Ebert v. Genpact Ltd.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL 3:21-CV-00980
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER EBERT, Plaintiff, v. GENPACT LIMITED, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER EBERT, Plaintiff,
v.
GENPACT LIMITED, Defendant.

CIVIL No. 3:21-CV-00980

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

March 31, 2022

MEMORANDUM

JENNIFER P. WILSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Before the court is Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 8.) This action was brought by Plaintiff Christopher Ebert (“Ebert”) to recover damages for Defendant's alleged wrongful termination of Ebert's employment. (Doc. 1-2.) Defendant, Genpact Limited^[1](“Genpact”), has moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Ebert was an at-will employee under Pennsylvania law, that he has not otherwise alleged facts that would indicate that a public policy was violated, and that employment discipline and ultimate employment termination are insufficient grounds to establish an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (Doc. 9.) Because the court finds that Genpact's handbook clearly established an at-will employment relationship; Ebert has alleged only personal adverse consequences, rather than a

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broader concern for society as required by the public policy exception to the general presumption in favor of at-will employment; and because the employment discipline and termination described in the complaint do not amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court will grant the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 8.)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

According to the complaint, Ebert was hired by Genpact on August 7, 2017. (Doc. 1-2, ¶ 3.) Ebert alleges that throughout his time working for Genpact, he only received positive reviews and feedback until he took a company survey that purported to be anonymous regarding his experiences at Genpact. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 18-19, 22-23.) Ebert asserts that after providing his responses to this survey, he was placed on a “Performance Improvement Plan, ” given unsatisfactory job performance evaluations, and ultimately faced employment termination without good cause on January 31, 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 23.)

On the basis of these facts, Ebert filed a three-count complaint on December 30, 2020 alleging wrongful termination/breach of contract, wrongful termination/retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Genpact. (Id.) This case was removed to federal court from the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County on June 1, 2021. (Doc. 1.) On June 6, 2021, Ebert filed a motion to remand. (Doc. 5.) Genpact filed the instant motion to dismiss,

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accompanied by a supporting brief, on June 14, 2021. (Docs. 8, 9.) The court stayed briefing of the motion to dismiss pending resolution of the motion to remand. (Doc. 12.) The court denied the motion to remand on July 23, 2021, and set a new briefing schedule for the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 15.) In accordance with this schedule, Ebert filed a brief in opposition on August 6, 2021. (Doc. 18.) Genpact timely filed a reply brief.^[2] (Doc. 19.) Accordingly, the motion is ripe for disposition.

JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the parties have complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. Further, venue is appropriate because the action detailed in the complaint occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the

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plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). To determine whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief, ” disregards the allegations “that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth, ” and determines whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).

DISCUSSION

Genpact argues that the complaint should be dismissed because Pennsylvania is an at-will employment state, absent a statute or contract to the contrary, and therefore a claim for wrongful termination is unavailable to Ebert. (Doc. 9, p. 5.)^[3] In addition, Genpact asserts that its employee handbook, which Ebert claims formed a contractual relationship with Genpact and which Genpact attached to its brief in support of the instant motion, unequivocally indicates that Ebert's employment was at-will. (Id. at 6-9.) Genpact also argues that Ebert has not established an exception to the general rule that he was an at-will employee,

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and therefore, his claims for wrongful termination based on breach of contract and for retaliatory discharge should be dismissed. (Id. at 9-10.) Finally, Genpact asserts that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is unavailable to Ebert as a matter of law because such claims are generally unavailable in the employment context absent extreme circumstances which do not exist in this case. (Id. at 11-12.)

Ebert claims that the court cannot consider the documents attached to Genpact's brief because they are “unverified, ” were not attached to his complaint, and because Ebert “never saw the Exhibits attached to the Defendant's Brief, nor were they given to him at the time of his hire, or thereafter.”^[4] (Doc. 18, p. 7.) The remainder of Ebert's brief restates facts and legal conclusions from his complaint, which do little to respond substantively to Genpact's arguments. In the alternative, Ebert requests that the court grant leave to file an amended complaint. (Id. at 15.)

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A. Ebert's Breach of Contract and Retaliation Claims Will be Dismissed Without Prejudice.

Under Pennsylvania law, ^[5] the general rule is that “absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, either party may terminate an employment relationship for any or no reason.” Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 562 (Pa. 2009) (citing Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283 (Pa. 2000) (noting that Pennsylvania courts have recognized for over a century that an employer may terminate an employee for any reason absent a contractual provision to the contrary)). In other words, employment in Pennsylvania is presumed to be “at-will.”

This is a strong presumption. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has stated:

Absent a definite contract to the contrary . . ., the reasonable expectations of the parties in the employment relations setting are that the employee will work for the employer only for so long as both desire. While an employment contract which is clearly for a term of a specific number of years would be enforceable, any language short of this definiteness is generally strictly reviewed because of the pervasive presumption that the employment is at-will.

Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).

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Where, as here, a plaintiff attempts to use an employee handbook as the basis for a contractual employment relationship, courts have held that:

A handbook is enforceable against an employer if a reasonable person in the employee's position would interpret its provisions as evidencing the employer's intent to supplant the at-will rule and be bound legally by its representations in the handbook. The handbook must contain a clear indication that the employer intended to overcome the at-will presumption. We have held that it is for the court to interpret the handbook to discern whether it contains evidence of the employer's intention to be bound legally.

Luteran v. Loral Fairchild Corp., 688 A.2d 211, 214-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (quoting Small v. Juniata College, 682 A.2d 350, 353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).

In addition, courts have held that “provisions in employee handbooks which contain disclaimers or state there is no intent to create an employment contract are sufficient to retain the at-will presumption.” Raines v. Haverford College, 849 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Ruzicki v. Catholic Cemeteries Ass `n, 610 A.2d 495, 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)) (finding no employment contract to defeat the at-will presumption where the handbook's disclaimer stated its purpose “is not intended to give rise to any contractual obligations or to establish an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine”)); Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 941 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (quoting Caucci v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 153 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2001)) (“Generally, explicit disclaimers of contract formation in an employee handbook preclude a breach of contract claim.”). These principles are also true for implied contracts based on employee

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handbooks. See Jacques v. Akzo Int'l Salt, Inc., 619 A.2d 748, 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“An employee handbook only forms the basis of an implied contract if the employee shows that the employer affirmatively intended that it do so.”); Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-Univ. Hosp., 612 A.2d 500, 504 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding that an employee handbook containing “disclaimer” language could not form the basis for a breach of contract action since an implied contract was not formed as a matter of law); but see DiBonaventura v. Consol. Rail Corp., 539 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“An employee handbook that explicitly indicates that discharge will be for just cause only...