Eastlick v. Southern Ry. Co

• Decision Date: 24 July 1902
• Citation: 116 Ga. 48,42 S.E. 499
• Parties: EASTLICK. v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

42 S.E. 499

116 Ga. 48

EASTLICK.

v.SOUTHERN RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 24, 1902.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

1. Since ordinary hearsay testimony is not only inadmissible, but wholly without probative value, its introduction without objection does not give it any weight or force whatever in establishing a fact.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from city court of Floyd county; John H. Reece, Judge.

Action by E. L. Eastllck against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

W. J. NeeJ and J. M. Neel, for plaintiff in error.

Shumate & Maddox and Harris, Chamlee & Harris, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN, P. J. Mrs. Eastlick brought against the railway company an action for the homicide of her husband, was nonsuited, and thereupon excepted. She introduced, at the trial, evidence warranting a finding that the deceased was killed by the running of a train of the defendant. She also introduced testimony tending to show that the engineer in charge of the train made, after the homicide, certain declarations to the effect that the deceased was sitting upon the track, "with his hands up to his jaws, " when his presence was discovered. Without objection from the plaintiff, several of the witnesses introduced in her behalf were permitted on cross-examination by the defendant's counsel to state in detail all that the engineer said on that occasion. If the declarations on his part which were testified to were true, he exercised such diligence in the premises as would undoubtedly relieve the company from all liability for the homicide. There can be no question that the plaintiff, but for the testimony with respect to these declarations of the engineer, would have been entitled to go before the jury, for the evidence as to the cause of her husband's death, in connection with the legal presumption of negligence against the company, was sufficient to make out in her behalf a prima facie case. Ought she to have been denied the privilege of having the jury pass upon the case merely because of the introduction of the hearsay testimony above pointed out? We think not. Such testimony, save as to well-defined exceptions, is inadmissible for any purpose, because it is wholly without probative value. The fact that it is admitted cannot give it any such value. In other words, testimony of this character which does not come within any of the exceptions just referred to Is, in legal contemplation, wholly worthless, and has been so...