Easterwood v. State

• Docket Number: CAAP-21-0000681
• Decision Date: 23 June 2023
• Parties: JOHN CLINTON EASTERWOOD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF HAWAI#I, Respondent-Appellee
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

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JOHN CLINTON EASTERWOOD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF HAWAI#I, Respondent-Appellee

No. CAAP-21-0000681

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii

June 23, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT (S.P.P. NO 1CPN-20-0000007).

On the briefs:

William K. Li, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Loren J. Thomas, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondent-Appellee.

(By Lisa M. Ginoza Chief Judge, Chief Judge, Keith K. Hiraoka Associate Judge and Kimberly T. Guidry Associate Judge, JJ.)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

Petitioner-Appellant John Clinton Easterwood (Easterwood) appeals from the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Petitioner Easterwood's Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" (Order Denying Rule 40 Petition) entered on November 4, 2021, by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court).^[1]

Easterwood's HRPP Rule 40 Petition sought relief from his no contest plea and sentence in Criminal No. 1CPC-18-0001444 (criminal case).^[2] In the criminal case, Easterwood plead no contest to Unauthorized Entry into Motor Vehicle in the First Degree (count 1), Assault Against a Law Enforcement Officer in the First Degree (count 2), and Resisting Arrest (count 4). He was sentenced to five-year terms of imprisonment for counts 1 and 2, and one-year of imprisonment for count 4, with the sentences to run concurrently.

Easterwood's HRPP Rule 40 Petition asserts three grounds: he was told by his criminal case counsel, Jason Burks (Burks), that Burks spoke with the trial judge who agreed to sentence Easterwood to probation, not prison, in return for a guilty plea; the judge relied on police action unrelated to Easterwood's case in his reasoning for a maximum sentence; and Burks mislead Easterwood into believing the judge had agreed to sentence Easterwood to probation in return for a guilty plea. In an order issued on September 4, 2020, the Circuit Court determined that Easterwood's petition presented a colorable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel for which a hearing would be held, but that his other assertions did not raise valid claims warranting a hearing.^[3]

The Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing on Easterwood's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. At the HRPP Rule 40 hearing, the Circuit Court heard testimony from Easterwood and Burks. The Circuit Court then issued its Order Denying Rule 40 Petition. This appeal follows.

On appeal, Easterwood contends that "[t]he Circuit Court erred when it found Easterwood non-credible, found Burks credible, concluded that [Easterwood's] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was unfounded, and ordered that no relief would be granted under HRPP Rule 40." Easterwood challenges: the Circuit Court's findings of fact (FOF) 13, 14, and 15, which relate to the Circuit Court's assessment of Easterwood's credibility; FOFs 16(b), (d), (e), and (f), relating to the Circuit Court's assessment of Burks' credibility as to specified facts; FOFs 17 and 18; and conclusions of law (COL) 4, 8, 9, and 12.

Upon careful consideration of the arguments by the parties, the legal authorities cited, and the record, we resolve Easterwood's appeal as set forth below and affirm.

The Hawai#i Supreme Court has stated that:

"The proper standard for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal is whether, 'viewed as a whole, the assistance provided was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'" State v. DeLeon, 131 Hawai#i 463, 479, 319 P.3d 382, 398 (2014) (quoting Dan v. State, 76 Hawai#i 423, 427, 879 P.2d 528, 532 (1994)).

The defendant has the burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel and must meet the following two-part test: 1) that there were specific errors or omissions reflecting counsel's lack of skill, judgment, or diligence; and 2) that such errors or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.

Araiza v. State, 149 Hawai#i 7, 14, 481 P.3d 14, 21 (2021) (citations omitted). The challenged findings and conclusions state as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

13. As finder of fact, the Court is unconvinced by Easterwood's contention that he only changed his pleas because he was promised probation. Instead, it appears more likely that denial of the very existence of any agreement with the state whatsoever, however non-credible such denial may be, is herein offered simply to bolster the claims supporting the instant petition.

14. Among the reasons why Easterwood's denial of any agreement with the state is non-credible, the Court notes Easterwood's own sworn adoption of the change of plea form K and the plain understanding of the word "agreement."

15. As an issue of fact, Easterwood's non-credible denial actually refutes his assertion that he only changed his pleas because he was promised probation. That Easterwood's petition should depend to such a degree upon so implausible a denial suggests that the petition itself lacks any other factual support.

16. The Court does find credible the testimony from Jason Burks ("Burks"), specifically: . . .

b. That Burks never told Defendant that probation would be anything other than a possibility; . . .

d. That Burks told Easterwood, absent an agreement with the State under which the Court could bind itself under HRPP Rule 11, "nothing is set in stone"; e. That Burks himself never personally promised probation, but told Easterwood that he might have a "decent shot" at probation; f. That Burks did explain to Easterwood that the likelihood of receiving probation would depend on Easterwood taking responsibility for his actions, and further that Easterwood's failure to take responsibility would also carry its own consequences[.] . . .

17. Easterwood's current position, that he changed his pleas only because he believed he had an enforceable contract guaranteeing him two or four years probation, has no factual support anywhere else in the record, and is as a

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