Eastham v. Young
Decision Date | 03 July 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 300,300 |
Citation | 243 A.2d 559,250 Md. 516 |
Parties | Gladys D. EASTHAM v. Ronald W. YOUNG. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Karl G. Feissner, Hyattsville (William L. Kaplan, Hyattsville, on the brief), for appellant.
Herbert D. Morrison, Washington, D. C., and Samuel M. Ivrey, Annapolis, for appellee.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and MARBURY, BARNES, McWILLIAMS, SINGLEY and SMITH, JJ.
Mrs. Eastham, a resident of Montgomery County, complains that she can not be sued in Anne Arundel County, as the trial court held she could be, to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate she owned in Anne Arundel County, and furniture and garden and boating equipment thereon, and asks us to free her from the toils of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.
Reversal is sought on two theories. Mrs. Eastham says that a suit to compel specific performance of a contract to convey real estate is properly brought against a sole defendant only in the county of his residence and that she timely ojected to venue in Anne Arundel County. Judge Sachse held that Code , Art. 16, § 100, gave the Anne Arundel County Court power to act under its provision that a resident of another county can be sued in the county where the land lies if, inter alia, the suit is 'to enforce any charge or lien' on the land. 1 The chancellor, having decided that Mrs. Eastham had waived venue, did not have to decide the point for the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County had basic jurisdiction of the subject matter and acquired jurisdiction of the person of Mrs. Eastham when she made a voluntary general appearance.
If we had to decide the point we would incline to the view that an ordinary suit for specific performance against a sole defendant must be brought in the county wherein that defendant resides, rather than in the county where the land lies if it lies in a different county.
Ordinarily one is entitled to be sued only in the county of his residence, in equity or in law, Pinkston Tr. v. Higham, 224 Md. 513, 518, 168 A.2d 712. ('The rules as to the place where a defendant may be sued applicable at law (Code (1957), art. 75, § 75) are also generally applicable in equity.') This Court held in Dorsey v. Omo, 93 Md. 74, 83, 48 A. 741, 744, that a bill to compel performance of a contract to assign a mortgage was not authorized to be brought against a sole defendant in the county where the mortgaged land lay under § 100 (then 72) of Art. 16, but must be brought in the county where the sole defendant lived. The opinion spoke of jurisdiction and lack of jurisdiction but it is apparent that territorial jurisdiction or venue was involved and not fundamental or basic jurisdiction of the subject matter. The Court said:
That generally an equity court which has jurisdiction over the person of a defendant may compel him to convey land in another jurisdiction is established by Donigan v. Donigan, 208 Md. 511, 522, 119 A.2d 430, and the authorities therein set forth at some length. See also 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 17 (1966) and § 104 of Art. 16 of the Code (1966 Repl. Vol.).
In Evans v. Zouck, 172 Md. 12, 14, 190 A. 523, Judge Offutt for the Court said:
See also Pinkston Tr. v. Higham, supra, 224 Md. 513, 519, 168 A.2d 712, 715, where we said:
'We hold that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County had jurisdiction over this suit * * *.'
Although the Circut Court for Anne Arundel County may not have been able to compel Mrs. Eastham's appearance before it in Young's suit against her, she waived objection to that court's territorial jurisdiction or venue and could not, after that waiver successfully challenge the court's right to proceed with the case and determine the merits. The authorities hold that the Code provisions exempting one from suit out of the county of his residence confers upon him a privilege which he waives by appearing in another county without timely objecting to venue. Colt Co. v. Wright, 162 Md. 387, 159 A. 743; Ireton v. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore, 61 Md. 432; Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 534, 122 A.2d 102; Fisher, Admrx. v. DeMarr, 226 Md. 509, 515-518, 174 A.2d 345; McCormick v. St. Francis De Sales Church, 219 Md. 422, 149 A.2d 768; Pinkston Tr. v. Higham, supra.
The chronology was this. On July 25, 1967, the buyer Young filed suit against Mrs. Eastham for specific performance and for $3,000 for out-of-pocket costs or, alternately, $10,000 damages, and for a preliminary injunction to restrain the removal or damaging of the personal property sold. The bill alleged that the seller 'has removed or allowed to be removed from the premises described certain of its furniture and furnishings which were to be included in the sale * * *,' and that Mrs Eastham had refused to honor the contract. An affidavit of Young filed on August 7 supported the allegations of the bill and alleged that unless an injunction were granted in his opinion, 'immediate substantial and irreparable injury will result before any adversary hearing can be held * * *.'
On August 9 the court granted a preliminary injunction to run for ten days against the damaging or moving of the personal property. On August 18 Mrs. Eastham moved the court to vacate the 'Ex Parte Injunction issued without notice' on the grounds that:
'1. The pleas filed herein raising the question of venue of this Court are valid, and would result in this action being dismissed.
'2. The Court should not have granted the Ex Parte Injunction in that no affidavit gave 'specific facts' of what immediate, substantial and irreparable injury would result.
On August 21, three days after the motion to vacate had been filed, Mrs. Eastham filed the pleading erroneously referred to in paragraph one of the motion to vacate as already filed. It was titled 'Motion Raising Preliminary Objection,' and read:
'COMES NOW the Defendant and moves the Court to dismiss this action in that the Defendant is sued out of the County in which she resides.'
Supporting this pleading were an affidavit of Mrs. Eastham that:
'Gladys D. Eastham, being first duly sworn, states that she is a resident of Montgomery County, Maryland, and that such vocation as she has is carried on solely in Montgomery County, Maryland, and none other,' and Rule 323, Maryland Rules of Procedure, and Code, Art. 75, § 75 (as 'points and authorities').
On August 22 Young filed a motion for an interlocutory injunction incorporating by reference his earlier motion for a preliminary injunction and his affidavit in support thereof, and...
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