstatement of employees who have used illegal drugs in the past"), with, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 852 (CA1 1997) (holding that public policy prohibits enforcement of a similar arbitration award). We now affirm the Fourth Circuit's determination.

II

Eastern claims that considerations of public policy make the arbitration award unenforceable. In considering this...