Easton v. Collier
| Decision Date | 30 June 1834 |
| Citation | 3 Mo. 379 |
| Parties | EASTON & RUSSELL v. COLLIER |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
APPEAL IN CHANCERY FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY.
Collier states in his bill that sometime in August, 1820, Easton obtained a judgment in his own name in the Circuit Court of Lincoln county, against one Prospect K. Robbins, in an action of debt on a note of said Robbins, to said Easton, which note was for $1731 86, that sum being amount of debt, and the damages amounted to $58 44, as nearly as the complainant can recollect; that the process in this case was a capias, and that Ira and Almond Cottle became the bail of Robbins; that on or about the 8th August, 1820, said bail came into the Circuit Court of Lincoln county, and surrendered Robbins in discharge of themselves; that on the same day the complainant and one Joshua N. Robbins appeared in court and acknowledged themselves bail for said Prospect K. Robbins; that the complainant being made liable as bail, Easton instituted suit against him and recovered judgment and made the money by execution. The complainant further states that on the 10th April, 1820, said Easton commenced another suit against the said Prospect K. Robbins on another note for the same amount as the former; that the form of the last was like the former, debt, and the process also a capias; that afterwards on the 7th August, Robbins, the defendant, the process in the cause not being served, came into the said Circuit Court of Lincoln county and consented that judgment should be entered up against him for debt and damages, the last amounting to forty-one dollars and twelve cents; that Easton failing to make the money on judgment against Robbins, commenced another suit on the same recognizance against the complainant and Joshua N. Robbins in the Circuit Court of St. Charles county, pretending that it was a recognizance entered into by the complainant and the said Joshua N. Robbins, as bail in the second suit above mentioned; and the complainant then avers, that he did not become bail for the said Prospect K. Robbins in the second suit instituted against him by Easton; the complainant further states that he pleaded to said suit, that there was no record of such recognizance, and that issue was taken on that plea; that on the trial of this issue, Easton produced in evidence a transcript of the record of a judgment rendered in Lincoln county against said Prospect K. Robbins on the note secondly above mentioned, in which transcript was embodied the transcript of the recognizance entered into by the complainant in the first action against Robbins above mentioned; that on this evidence the Circuit Court of St. Louis county, to which the cause...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kennard v. Wiggins
...what purports to be a provision of a decree, the defendant may not plead as res adjudicata the very decree or provision attacked. Easton v. Collier, 3 Mo. 379; 34 C.J., secs. 753, 1158; States v. Cromwell, 107 N.Y. 91, 114 N.E. 448. (7) The will construction suit is not res adjudicata, as t......
-
Kennard v. Wiggins
...what purports to be a provision of a decree, the defendant may not plead as res adjudicata the very decree or provision attacked. Easton v. Collier, 3 Mo. 379; 34 C. J., secs. 753, 1158; States v. Cromwell, 107 N.Y. 91, 114 N.E. 448. (7) The will construction suit is not res adjudicata, as ......