Eastwood v. Oskins
| Decision Date | 12 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-36881,A-1-CA-36881 |
| Parties | JO ANN EASTWOOD and CATHERINE OLDFIELD, Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Charley B. Oldfield, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BILLIE CARLENE OSKINS, JESSIE FIELDS, and RON BROWN, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SIERRA COUNTY
Threet Law Firm
Joseph L. Romero
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellants
Deschamps Law Firm, LLC
Lee Deschamps
Socorro, NM
for Appellees
{1} Plaintiffs Jo Ann Eastwood and Catherine Oldfield, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Charlie Oldfield, appeal from a judgment following a bench trial in which the district court ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to cancel a conveyance of real property by the former personal representative of the Estate, Defendant Billie Carlene Oskins, to Defendant Ron Brown. The district court concluded that Brown was protected as a bona fide purchaser for value. We affirm, though for a different reason than that relied on by the district court.
{2} Decedent, Charley Oldfield, owned real property consisting of several acres and a residence in Sierra County (the Property) that served as collateral for a personal loan with BBVA Compass Bank (Compass Bank). Mr. Oldfield died testate in July 2011, devising all of his real and personal property to his six children, including Defendant Oskins, in equal shares. The will designated Oskins as personal representative for the Estate, and the probate court in Sierra County entered an order of appointment effectuating that designation in November 2011.
{3} Following Mr. Oldfield's death, the siblings agreed that the Property would not be sold, that their brother, Buster Oldfield, would continue to live on the Property, and that each sibling would contribute money on a monthly basis to pay utilities and the amount due on the loan. The Estate nevertheless fell behind in loan payments. On February 12, 2012, Oskins, as personal representative, recorded a quitclaim deed conveying the Property to herself with the Sierra County clerk's office. Oskins took this action in order to obtain refinancing for the loan from Compass Bank, which she could not obtain in her capacity as personal representative, and she intended to convey the Property back to the Estate after repaying the loan. After learning what Oskins had done, four of the beneficiaries—Donnie Oldfield, Luther Oldfield, Catherine Oldfield, and Jo Ann Eastwood—secured counsel, who wrote to Oskins in June 2012, informing her that she had no authority to take this action and demanding that she resign as personal representative. Oskins responded by filing a motion to withdraw as personal representative on July 9, 2012, consenting therein to the appointment of her brother and co-devisee Donnie Oldfield as successor personal representative.1 The probate court transferred the probate proceeding to district court on August 8, 2012, citing a dispute among the siblings regarding the distribution of the Estate's assets as grounds for the transfer.
{4} The next day, Oskins sold the Property to Defendant Ron Brown, a friend of the late Mr. Oldfield generally acquainted with the family. Oskins, along with her sister, co-devisee, and, at one point in this litigation, codefendant, Jessie Fields, had gone to Compass Bank around the middle of July 2012 to discuss the Property and learned that it was in foreclosure. There, they encountered Brown, who expressed interest in buying the Property.
{5} Brown had come to Compass Bank to inquire about the Property after hearing that it was in foreclosure. While there, Brown was informed by Compass Bank officials that the Property was in foreclosure and that it was available for purchase. Brown thenaccompanied Oskins and Fields to meet, separately, with the judge in the county probate proceeding, whom he asked whether "the ability of the bank to sell [the Property] at a foreclosure" would be affected by the fact that "this [was] in probate and going to district court."2 The judge responded that it would not because "the foreclosure and the probate [were] two entirely different things." In the time between these meetings and the August 9 closing, Brown pursued his interest in the Property. Brown obtained a copy of an appraisal of the Property, which he personally valued at $50,000 to $55,000, from Oskins, paying her $500 as reimbursement for the expenses incurred in obtaining it despite her telling him that she did not want payment. Brown paid an additional $500 to Fields for her help in obtaining the release of a previously paid-off mortgage from a company in Albuquerque. He called Compass Bank's offices in Alabama and was informed by someone in its legal department that the Property was foreclosed and that he could buy it. And he hired Ekmar Abstract & Title Company (Ekmar) to conduct a title search and handle the transaction on his behalf.
