Eastern Shores Sales Co. v. City of North Miami Beach

• Decision Date: 01 June 1978
• Docket Number: No. 51127,51127
• Citation: 363 So.2d 321
• Parties: EASTERN SHORES SALES CO., Petitioner, v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 321

363 So.2d 321

EASTERN SHORES SALES CO., Petitioner, v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, Respondent.

No. 51127.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 1, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1978.

James E. Tribble and J. Frost Walker, III of Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick & Hoehl, Miami, for petitioner.

Burton B. Loebl, City Atty., North Miami Beach, for respondent.

ALDERMAN, Justice.

We grant certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District in City of North Miami Beach v. Eastern Shores Sales Company, 341 So.2d 825 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). The Third District reversed the trial court, expressly relying upon the decision of the Fourth District in Watson v. City of Hallandale, 193 So.2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), cert. den. 201 So.2d 233 (Fla.1967). The factual situation in Watson varies materially from the facts set forth in the body of the opinion under review. ¹ The Third District's reliance upon Watson creates a misapplication of law sufficient to vest jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Wale v. Barnes, 278 So.2d 601 (Fla.1973).

This case involves an annexation agreement entered into between the City of North Miami Beach and the predecessors in interest of Eastern Shores Sales Company. The determinative issue is whether the City, because of a 1957 final decree of the Circuit Court expressly upholding the validity of the agreement, is now estopped from contesting the validity of that agreement. We quash the decision of the Third District and hold that the City is collaterally estopped. We also disapprove the decision of the Fourth District in Watson.

In 1956, the City and the predecessors of Eastern Shores entered into an agreement to annex certain land to the City. The agreement provided that the City would not levy taxes against the annexed land until buildings had been constructed or revenue-producing improvements had been placed on the land. The agreement further provided:

(T)his contract shall become effective and operative only after the same has been duly approved by a final decree in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, declaring that this contract is legal and can be carried out by both the parties hereto and that said decree has become final by virtue of having been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Florida, or that the time for appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida has expired. Upon the above events taking place, then and in that event, this contract shall become binding and operative between the parties.

The City filed suit in the Circuit Court seeking a declaratory decree approving the annexation and ratifying the agreement. Several resident taxpayers were permitted to intervene. These intervenors alleged that the agreement was unconstitutional.

In 1957, the Circuit Court approved the annexation and the agreement. Its final decree specifically found the agreement to be binding and, further, declared:

. . . (Both) the actions and proceedings of the officers of the plaintiff, City of North Miami Beach, in executing said contract, and the terms of said contract are hereby found to be legal, valid and proper under the Constitutions of the State of Florida and the United States of America and the Statutes of the State of Florida.

No appeal was taken from this decree, and after the decree became final, the City, in accordance with the agreement, annexed the land.

The Circuit Court reserved jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. In 1965, the court enforced the agreement, finding that the City was in contempt of court because it had levied taxes for the years 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964 on Maule Lake (which is a part of the annexed land). The court ordered the City not to levy taxes on Maule Lake until a building or revenue-producing improvements are placed thereon. No appeal was taken from this order.

In 1973, Eastern Shores' land was placed on the City's tax roll, and city taxes were assessed retroactively to 1970. Eastern Shores was granted leave to intervene as a party defendant in the original 1957 law suit. The court entered an order requiring the City to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for violating the court's earlier decree. Eastern Shores alleged that no buildings had been constructed on its property nor had revenue-producing improvements been placed thereof. The City, in response, sought to be relieved from that portion of the 1957 decree that prohibits the City from taxing undeveloped land.

In its order, the trial court again held the City in contempt of court and adjudged that it could purge itself by terminating and cancelling any attempt to collect city taxes on Eastern Shores' property until buildings or revenue-producing improvements are constructed thereon. On appeal, the Third District was confronted with the issue of whether the City is estopped from contending that the agreement is unlawful. Relying on Watson v. City of Hallandale, supra, the District Court held that the City was not estopped to assert the invalidity of the 1956 judgment which would have barred the assessment of taxes on Eastern Shores' property. We disagree and hold that the prior final decree is binding upon the parties to this suit.

The trial court was wrong when, in 1957, it allowed the City to contract away its taxing power relative to the undeveloped land described in the agreement. ² This, however, is not sufficient reason now to void that portion of the final decree. In Einstein v. Davidson, 35 Fla. 342, 17 So. 563 (1895), we said:

A judgment that is absolutely null and void a mere brutum fulmen can be set aside and stricken from the record, on motion, at any time, and may be collaterally assailed. . . . But the judgment that is voidable only, because irregular or erroneous, must be moved against in time, by motion to vacate, or by resort to an appellate tribunal; otherwise it becomes an absolute verity, and passes beyond the control of the courts to disturb. . . .

In Aldrich v. Aldrich, 163 So.2d 276 (Fla.1964), we concluded:

In summary, it is our opinion that the Circuit Court of Dade County in 1945 had "subject matter" jurisdiction of the cause and that, in exercising such jurisdiction, its decision as to alimony after the death of the husband was erroneous. It is our further view, however, that when the husband failed to take an appeal and give a reviewing court the opportunity to correct the error, the decree of the Circuit Court on such question passed into verity, became final, and is not now subject to collateral attack. . . .

In the present case, the trial court had "subject matter" jurisdiction; ³ therefore, the final decree, although erroneous, became binding upon the parties when no appeal was taken. Once the authority to decide has been shown, it cannot be divested by being incorrectly employed. Aldrich v. Aldrich, supra.

A distinction exists between the effect of a judgment as a bar to a second action on the same claim or demand and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties on a different claim...