Eastman Oil Mills v. State ex rel. Roberson

• Decision Date: 16 October 1922
• Docket Number: 22780
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: EASTMAN OIL MILLS v. STATE EX REL. ROBERSON, Atty. Gen

93 So. 484

130 Miss. 63

EASTMAN OIL MILLS v. STATE EX REL. ROBERSON, Atty. Gen

No. 22780

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 16, 1922

APPEAL from chancery court of Coahoma county, HON. G. E. WILLIAMS Chancellor.

1 STATES. Laws prohibiting operation of gins cannot be altered or suspended by state officers.

The provision of chapter 162, Laws of 1914 (Hemingway's Code section 4755), that corporations which are prohibited by the act from owning or operating gins must dispose of them within a reasonable time after the passage of the act, cannot be altered, changed or suspended by the act or consent of any officer of the state, and all such corporations that continued to own and operate these prohibited gins after the expiration of a reasonable time from and after the passage of the act did so in violation of law.

2 STATES. Officers not empowered to authorise continuance of business constituting violation of law.

State officers cannot grant indulgences authorizing the committal of offenses, and they have no power to authorize the continuance of any act or business which is in violation of law.

3. ATTORNEY GENERAL. Authorization to operate gins in violation of law mere promise of forbearance not binding on successor.

The attorney-general has no power or authority to grant permission to a corporation to own and operate gins in violation of the provisions of chapter 162, Laws of 1914 (Hemingway's Code, section 4750 et seq.), and his act in attempting so to do amounts to no more than a promise of forbearance on his part and has no binding force on his successor or any other officer having authority to enforce the provisions of the act.

4. ESTOPPEL. State cannot be estopped by unauthorized acts of its officers. The state cannot be estopped by the unauthorized acts of its officers.

HON. G. E. WILLIAMS, Chancellor.

Suit by the state, on the relation of Frank Roberson, attorney-general, against the Eastman Oil Mills. From a decree imposing a penalty and forfeiting defendant's charter, it appeals. Affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

J. R. McDowell, for appellant.

Counsel says that we find ourselves in peril because we had hoped that that Law of 1914, would be declared unconstitutional. Suppose we did entertain such a hope, are we to be driven from the state because we agreed with the attorney-general that instead of multiplying his troubles with useless litigation we would, with his permission, continue as before, unless we could sell our property without too great a loss, and await the decision of the court of last resort upon the validity of the statute which sought to take from us our charter rights?

We are not asking the attorney-general to violate the law, or to give us any rights or privileges, but simply not to take advantage of us while the question was in dispute. We insist that in the light of all this record discloses we should have been given an opportunity, after the attorney-general saw fit to terminate the agreement made by his predecessor to have disposed of the gin property within a reasonable time. If we had known that we would have been dragged into court and driven from the state because we agreed with the state to abide the result of a test case then pending, we would have sought injunction at once. I cannot believe that it is to be the policy of the state to treat its citizens and taxpayers like this.

I have read the Lukens case cited by appellee, but cannot see that it is applicable to the case at bar. There the governor approved an act of the legislature making an appropriation upon an agreement that the beneficiaries would take less than the amount carried by the appropriation bill. He plainly violated the law when he made such an agreement, as the law said he must approve or disapprove legislative acts as passed by the legislature.

Counsel seems outraged because when one of the gins owned by appellant was partially destroyed by fire during the season of 1919-1920 we rebuilt it without his permission. It is admitted we rebuilt it to save the parts not destroyed by fire, and that before we attempted to operate it, we communicated with the attorney-general for the purpose of renewing the agreement had with his predecessor. He had a right to refuse this permission, in which event we could have proceeded to sell the gin as reconstructed, when we could not have sold the salvage at all, and it would have been a dead loss. I can't see how that act hurts us or helps us. If we are to be penalized for owning the gins, the penalty would be not greater because we repaired, improved or rebuilt parts thereof. The penalty is no greater.

