Eccleston v. Ortiz
| Decision Date | 17 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 20-7042 (RMB) |
| Parties | SEBASTIEN LEIGH ECCLESTON, Petitioner v. DAVID ORTIZ, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Petitioner did not submit a certified copy of this trust fund account statement. Therefore, the Court will administratively terminate this action pursuant to Local Civil Rule 54.3,1 subject to reopening upon receipt of either the $5 filing fee for a habeas petition or the certified trust fund account statement required by 1915(a)(2).
Petitioner should also be aware that pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts,2, the judge must promptly examine the petition and "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner." § 2254, Rule 4. If Petitioner were to reopen this action by paying the filing fee or submitting his certified trust fund account statement, the Court would order Respondent to answer only one ground for relief alleged in the Petition and Addenda.
Petitioner Sebastien Leigh Eccleston, a prisoner incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey, is challenging his conviction by plea agreement on May 3, 1996 in the United States District Court, District of New Mexico, Criminal No. 95-0014(JB). (Pet., Dkt. No. 1.)
On May 3, 1996, Eccleston pled guilty to four counts: (i) carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1), and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2; (ii) "us[ing and carry[ing] a firearm ... during and in relation to a crime of violence," carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2119(1), and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2; (iii) "obstruct[ing], delay[ing] and affect[ing], and attempt[ing] and conspir[ing] to obstruct, delay and affect commerce ... by robbery ... in that [Eccleston] did unlawfully take and obtain personal property" from Karen Kuepers "by means of actual and threatened violence, and fear of injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2"; and (iv) "us[ing [and carry[ing] a firearm ... during and in relation to a crime of violence," in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 924(c) and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.
United States v. Eccleston, No. CIV 19-1201 JB\CG, 2020 WL 4557094 (D.N.M. July 28, 2020). After sentencing, Petitioner extensively challenged his conviction and sentence in direct and collateral appeals. Id., n. 1. Most recently, Petitioner's sentencing court denied his successive § 2255 motion under United States v. Davis,139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), in which the Supreme Court held that § 924(c)'s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Id.
Petitioner alleges the following grounds for relief in his petition:
In his first Addendum ("Addendum No. 1"), Petitioner adds the following claims:
(Addendum No. 1, Dkt. No. 1-2.)
(Addendum No. 2, Dkt. No. 2 at 1-2.)
Petitioner, in his third Addendum ("Addendum No. 3"), alleges that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the Indictment lacked a nexus to Interstate Commerce for Hobbs Act robbery. (Addendum No. 3, Dkt. No. 3.) Finally, in his fourth Addendum ("Addendum No. 4"), Petitioner maintains that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because he "did not know he was being enhanced as a repeat offender for a firearm that was not 'used' in the second or subsequent offense for Hobbs Act robbery, under 924(c), at the time of the plea." (Addendum No. 4, Dkt. No. 6 at 2.)
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to replace traditional habeas corpus under § 2241 for federal prisoners, for the purpose of allowing prisoners to file motions seeking collateral review oftheir sentences in the sentencing court rather than in the district of confinement. Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg, 868 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2017). A federal prisoner must seek collateral review of his conviction or sentence under § 2255, unless the prisoner can establish that the saving clause of § 2255(e) is applicable. Id. The saving clause applies when the remedy by motion under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner's sentence. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 178 (citing § 2255(e)).
In 1996, Congress added significant gatekeeping provisions to § 2255, restricting second or successive § 2255 motions solely to instances of "newly discovered evidence" or "a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." Id. at 179 (quoting § 2255(h)). Congress did not address how a prisoner could raise a claim on collateral review that the federal criminal statute he was convicted for violating has since been interpreted more narrowly. Id. Thus, the Third Circuit determined that "in the unusual situation where an intervening change in statutory interpretation runs the risk that an individual was convicted of conduct that is not a crime, and that change in the law applies retroactively in cases on collateral review, he may seek another round of post-conviction review under § 2241." