Eastham v. Roundtree
| Decision Date | 17 January 1882 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 929. |
| Citation | 56 Tex. 110 |
| Parties | BYRD EASTHAM v. IRENE ROUNDTREE. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from Walker county.
Randolph & McKinney, for appellant.
J. A. Baker, for appellee.
This suit was brought by the appellant, as the administrator of the estate of Carothers, against J. M. Roundtree and J. W. Bowden, to recover a house and lot in the town of Huntsville.
Roundtree and Bowden disclaimed, and Irene Roundtree intervened in the suit by her guardian, and claimed an undivided one-half of the property sued for.
She claimed that the property was bought from L. Roundtree for the sum of $5,000, and that one-half of the purchase money was paid by J. M. Roundtree, her father, out of money which she had inherited from her mother's estate, or that the same was paid by her father for her use and benefit on account of moneys belonging to her which her father had used.
By an amendment she alleged that, if her father did not pay for one-half of the property as stated in her original petition, that the same was paid by her father for her expressly as an advancement.
To the pleading of the intervenor the plaintiff replied that if J. M. Roundtree, the father of the intervenor, paid any part of the purchase money for the property, that the same was paid with his own money, and that the title to the entire property was taken in the name of Carothers for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding the creditors of J. M. Roundtree.
When the property was bought from L. Roundtree the deed was made to Carothers, who, the intervenor alleged, knew that the property was paid for when the deed was made, and agreed to hold one-half of the property in trust for her.
There was evidence tending to show that J. M. Roundtree may have had money in his hands at the time of the purchase which belonged to his daughter, the intervenor, or that he may have been indebted to her on account of money belonging to her which he had used.
There was also testimony tending to show that at the time the purchase was made, J. M. Roundtree was heavily indebted, and much pressed by his creditors.
There was also testimony tending to show that Carothers in his life-time admitted the facts in reference to the manner in which he held the property to be as alleged by the intervenor, and that J. M. Roundtree negotiated the purchase of the property and paid for the intervenor one-half of the purchase money, and that the other half was paid by Carothers through him.
This cause was before the court at a former term.
Upon the former trial, as upon that from which the present appeal is prosecuted, the testimony of J. M. Roundtree was objected to by the appellant, and admitted over his objection. Upon the former appeal it was held that there was no error in admitting the evidence, and we now see no reason to doubt the propriety of the ruling then made.
It is claimed that the charge of the court was not sufficiently full in that part which referred to the certainty and fullness of proof necessary to establish a resulting trust.
The charge was as full as the decisions upon this subject require; in fact, the learned judge who tried the cause seems to have complied fully and clearly with the rule established by law upon this subject.
On the trial the court, in the second charge given, in effect charged the jury that if J. M. Roundtree for the benefit of his daughter, the intervenor, out of his own money paid one-half of the purchase money for the property in controversy at the time the same was purchased, intending the same as an advancement to her, that then she was entitled to recover. To this charge the appellant excepted, because the court did not qualify the charge by instructing the jury that, if the father paid one-half of the purchase money, intending the same as an advancement to the intervenor, and took the deed in the name of Carothers for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors, that then the intervenor could not recover.
The appellant also asked the court to instruct the jury in effect, that if J. M. Roundtree paid one-half of the purchase money of the property out of his own money, and took the deed in the name of Carothers for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors, that then the intervenor could not recover. These charges were refused, upon the ground that the intervenor could not be affected by the fraud of her father to which she was not a party; and the refusing to give the charges asked, as well as the giving of the second charge given, was assigned as error.
If J. M. Roundtree paid one-half of the purchase...
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Murphy v. Johnson
...although the children did not participate in the illegal or fraudulent acts and had no knowledge of them. In the case of Eastham v. Roundtree, 56 Tex. 110, where a father in failing circumstances, with a view to secreting his property from creditors, purchased certain land, taking the title......
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Pettit v. Tabor, 06-19-00002-CV
...and that agreements on the part of grantees to hold in trust and to reconvey will not be enforced." Id. at 125-26 (citing Eastham v. Roundtree, 56 Tex. 110 (1882)). The court also recognized that the policy barring enforcement of such agreements was to deter debtors from attempting "to put ......
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Skinner v. Vaughan
...such objection was urged, same was not tenable. Mrs. Hearn, having disclaimed, had no substantial interest in the controversy. Eastham v. Roundtree, 56 Tex. 110; Oaks v. West, Tex.Civ.App., 64 S.W. 1033; Smith v. Rickerts, Tex.Civ.App., 38 S.W.2d We think comprehended in the objection of pl......
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Mauritz v. Bell
...purchase money. This is the general proposition supported by all the cases." To the same effect are these further authorities: Eastham v. Roundtree, 56 Tex. 110; Burns v. Ross, 71 Tex. 516, 9 S. W. 468; Hix et al. v. Armstrong, 101 Tex. 271, 106 S. W. 317; 28 Cyc., paragraph B, page 104; 2 ......