In the Cresent Cotton Oil Co. case there was an agreement with the attorney-general that the gins might continue to run. I don't suppose the present attorney-general sought to breach that agreement or insist upon a greater penalty on that account. Since this case was begun, the United States supreme court has upheld the statute under review in the present suit, and we are ready of course to abide that decision if given an opportunity to comply with the law without being driven out of the state, because of our faith in the acts of the attorney-general.

We do not hesitate to say that this court should reverse the decree of the chancellor and now enter an order imposing such penalty as it may think proper in case the appellant shall not within a time to be fixed by the court dispose of its unsold gin and otherwise comply with the law.

Roberson & Yerger, for appellee.

Chapter 162 of the Laws of 1914 (Hemingway's Code, sections 4752 to 4756), is the law which appellee claims to have been violated by the appellant. This law is statutory law and provides that a corporation engaged in the manufacture of cotton seed products shall not own, lease or operate a cotton gin in this state, except in the city or town of the location of its cotton oil plant, and that a corporation which shall own, lease or operate a gin in violation of the statute shall be subject to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, and in addition thereto, shall forfeit its charter as a domestic corporation, and its right to do business in this state if a foreign corporation."

The appellant in its answer to the original bill attacked the constitutionality of the statute in question but the constitutionality of the statute has been definitely determined, not only by our supreme court, but by the supreme court of the United States. State ex rel. Collins v. Crescent Cotton Oil Company, reported in 77 So. 185, 116 Miss. 398. Appellant devotes more than half of its brief to the proposition that this action is not maintainable against it, because a former attorney-general gave it permission to operate the gins during certain seasons. It is not the purpose of this brief to criticize the acts of any one in connection with this matter, but even if a former attorney-general did give the permission claimed, still it remains that no attorney-general ever gave appellant any permission to rebuild any gin at Rich after it had been burned and the insurance collected thereon.

But, as a legal proposition, we do not believe any officer, attorney-general, or otherwise, can legally give permission to any one to violate the plain letter of a statute; if such permission were given, same could not be set up as a defense by one charged with a violation of such statute. Such an agreement would have no sanction in the law; would be contrary to public policy and void. Estoppel cannot have as a foundation an illegal agreement; contracts cannot vest in parties any rights in contravention of law or public policy. For an able discussion of this proposition, the court is referred to the case of Lukens v. Nye, 20 Ann. Cases, 158.

No state official could, by agreement permit or otherwise legalize, something that had been expressly condemned by the solemn act of the legislature.

Appellant says in effect that the bringing of this lawsuit was a breach of faith on the part of the state of Mississippi. This the appellee most strenuously denies. There is nothing in the record which justifies any such conclusion. On the other hand, the record plainly shows that if any one was guilty of unbecoming conduct in this matter, that it was the appellant herein. Is there anything in the record which shows that the present attorney-general, or his predecessor, were ever notified of the burning of the gin at Rich in 1919? Absolutely nothing.

Is there anything in the record which shows that either the present attorney-general, or his predecessor, were ever asked by the Eastman Oil Mills for permission to rebuild the gin at Rich? Absolutely nothing. If the appellant was going to rely on the permission given by the attorney-general, why was it that after its gin at Rich was burned, that it did not request the permission of the then attorney-general to then rebuild same.

But, admitting for the sake of argument that there was a binding contract between the Eastman Oil Mills and a former attorney-general with reference to the operation of the gin; still appellant can find no consolation therein, because there is nothing in the records which intimates that in case one of the gins should burn that appellant had had the consent to rebuild same.

OPINION

COOK, J.

This suit was instituted by the state, on relation of the attorney-general against the Eastman Oil Mills, a corporation chartered under the laws of this state, and domiciled at Jonestown, Miss., seeking to impose on the defendant the penalties prescribed for a violation of chapter 162, Laws of 1914, Hemingway's Code, section 4750 et seq., and from a decree imposing a penalty of one thousand dollars and forfeiting the defendant's charter, this appeal...