Easton v. Koch

• Decision Date: 30 April 1943
• Docket Number: 307-1942
• Citation: 152 Pa.Super. 327,31 A.2d 747
• Parties: Easton, Appellant, v. Koch et al
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

31 A.2d 747

152 Pa.Super. 327

Easton, Appellant, v. Koch et al

No. 307-1942

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

April 30, 1943

March 9, 1943, Submitted

Appeal from decree of C. P. Northampton Co., Sept. T., 1940, No. 2 in case of City of Easton v. Howard P. Koch, Treasurer, et al., Commissioners of County of Northampton.

Bill in equity. Before Barthold, J.

Decree entered in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed.

Decree affirmed in part and reversed in part.

John Field Oldt, for appellant.

George C. Laub, for appellees, Northampton County, Williams Township and Williams Township School District.

Stanley J. Fehr, for appellees, Bushkill Township and Bushkill Township School District.

Before Keller, P. J., Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Rhodes, Hirt, Kenworthey and Reno, JJ.

OPINION

Rhodes, J.

The question presented by this appeal is the taxability of certain real estate owned by a municipality. By a bill in equity the city of Easton sought an injunction to restrain the County Treasurer and the County Commissioners of the County of Northampton from selling, for nonpayment of delinquent taxes for 1938, certain parcels of real estate owned by the city and located in the township of Bushkill and in the township of Williams. A preliminary injunction was granted. Subsequently the road supervisors and the school directors of the two townships were joined as additional defendants. The chancellor made certain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and dissolved the preliminary injunction in so far as it related to the Jacobsburg tract and South Delaware Park. After hearing on the exceptions filed by the city, the court in banc made additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, and amended some of the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the chancellor. It dismissed the exceptions and entered a final decree. The city has appealed.

The city contended that the proposed sales for nonpayment of taxes should be enjoined because the two tracts of land were public property used for public purposes and exempt from taxation.

The court below concluded that both tracts of land were not exempt, and entered a final decree accordingly. ^[1] We shall consider the reasons and their validity separately; and our discussion will be limited to the questions presented.

It is to be noted that there is a distinction, for the purposes of taxation, between property owned by private corporations institutions, and individuals and that owned by a municipality and devoted exclusively to public purposes. Robb v Philadelphia, 25 Pa.Super. 343, 346. It is the general rule that the property of municipalities held for governmental purposes is presumptively exempt from the operation of general tax laws, and that it is not subject to tax without express statute. Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, 204 Pa. 635, 640, 641, 54 A. 463; Directors of the Poor of Schuylkill County v. School Directors of North Manheim Township, 42 Pa. 21, 23; Robb v. Phila. delphia, supra, p. 346; Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority et al., 331 Pa. 209, 228, 233, 200 A. 834. Preliminarily we shall refer to the constitutional and relevant statutory provisions.

Article 9, § 1, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, as amended by the amendment of November 6, 1923, reads in part as follows: "All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, .... and shall be levied and collected under general laws; but the General Assembly may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes ...."

The General County Assessment Law, Act of May 22, 1933, P. L. 853, 72 PS § 5020 -- 101 et seq., which amends, revises, and consolidates the law relating to taxation for local purposes, was passed by the General Assembly pursuant to this constitutional authority. Section 204, 72 PS § 5020 -- 204, sets forth the property which "shall be exempt from all county, city, borough, town, township, road, poor and school tax," and includes the following: "(g) All other public property used for public purposes, with the ground thereto annexed and necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same." ^[2] Clause (1) of the same section provides in part: ".... all property, real or personal, other than that which is in actual use and occupation for the purposes specified in this section, and all such property from which any income or revenue is derived .... shall be subject to taxation ...." See Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority et al., supra, page 228, footnote 15.

Jacobsburg Tract

Although this land is municipally owned, it is subject to taxation if it is established that it is not in actual use and occupation for public purposes; it is barren and unproductive. The court below found ^[3] and concluded ^[4] that this tract was not in actual use and occupancy for public purposes; that it was not necessary, essential, or indispensable to the operation of the present municipally owned water system of the City of Easton when the assessment was made for 1938; and that accordingly it was not exempt from the taxes for that year.

