Raines v. Haverford College

• Decision Date: 12 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-CV-6969.,93-CV-6969.
• Parties: Kenneth RAINES, Plaintiff, v. HAVERFORD COLLEGE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

849 F. Supp. 1009

Kenneth RAINES, Plaintiff, v. HAVERFORD COLLEGE, Defendant.

No. 93-CV-6969.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

April 12, 1994.

Louis Rosner, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiff.

Carol B. Trask, Dechert Price & Rhoads, Philadelphia, PA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOYNER, District Judge.

This matter before the Court concerns defendant's motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In response, plaintiff has filed a motion to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant defendant's motion and deny plaintiff's motion.

Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the appropriate method in which to challenge the legal sufficiency of a claim. See United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 833 (M.D.Pa.1989). In ruling upon a 12(b)(6) motion, the court primarily considers the allegations in the complaint, although matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to the complaint may also be taken into account. Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pennsylvania Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3rd Cir.1990). In so reviewing the pleadings and any materials of record, the court must accept as true all of the matters pleaded and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, construing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3rd Cir.1990); Hough/Loew Assoc., Inc. v. CLX Realty Co., 760 F.Supp. 1141, 1142 (E.D.Pa.1991). A complaint is properly dismissed if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Ramson v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3rd Cir.1988).

Additionally, Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend its pleading by leave of court and that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (1993). It is within the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion to amend. Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 519 (3rd Cir.1988); Tarkett, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 144 F.R.D. 289, 290 (E.D.Pa.1992). Courts in this Circuit generally grant such requests liberally, and deny them only where there has been undue delay, bad faith or where it would be prejudicial to the nonmoving party. Transport Workers, Local 234 v. Septa, 137 F.R.D. 220, 223 (E.D.Pa.1991). Further, where the proposed amendment fails to state a cause of action or to raise meritorious claims, leave to amend should also be denied. Perfect Plastics Indus. v. Cars & Concepts 758 F.Supp. 1080, 1082 (W.D.Pa.1991); Transport Workers, 137 F.R.D. at 223.

Discussion

Plaintiff, a former employee at Haverford College, filed a five count complaint against defendant after defendant terminated plaintiff from his position as a carpenter foreman in December, 1992. The complaint states that plaintiff was allegedly terminated for "abuse of college time and materials and submitting false time sheets." Complaint, para. 8. According to the complaint, however, defendant had a long standing policy and practice of allowing maintenance department employees to use scrap materials belonging to defendant and allowing employees to perform construction and maintenance projects for their own personal benefit during "non-busy" work time. Id. at para. 9.

Plaintiff, a black male, has sued defendant alleging claims of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 as amended, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S.C.A. § 951 et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as claims of breach of contract and detrimental reliance. The pending motions concern counts four and five, plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and detrimental reliance. Defendant maintains that plaintiff has failed to set forth any claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to these two claims.

A. Breach of contract

Plaintiff has sued defendant for breach of contract alleging that the "employee handbook and other written and unwritten policies, practices and procedures constituted a binding contract of employment" between the parties that "provided both a substantive right to continued employment ... and governing the manner in which, discipline (including discharge) could be implemented." Complaint, para. 23. Plaintiff further asserts that defendant breached this contract by not following the procedures set forth in the handbook when it terminated plaintiff. Id. at para. 24. Defendant now asserts that plaintiff fails to state a claim because the employee handbook does not constitute an employment contract.

In response, plaintiff requests that he be allowed to amend paragraphs 23 and 24 of the complaint in order to state the following:

23. The employee handbook and other written and unwritten policies, practices and procedures, including A Guide For Supervisors: Effective Management and Employee Discipline constituted a binding contract ...

24. Defendant terminated plaintiff without cause, in violation of its contractual obligation. Whether or not defendant had good cause to discipline and/or to discharge Mr. Raines, defendant failed to follow the procedures set forth in the employee handbook ...

However, even in light of the proposed amendments, plaintiff fails to state a claim, and therefore, plaintiff's motion is denied because the amendment is futile.

Case law in Pennsylvania clearly holds that the employment-at-will doctrine applies absent a clear intent by the parties to the contrary. Under this doctrine, an employee can be discharged for any or no reason. Ruzicki v. Catholic Cemeteries, Inc., 416 Pa.Super. 37, 610 A.2d 495, 497 (1992). In order for the presumption of employment-at-will to be overcome, there must be either an express contract between the parties, or an implied in-fact contract plus additional consideration passing from the employee to the employer from which the court can infer the parties intended to overcome the at-will presumption. Id. (quoting Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 376 Pa.Super. 90, 95, 545 A.2d 334, 336 (1988) (citations omitted)).

In order for an employee handbook to constitute a contract, it must contain a clear indication that the employer intends to overcome the at-will presumption. Ruzicki, 416 Pa.Super. 37, 610 A.2d 495, 497. Further, under the reasonable person standard, a handbook is only enforceable as a contract if a reasonable person in the same position as the employee would interpret its provisions as evidencing an intent by the employer to overcome the at-will presumption. Id. Moreover, it is for the court to determine whether the handbook contains any provisions indicating such an intent by the employer. Id.; see also Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 660 (3rd Cir.1990) (duty of court to determine if evidence suffices to defeat at-will presumption).

Courts have held that provisions in employee handbooks which contain disclaimers or state there is no intent to create an employment contract are sufficient to retain the at-will presumption. For instance, in Ruzicki, the court found there was no employment contract to defeat the at-will presumption where the handbook's disclaimer stated its purpose "is not intended to give rise to any contractual obligations or to establish an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine." Ruzicki, 416 Pa.Super. 37, 610 A.2d 495, 496. Likewise, in Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-Univ., 417 Pa.Super. 316, 612 A.2d 500 (1992), the court also found that defendant's disclaimer contained in the employee's manual, which stated that the guidelines "are a summary of the Hospital Manual and group benefits policies with insurance companies, and are not intended to be a legal contract," clearly indicated the employer's intent not to confer any rights upon its employees. Therefore, plaintiff's claim for breach of contract failed. Rutherfoord, 417 Pa.Super. 316, 612 A.2d 500, 504.

In the present case, plaintiff asserts that the employee handbook, along with other written and unwritten policies, constitute a contract so as to overcome the at-will presumption. However, the handbook contains an introductory letter from the President of the College which states "The handbook of course is not a contract of employment, but it is intended to serve as an introduction and guide to expectations at Haverford."¹ In light of the above cases, the handbook clearly fails to create a contract of employment as alleged by plaintiff.²

Plaintiff next claims the handbook clearly establishes that employees could only be terminated for cause, and further that defendant violated its procedure by failing to follow its four-step process regarding disciplinary actions. Plaintiff states that these policies clearly indicate defendant's intent to alter the at-will relationship. However, even where such policies exist, plaintiff must show that they were offered as binding terms of one's employment so as to become part of a contract of employment and alter the at-will status. "A company may indeed have a policy upon which they intend to act, given certain circumstances or events, but unless they communicate that policy as part of a definite offer of employment they are free to change as events may require." Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-University, 417 Pa.Super. 316, 612 A.2d 500, 504 (1992) (quoting Morosetti v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 522 Pa. 492, 496, 564 A.2d 151, 152-53 (1989)).

In the present case, there is no indication that defendant made any "just cause" policy as part of a definite offer of employment, or even that such a policy exists. Both the handbook and A Guide For Supervisors: Effective...