Eastern Scrap Services, Inc. v. Harty

• Decision Date: 29 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 75-50-M,75-50-M
• Citation: 115 R.I. 260,341 A.2d 718
• Parties: EASTERN SCRAP SERVICES, INC. v. William HARTY et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 718

341 A.2d 718

115 R.I. 260

EASTERN SCRAP SERVICES, INC. v. William HARTY et al.

No. 75-50-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 29, 1975.

Reargument Denied Sept. 11, 1975.

[115 R.I. 263] Michael F. Horan, Pawtucket, for petitioner.

William J. George, North Providence, Gerald J. Pouliot, Asst. City Sol., Pawtucket, for respondents.

OPINION

DORIS, Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the action of the City Council of Pawtucket in denying the petitioner's application for a second-hand shop license. We ordered the writ issued, and in compliance therewith, the pertinent records of the city council have been certified to this court.

The petitioner, a Rhode Island corporation and the lessee of a parcel of real estate located on York Avenue in the city of Pawtucket, obtained from the zoning officer of that city a Certificate of Zoning Compliance for the use of these premises for the purchase and selling of semiprecious metals. Thereafter, pursuant to chapter 21 of title 5 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, as amended by P.L.1965, ch. 138, § 1 and chapter 1117, as amended, of the Revised Ordinances of Pawtucket, the petitioner applied to the city council for a license to use his premises for the business of purchasing and selling semiprecious metals. When the application for the license was denied, petitioner filed this petition.

In our order granting the writ, we directed the parties to brief the question of whether G.L.1956 (1970 Reenactment) § 45-5-16 renders improvident the issuance of the writ of certiorari. We now consider that question.

The petitioner takes the position that § 45-5-16 merely establishes the time limitation within which an appeal which is specifically authorized elsewhere may be exercised, but that it does not confer any right of appeal. In support of his argument he directs our attention to the following line of cases: Order of St. Benedict v. Town Council of Portsmouth, 84 R.I. 503, 125 A.2d 150 (1956); Aldee Corp. v. Flynn, 72 R.I. 199, 49 A.2d 469 (1946); Walsh v. Town Council of Johnston, 18 R.I. 88, 25 A. 849 (1892). The petitioner therefore contends that certiorari is the only remedy available to obtain review of the decision denying his application for a license. Aldee Corp. v. Flynn, supra.

The respondents, while conceding that this court has ruled that certiorari is the proper vehicle by which to obtain review of quasi-judicial actions of a town council, point nevertheless to the rule that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the court is without power to construe the statute but must interpret it literally. Podborski v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co., 109 R.I. 1, 279 A.2d 941 (1971); United Transit Co. v. Hawksley, 86 R.I. 53, 133 A.2d 132 (1957). The respondents suggest, therefore, that we should interpret § 45-5-16 as providing an aggrieved party with a right of appeal to the Superior Court, and in so doing overrule Aldee Corp. v. Flynn, supra.

We are not persuaded by respondents' argument. This court has repeatedly held that long-standing acquiescence by the Legislature in a judicial determination of legislative intent warrants an assumption of legislative approval. Mercurio v. Fascitelli, 107 R.I. 511, 268 A.2d 427 (1970); Henry v. J. W. Eshelman & Sons, 99 R.I. 518, 209 A.2d 46 (1965); Colarusso v. Mills, 99 R.I. 409, 208 A.2d 381 (1965). In this instance, our construction of § 45-5-16 and its predecessors has survived over half a century without eliciting a sign of legislative disapproval.

After a reexamination of the cases in which § 45-5-16 has been interpreted, we find no reason to depart from the reasoning expressed therein. We therefore specifically affirm the holding in Aldee Corp. v. Flynn, supra, and conclude...