The finding may not be a pure finding of fact (see Altaffer et ux v. Anderson Automobile Co. et al., 77 Pa.Super. 63, 65, 66), but there is no dispute about the facts as disclosed by the evidence. This we have examined, and we agree that the finding and conclusions of the court below are correct.

The court below in its opinion has summarized the testimony upon which its finding and conclusions are based as follows:

"The Jacobsburg tract contains five hundred thirty-seven (537) acres of land located in Bushkill Township, Northampton County, Pennsylvania, between eight and eleven miles from the City of Easton. It was acquired by the City of Easton along with the other property and franchises of the Northampton Consolidated Water Company. The evidence reveals that while the Northampton Consolidated Water Company acquired the property as a future source of water supply, it had never been connected in any manner whatsoever with the water supply system of said company and has since its acquisition by the City of Easton never been connected with the water supply system of said city. No dam or reservoir exists on the property and there are no pipelines on the property connected with the municipal water plant. While the Northampton Consolidated Water Company owned the property it made no effort to impound the water or did any work upon the property outside of making preliminary surveys and drilling three test wells. Since the City of Easton took over the property in 1936 no work has been done toward the development of this tract as a future source of water supply, except that all of the buildings on the tract have been removed and the city through a WPA Project is now making a survey of the entire tract for the purpose of running elevations to prepare contour maps of the whole section and to place monuments on boundary lines. It appears from the testimony that the tract is suitable and adaptable as a future source of water supply, that the land is held for that purpose and was not being used for any other purpose in 1938."

This land has not been, and there is no certainty that it ever will be, used as a source of water supply, or for any other public purpose, and it was not required for the protection of the purity of the present water supply. See Roaring Creek Water Co. v. Girton et al., 142 Pa. 92, 21 A. 780; Spring Brook Water Co. v. Kelly, 17 Pa.Super. 347; York Haven Water & Power Co. v. School District of the Township of Londonderry, 77 Pa.Super. 308. "An exemption of lands owned by a city for public purposes means a present, and not an indefinite, prospective, use." Cooley on Taxation, 4th Ed. § 641; School District of Pittsburgh v. County of Allegheny, 347 Pa. 101, 31 A.2d 707. We find no error in the finding and conclusions of the court below, and the decree to this extent will be affirmed.

South Delaware Park

The court in banc amended the chancellor's conclusion of law to read as follows:

"5. A portion of the City Park owned by the City of Easton was in actual use and occupancy for a public purpose and a portion thereof was not so used and occupied when the assessment on this property was levied in 1938 and the tax due. Since no separate assessment was made for the tax exempt portion, we are without authority to apportion the tax."

The court in banc found, in an amended finding of the chancellor and in additional findings, that certain portions of the tract were not in actual use and occupancy for public use as a park, and that a portion of the tract along the South Delaware River Road, comprising 2.72 acres more or less, was in actual use and occupancy for public park purposes when the assessment on this property was made in 1938, and therefore exempt from 1938 taxes. Such findings are entitled to great weight, but it is still the duty of the appellate court to determine whether the ultimate result reached was based on a proper understanding of the facts proven, and a correct application of the legal principles. Binswanger v. Hyman, 271 Pa. 296, 299, 114 A. 628, 629. ^[5] Any difference in the findings is not questioned. See Belmont Lab., Inc., v. Heist et al., 300 Pa. 542, 151 A. 15.

The court in banc approved the chancellor's sixth conclusion of law whereby the preliminary injunction restraining the sale of this tract for delinquent taxes of 1938 was dissolved, but held that the bill in equity in so far as it pertains to this tract must be dismissed for the reason that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the sale thereof because the property was only partially exempt. See Dougherty v. Philadelphia et al., 314 Pa. 298, 301, 171 A. 583; Chevra A. C. A. C. v. Phila. delphia et al., 116 Pa.Super. 101, 104,...