Eastham v. Hunter

Decision Date10 April 1905
Citation86 S.W. 323
PartiesEASTHAM et al. v. HUNTER et al.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Trespass to try title by Beverly Hunter and others against Mrs. Delha Eastham and others. There was a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing a judgment for defendants, and rendering a judgment for plaintiffs (81 S. W. 336), and defendants bring error. Reversed.

Dean, Humphrey & Powell, for plaintiffs in error. McKinney & Hill, for defendants in error.

BROWN, J.

Beverly Hunter and Caroline Hunter, husband and wife, owned and occupied as their homestead the land in controversy. In 1879 they executed a power of attorney to Robert Hunter, their son, authorizing him to sell the land. On January 5, 1880, Robert Hunter, acting under the power of attorney, sold the land to W. R. Pace, and made him a deed reciting a cash payment of $112.50; and on December 1, 1880, Pace sold the land to B. Eastham, and executed to him a deed in which it was recited that the consideration of $145.25 was paid. Beverly Hunter and Caroline Hunter removed to Kansas before the sale of the land by Robert Hunter, and both died before the institution of this suit. Plaintiffs are their heirs. Eastham died in 1883, and defendants are his widow and son and Dunn, who claimed under them. The Court of Civil Appeals found that Pace did not pay the $112.50 to Robert Hunter or to Beverly or Caroline Hunter, but that the consideration expressed in the deed was paid by a debt due from Beverly and Robert Hunter, or by a debt of Robert Hunter alone, to Wm. R. Pace. At the time of the transaction, Eastham paid to Pace $145.25, the consideration expressed in the deed from the latter to him.

Upon the issue of notice to Eastham of the consideration paid by Pace for the land, the latter testified as follows: "At the time Eastham bought the land from me, he did not know and did not have any knowledge than that I had paid to Robert Hunter the full consideration named in the deed from Robert Hunter to me, but had reason to know that I had paid every cent called for in the said deed. If any part of the consideration named in the deed from Robert Hunter to me went to pay Robert Hunter's debt, Mr. Eastham did not know it." On cross-examination Pace testified upon the same subject as follows: "Eastham did not know anything about the transaction until after it was completed, and at the time of my transaction with him we discussed the matter fully." And again, on cross-examination, he testified: "At the time I traded with Robert Hunter, I knew that Eastham knew nothing about it, but when I traded with Eastham I then explained to him the whole transaction." Judgment was rendered in the trial court in favor of Mrs. Eastham and her children, which was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the land.

Upon reversing the judgment of the trial court, the Court of Civil Appeals could render judgment only in case the evidence is so conclusive that there was no issue as to notice which should have been submitted to a jury—that is, if the trial court should have instructed a verdict, then the Court of Civil Appeals correctly rendered judgment; otherwise it had no authority to do so. Railway v. Strycharski, 92 Tex. 1, 37 S. W. 415; Stevens v. Maston's Heirs, 90 Tex. 425, 39 S. W. 292, 921; Underwood v. Jones, 95 Tex. 121, 65 S. W. 480.

For the purposes of this investigation, we will assume that the Court of Civil Appeals correctly held that the consideration of the deed from Robert Hunter to Pace was the discharge of a pre-existing debt; and we will inquire, does the evidence establish that Eastham had notice of the manner in which Pace paid for the land, with such conclusiveness as to justify the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals? The evidence is undisputed that Eastham paid to Pace a valuable consideration for the land, being its full value, and that at the time Robert Hunter was in possession of the land. He was there when he...

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    ...(Tex.Civ.App.) 289 S.W. 712; Stewart v. Miller (Tex.Civ.App.) 271 S.W. 311; Kifuri v. Lira (Tex.Civ.App.) 73 S. W.2d 891; Eastham v. Hunter, 98 Tex. 560, 86 S.W. 323; Progressive Lbr. Co. v. Marshall & E. T. Ry. Co., 106 Tex. 12, 155 S.W. 175; Harpold v. Moss, 101 Tex. 540, 109 S.W. 928; Pe......
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    ...physical and mental condition in its most favorable aspect for plaintiffs, ignoring all conflicts and contradictions. Eastham v. Hunter, 98 Tex. 560, 565, 86 S. W. 323. The age of Mrs. Miller at the date of said deeds is not shown. She was, however, an elderly woman. She had borne thirteen ......
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