Huntley v. Department of Employment Sec.

• Decision Date: 16 February 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-55-M,77-55-M
• Citation: 121 R.I. 284,397 A.2d 902
• Parties: Shirley R. HUNTLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 902

397 A.2d 902

121 R.I. 284

Shirley R. HUNTLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.

No. 77-55-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 16, 1979.

[121 R.I. 296] David B. Green, Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., Providence, for petitioner.

Joseph R. DeCiantis, Legal Counsel, Bd. of Review, Providence, for respondent.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This is a petition for certiorari brought under the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-35-16, to review a judgment of the Superior Court affirming a decision by the Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security (the board). The board had previously upheld the decision of the referee and denied benefits to claimant.

The claimant, Mrs. Huntley, was employed for 7 years as an inspector on the second shift for a Providence manufacturing concern. She became ill on October 17, 1974, and stopped working. The claimant attempted to return to work on January 15, 1975, but there was no work. One week later, she was told by the employer that she could return to work on the first shift beginning at 7 a. m. The record indicates, however, that claimant informed the employer's personnel manager that she could not accept first-shift employment because she had four children aged 13 and under, including a 9-year-old son with muscular dystrophy who had to be walked to and from school.

The Director of the Department of Employment Security (the director) initially stated in her report that a person must be available for all hours normally worked in his or her occupation and determined that the claimant had voluntarily quit her employment without good cause. The director also determined that claimant had received benefit overpayments for the period of the week ending February 1, 1975 through the week ending March 1, 1975 and ordered restitution. In an amended decision the director found that claimant was unavailable for work because she was unable to work all shifts in a multi-shift industry. In addition, the director determined claimant had not informed the local office of the Department of Employment Security that work was available to her on January 22, 1975. Consequently, the director denied benefits for the week ending January 25, 1975 and indefinitely thereafter and again ordered restitution.

Claimant appealed from the amended decision, and on April 23, 1975 a hearing was held before a referee who concluded that claimant had restricted her availability to work to shifts other than the first shift and that this restriction caused her unemployment. Thus, the referee concluded that claimant did not meet the availability requirements of G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-44-12, and benefits were denied on that basis. This decision was appealed to the board which also conducted a hearing. Claimant's counsel represented at the hearing that claimant would be available for work beginning at 8 a. m., presumably on regular working days. This representation was not supported by any testimony, either before the referee or the board. The claimant did, however, state in specifying her reasons for appeal from the decision of the referee that she could begin work at 8:30 a. m. or 9 a. m. The board approved and confirmed the decision of the referee.

The claimant appealed to the Superior Court which viewed the decision in Chaharyn v. Department of Employment Security, 85 R.I. 75, 125 A.2d 241 (1956), as controlling and as requiring 24-hour availability without restrictions of any kind. Therefore, the decision of the board was affirmed.

A number of cases have considered whether statutes similar to ours require availability for work on a 24-hour basis. See St. Germain v. Adams, N.H., 377 A.2d 620 (1977); Carson v. Department of Employment Security, 135 Vt. 312, 376 A.2d 355 (1977). These cases suggest that there must be a substantial and unequivocal attachment to the labor market in order to meet the availability requirement. Although the cases do not require 24-hour availability, they require a substantial likelihood that the applicant can obtain employment in spite of certain limited or nonsubstantial restrictions.

Our decision in Chaharyn v. Department of Employment Security, supra, is generally consonant with these principles. There a graduating law student voluntarily left his job as a designer to pursue a clerkship required for admission to the bar. He went to the local office of the Department of Employment Security to register for work and claim statutory benefits, and included in his application a statement that he would not be available for work during the daytime hours while he was occupied as a law clerk. We observed in Chaharyn that the claimant had represented he was not available for work during the period normally worked by most persons in his profession. Accordingly, we held the claimant had so restricted his availability in advance that he was substantially removed from the labor market and therefore not entitled to benefits. In particular, we noted that:

"In our opinion a claimant who in advance materially restricts or limits his availability and willingness to accept work, other than as specifically provided for in the act, has not registered For work under the act."

85 R.I. at 81, 125 A.2d at 244. We continued by saying that:

"It is our opinion that by the use of the phrase 'register for work,' the legislature intended a claimant must first register For work in a way that will genuinely attach him to the labor market without any conditions or restrictions, other than those provided in the statute, in order to become eligible for aid and an offer of a job."

85 R.I. at 82, 125 A.2d at 245.

Although our opinion in Chaharyn contains language which might be construed to require a claimant to register for work, without restriction, on a 24-hour basis, such a construction would go considerably beyond the holding of the case required by the facts which were presented. ¹ We believe that § 28-44-12 does not require a 24-hour availability, but that this statute read in the light of Chaharyn is designed to insure that claimants filing for benefits be available for work in a manner that substantially attaches them to the labor market. Expressed in another way, we believe restrictions that substantially impair the claimant's attachment to the labor market render a claimant unavailable for work.

The record in the case presented to the court is such that the Superior Court could well have determined that the board was not clearly erroneous in finding that the claimant's availability was substantially restricted. However, the court did determine that Chaharyn mandated 24-hour availability without restrictions of any kind. With this holding we are in disagreement.

We find persuasive the doctrines suggested in Sanchez v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 20 Cal.3d 55, 141 Cal.Rptr. 146, 569 P.2d 740 (1977), and in Tung-Sol Electric, Inc. v. Board of Review, 35 N.J.Super. 397, 114 A.2d 285 (1955), that availability may be restricted for good cause so long as the restriction does not prevent the claimant from being genuinely attached to the labor market or available to a substantial field of employment. It should be noted that the doctrine of Sanchez is somewhat more sweeping than we are willing to espouse, and that New Jersey's statute in Tung-Sol Specifically permitted some degree of restriction to be placed upon availability. ²

Many cases have adopted a rationale set forth in Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 Yale L.J. 123, 124 (1945) "The availability requirement is said to be satisfied when an individual is willing, able, and ready to accept suitable work which he does not have good cause to refuse, that is, when he is genuinely attached to the labor market. Since, under unemployment compensation laws, it is the availability of an individual that is required to be tested, the labor market must be described in terms of the individual. A labor market for an individual exists when there is a market for the type of services which he offers in the geographical area in which he offers them. 'Market' in this sense does not mean that job vacancies must exist; the purpose of unemployment compensation is to compensate for the lack of appropriate job vacancies. It means only that the type of services which an individual is offering is generally performed in the geographical area in which he is offering them."

This rationale gave rise to the two-step procedure utilized in Sanchez, supra, wherein the court first determined that a claimant had the right to refuse unsuitable work or work which the claimant would have good cause to refuse. Thereafter, the court held that the claimant would still be available for work within the terms of the statute so long as such claimant was available to a "substantial field of employment."

It should also be noted that § 28-44-12 specifically provides that "(n)o individual shall be eligible for benefits for any week in which he fails, Without good cause, to comply with the requirements as set forth * * *." (Emphasis added.) Thus, we believe that Chaharyn does not have the effect of completely proscribing restrictions which may be placed upon availability for good cause so long as those restrictions do not materially impair availability for general employment in the field in which the claimant is qualified. We believe that parental responsibility may constitute good cause for limiting availability, so long as such limitation does not substantially impair a claimant's attachment to the labor market.

In a case very similar to the instant case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina observed:

"It is difficult to imagine a better cause for rejection of employment in the late afternoon and evening than the responsibility of a mother for the care of a nine year old child who would otherwise be without supervision * * *. The alarming increase in juvenile delinquency in recent years has made...