Eastern Massachusetts St. Ry. Co. v. Mayor of Fall River
| Decision Date | 29 January 1941 |
| Citation | 308 Mass. 232,31 N.E.2d 543 |
| Parties | EASTERN MASSACHUSETTS STREET RAILWAY COMPANY v. MAYOR OF FALL RIVER. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
December 4, 1940.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, QUA DOLAN, & RONAN, JJ.
School and School Committee. Municipal Corporations, Contracts, Officers and agents. Mandamus.
The school committee in a city having one of the standard forms of character set forth in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 43 is a "department" or a
"board" within the meaning of Section 29, in the form appearing in Section 10 of St. 1938, c. 378. By reason of Section 29 of G L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 43 in the form appearing in
St. 1938, c.
378, Section 10, a contract for the furnishing of transportation of school children, negotiated and awarded, under G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 40 Section 4, as amended by St. 1932, c. 271, Section 6, by the school committee of a city having a Plan A form of charter cannot become binding on the city without approval by the mayor; and such approval is not a mere perfunctory matter but requires the exercise of independent judgment.
Mandamus did not lie to compel the mayor of a city to approve a city contract which could not become valid without his approval and which in the exercise of his independent judgment, in good faith and for a reason neither arbitrary nor capricious, he had refused to approve.
PETITION, filed in the Superior Court on September 3, 1940, for a writ of mandamus.
The case was heard by Greenhalge, J., who ordered the issuance of the writ. The respondent alleged exceptions.
G. L. Sisson, Corporation Counsel, for the respondent.
A. E. Seagrave, (A.
E. Beaulieu with him,) for the petitioner.
This petition is brought to compel the mayor of Fall River to approve a contract involving more than $500 for the furnishing of transportation of school children for a period of three years. The school committee awarded the contract to the petitioner, which was not the lowest bidder, but when the contract was submitted to the mayor for his approval he notified the committee in writing of his refusal to approve stating, "I see no reason for not awarding this contract to the lowest bidder whereby a saving to the city of $3,000.00 could be effected." Thereafter the school committee voted to "reaffirm its action" and to award the contract to the petitioner. The mayor still refuses to approve.
Chapter 40 of the Tercentenary Edition of the General Laws, entitled "Powers and Duties of Cities and Towns," contains in Section 4 (), headed "Power to contract," this provision among others: Chapter 43, entitled "City Charters," in Section 29, as amended by St. 1938, c. 378, Section 10, provides: "All contracts made by any department, board or commission where the amount involved is five hundred dollars or more shall be in writing, and no such contract shall be deemed to have been made or executed until the approval of the mayor under Plan A, B, C or D, or of the city manager under Plan E, and also of the officer or of the head of the department or of the chairman of the board, as the case may be, making the contract is affixed thereto." Fall River has a "Plan A" charter under c. 43. Section 29 therefore applies to Fall River (see G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 43, Section 45) and supersedes "general and special laws relating thereto and inconsistent" with that section, c. 43, Section 11. See Gilliatt v. Quincy, 292 Mass. 222 , 223, 224. The mayor is a member of the school committee and is chairman of the committee, Section 31. He is also "the chief executive officer of the city." Section 48.
The school committee in a city having one of the standard forms of charter set forth in c. 43 is a "department" or a "board" within the meaning of c. 43, Section 29, so that under that section a contract of the kind here involved which has been negotiated and adopted by the committee cannot "be deemed to have been made or executed until the approval of the mayor . . . is affixed thereto." School committees are not bodies separate and distinct from the city governments provided for in c. 43. They are parts of those governments and are within the purview of c. 43. Chapter 43 itself, in Sections 31 to 36 inclusive, makes provision for the election, organization and powers of school committees in cities adopting any one of the standard charters. Section 33 provides that "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter . . . the school committee, in addition to the powers and duties conferred and imposed by law on school committees" (see G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 71, Sections 35 et seq.) may exercise certain specified additional powers. In Sections 52 and 54, relating to Plan A charters, the school committee is classed with departments and boards. See further School Committee of Cambridge v. Mayor & City Council of Cambridge, 233 Mass. 6; Trustees of Public Library of Boston v. Rector of Trinity Church, 263 Mass. 173 , 179. Section 29 requiring the mayor's approval refers to "any department, board or commission" of the city, without exception. The petitioner, by bringing this petition, in effect concedes, in so far as it can concede, that the contract in question requires the approval of the mayor.
But the petitioner argues that by c. 40, Section 4, hereinbefore first quoted, the power to make contracts for the furnishing of transportation of school children is so fully and unreservedly entrusted to the school committee that when the committee has negotiated a contract it is the absolute duty of the mayor to approve it, or at least that he has no power to withhold his approval on the only ground here stated by him, to wit: that the contract was not awarded to the lowest bidder. It is urged upon us that the broad powers of school committees and their historic position in the municipal governments of the Commonwealth as independent bodies in control of public education (see G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 71, Section 37; Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325; Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82; Russell v. Gannon, 281 Mass. 398) preclude any construction of c. 43, Section 29, which would leave the mayor free to exercise any judgment or discretion of his own and so would give to him something like a veto power over contracts made by the committee. We are not convinced that in respect to the contract here involved this argument should prevail against the natural meaning of the words of Section 29 as amended. Those words are: "no such contract shall be deemed to have been made or executed until the approval of the mayor . . . and also of the officer or of the head of the department or of the chairman of the board, as the case may be, making the contract is affixed thereto." This is scarcely the form of expression which would have been used if the intent had been to limit the mayor to the merely formal duty of signing his name to whatever might be placed before him. Although the initiative in the making of contracts in the sense of taking the necessary preliminary steps to define their terms is left to the department, board, or commission within whose jurisdiction the subject matter falls, the mayor as the chief executive officer of the city, and as therefore in a position to understand its needs as a whole, was entrusted with the general duty of examining and passing upon the advisability of entering into contracts proposed, not only by school committees, but by all the departments, boards and commissions of the city. Rollins v. Salem, 251 Mass. 468 , 471. No doubt it was expected that the mayor would give weight to the judgment of the officers and boards dealing with a subject in the first instance, but it was also intended that he should apply to the problem his own best judgment from his different viewpoint. No limitation is expressed as to the nature of the elements which the mayor may take into consideration in deciding whether or not to affix his approval, nor does any sound distinction occur to us by which he can be debarred from consideration of any reasonable grounds or arguments entertained in good faith and not in themselves merely arbitrary or capricious. In this case good faith of the mayor "is not in issue," and the reason given by him -- the saving of money by awarding the contract to the lowest bidder -- does not appear to have been unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
In McLean v Mayor of Holyoke, 216 Mass. 62 , where there was a charter provision that no contract like that there involved should be deemed to have been made or executed until the approval of the mayor should be affixed thereto, it was...
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