Eber v. Harris County Hosp. Dist.

• Citation: 130 F.Supp.2d 847
• Decision Date: 01 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. H-99-3450.,CIV. A. H-99-3450.
• Parties: Stephen R. EBER, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

130 F.Supp.2d 847

Stephen R. EBER, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. CIV. A. H-99-3450.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas.

February 1, 2001.

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Keith Lovelace, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Stephen R. Eber, plaintiff.

Barbara Ann Callistien, Attorney at Law, Christopher L. Janak, Office of Harris County Attorney, Houston, TX, for Harris County Hospital District, defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendant Harris County Hospital District's ("HCHD") motion for summary judgment and sanctions (# 16). HCHD seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff Stephen R. Eber's ("Eber") claims arising from alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment is warranted.

I. Background

Eber, who holds bachelor's degrees in biology and nuclear medicine as well as a law degree, alleges that he has suffered from venous stasis for a number of years. According to Eber, this condition, which causes blood to pool in his legs, has worsened over time. He contends that when employed by HCHD, the disease prevented him from standing or walking for extended periods of time and required him to elevate his feet periodically. Eber's condition, however, did not preclude him from working. He held the position of Nuclear Medicine Supervisor at Lyndon B. Johnson General Hospital ("LBJ") from April 18, 1991, through September 10, 1997, when he was transferred to another HCHD hospital, Ben Taub General Hospital ("Ben Taub"), where he was assigned to work as a nuclear medicine technician. Eber argues that the move from LBJ to Ben Taub was a demotion from a supervisory to a technical position, was accompanied by a decrease in pay, and was discriminatory in nature. HCHD denies that Eber's pay was decreased or that he was a victim of discrimination, citing performance-related reasons for the transfer.

Days after the transfer, Eber received a job offer from Lieber & Moore Cardiology Associates, P.A. ("Lieber & Moore") to perform nuclear medicine procedures in a clinical setting. On September 16, 1997, Eber resigned from HCHD and soon began working at Lieber & Moore, where he was employed as a nuclear medicine technician until May 12, 1998. On April 14, 1998, Eber was admitted to Cypress Fairbanks Hospital for treatment of a streptococcal infection in his legs. After he was discharged from the hospital on April 27, 1998, he experienced cardiac problems arising as a result of the leg infection, causing him to seek additional medical care. On June 6, 1998, Eber was admitted to Methodist Hospital, where he underwent aortic heart valve surgery. Although he lapsed into a coma for several weeks and suffered temporary multi-organ system failure, he eventually recovered and was discharged from the hospital on July 26, 1998.

Dr. John Taxis ("Dr. Taxis") examined Eber on September 2, 1998, and released him to return to work on September 7, 1998. On September 8, 1998, Dr. James H. Pickett ("Dr. Pickett"), likewise, approved his return to work. Eber contends, however, that he was suffering from depression, and his wife prevailed on him to see a psychiatrist. On September 9, 1998, Eber consulted Dr. Larry Flowers ("Dr. Flowers"), a psychiatrist, who diagnosed him with major depressive disorder and prescribed Prozac. According to Dr. Flowers's affidavit, Eber "did not return to normal functioning for at least 9 months." Eber claims that during this period, he "could not do tasks such as driving a car, shopping for groceries, paying bills and in fact was in a zombie-like state and unable to function." According to Eber's deposition testimony, however, in mid-September 1998, he went to the offices of the Texas Workforce Commission ("TWC") and applied for unemployment compensation.

On April 27, 1999, approximately 594 days after his transfer, Eber signed a charge of employment discrimination, which his attorney forwarded to the EEOC the following day. This charge alleges that he was disabled during the time he was employed by HCHD and was constructively discharged when HCHD failed to accommodate his special needs arising from the disability. Eber was issued a notice of right to sue on July 12, 1999, upon the EEOC's dismissal of his charge as untimely filed. Eber instituted this lawsuit on October 8, 1999, alleging that HCHD had discriminated against him on the basis of a disability in violation of Titles I and II of the ADA.¹

II. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 506 (5th Cir.1999); Marshall v. East Carroll Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 134 F.3d 319, 321 (5th Cir.1998); Wenner v. Texas Lottery Comm'n, 123 F.3d 321, 324 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1073, 118 S.Ct. 1514, 140 L.Ed.2d 667 (1998). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. See Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994)).

Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Colson, 174 F.3d at 506; Marshall, 134 F.3d at 321-22; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. "[T]he court must review the record `taken as a whole.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348). All the evidence must be construed "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence, assessing its probative value, or resolving any factual disputes." Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 n. 14 (5th Cir.1993)); see Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2110; Colson, 174 F.3d at 506; Marshall, 134 F.3d at 321; Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 134 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067, 119 S.Ct. 794, 142 L.Ed.2d 657 (1999); Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 435 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1103, 119 S.Ct. 868, 142 L.Ed.2d 770 (1999). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 401, 112 L.Ed.2d 349 (1990); see Marshall, 134 F.3d at 321. "Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2110 (citing 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2529, at 299 (2d ed.1995)). "That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that `evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'" Id. (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, at 300).

Nonetheless, "`only reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.'" Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n. 14, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir.1989)). "If the [nonmoving party's] theory is ... senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted." Id. at 468-69, 112 S.Ct. 2072. The nonmovant's burden is not satisfied by "some metaphysical doubt as to material facts," conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, speculation, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute, or "only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075; see Hart, 127 F.3d at 435; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047; Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994)); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof at trial. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113...