Eaves v. Progressive Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1950
• Docket Number: 16388.
• Citation: 60 S.E.2d 687,217 S.C. 365
• Parties: EAVES v. PROGRESSIVE FIRE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

60 S.E.2d 687

217 S.C. 365

EAVES v. PROGRESSIVE FIRE INS. CO.

No. 16388.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 27, 1950

Schultz & Mills, Columbia, for appellant.

John Gregg McMaster, Columbia, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

Action in this case was commenced by the respondent in the County Court for Richland County, seeking to recover under a fire insurance policy which, it is contended, was issued by the appellant. The cause came on to be heard before the Honorable Legare Bates, Presiding Judge, and jury. Both sides made motions for directed verdicts which resulted in appellant's motion being denied and respondent's motion being granted in the sum of $450, said amount being determined by the jury.

Appellant then made timely motion for a new trial which was denied, and it is now contended before this Court that the testimony was insufficient to establish the effective force of the contract of insurance at the time of the loss, that the effective force of the contract of insurance was a question of fact for the jury, and that the verdict should have been itemized.

On February 17 1949, respondent paid 72cents premium in advance and signed an application for the issuance of a contract of fire insurance upon the contents of her home in the City of Columbia and was issued a receipt therefor by an agent of the appellant which stated: 'No obligation is incurred by this company by reason of this deposit, unless and until a policy is issued upon said application and delivered to said applicant.'

The application which was filled out at this time stated in part: 'I agree that said answers, with this declaration, shall form the basis of a contract of fire insurance * * * and that the policy which may be granted by the said company in pursuance of this application shall be accepted subject to the conditions and agreements contained in such policy. I further agree that no obligation shall exist against said company on account of this application although I may have paid the premiums thereon, unless said company shall issue a policy in pursuance thereof, and the same is delivered to me.'

The aforementioned application was the basis for the issuance of the insurance contract in question, which, from the evidence, appears to have been placed under respondent's door by appellant's agent during respondent's absence at approximately 11:00 or 11:30 a. m. on March 5, 1949. Upon respondent's return home about 2 p. m. of the same day she found her residence in flames and, after the fire had been extinguished, discovered the policy where it had been placed by the insurance agent. The policy shows that it was countersigned March 7, 1949, two days hence, and there is testimony to the effect that it was intended to be effective as of that date. The crucial question, therefore, is whether or...