{6} The closing took place as scheduled in Ekmar's offices with Oskins and Brown attending at separate times. At the closing, Oskins executed a second quitclaim deed to herself to correct an error in the legal description of the property in the quitclaim deed. Oskins then signed a purchase contract and executed a warranty deed conveying the Property to Brown. Oskins did this at the direction of Ekmar, and she believed that Compass Bank was the seller in the transaction, with her involvement nonetheless required because the deed was in her name and because she was personal representative. The sales contract and the warranty deed conveying the property to Brown identify Oskins as "Seller," as do numerous other documents involved in the closing.
{7} For his part, Brown tendered a check in the amount of $19,116.77 to Ekmar, which subsequently wired $18,140.02 to Compass Bank as payoff of the outstanding loan while keeping the difference as payment for its services and recording costs. Brown did not read any of the documents presented to him at the closing, although he had the opportunity to do so, and Brown signed the warranty deed in the belief that he had purchased the Property from Compass Bank.
{8} Plaintiffs filed a motion to remove Oskins as personal representative after the transfer, and, following a hearing, the district court entered an order removing Oskins as personal representative of the Estate on October 15, 2012. Plaintiffs subsequently suedboth Oskins and Brown in a separate action, alleging, among other things, that Oskins had breached her fiduciary duty to the Estate. Plaintiffs sought to set aside the conveyance from Oskins to Brown and return the Property to the Estate. The case was tried in the district court, with Brown and Oskins, represented by the same attorney, presenting a joint defense: that Brown had purchased the property from Compass Bank, rather than Oskins, with both disclaiming any knowledge to or reason to know the contrary.
{9} Following the bench trial, the district court determined that the fair market value of the Property was $55,000, less the mortgage and costs totaling $19,032, for a "net fair market value of $35,968." The court ruled that Oskins had breached her fiduciary duty as personal representative by "improperly convey[ing] the major asset of the [E]state to . . . Brown" and that Oskins was liable to the Estate for $32,370 in damages caused by this breach. It concluded, however, that Plaintiffs were not entitled to void the deed from Oskins to Brown because Brown was a bona fide purchaser for value. Plaintiffs appealed.3
{10} The district court did not enter findings of fact to support its conclusion that Plaintiffs were not entitled to void the deed from Oskins to Brown. Although this complicates our review of the issue, "the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law does not operate as a bar to appellate review," Jury v. Jury, 2017-NMCA-036, ¶ 27, 392 P.3d 242, when we can determine from the record that the district court has "resolve[d] the material issues in a meaningful way[,]" Montoya v. Medina, 2009-NMCA-029, ¶ 5, 145 N.M. 690, 203 P.3d 905 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), leaving no "genuine issue" as to the facts underlying its decision, Cockrell v. Cockrell, 1994-NMSC-026, ¶ 5, 117 N.M. 321, 871 P.2d 977. We understand the facts and testimony outlined above to be undisputed4 and therefore conclude that the record is adequate to permit our review. "We review de novo the district court's application oflaw to the facts[,]" Giant Cab, Inc. v. CT Towing, Inc., 2019-NMCA-072, ¶ 6, 453 P.3d 466, giving it no deference. Chapman v. Varela, 2009-NMSC-041, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 680, 213 P.3d 1109; see also Kokoricha v. Estate of Keiner, 2010-NMCA-053, ¶ 11, 148 N.M. 322, 236 P.3d 41 . Insofar as our review involves issues of statutory interpretation, our review is likewise de novo. Moongate Water Co. v. City of Las Cruces, 2013-NMSC-018, ¶ 6, 302 P.3d 405.
{11} At common law, a conveyance of property made in violation of a fiduciary duty rendered the conveyed title voidable until it passed into the hands of a good-faith or bona fide purchaser, also called a purchaser without notice. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 288 (1959) (...
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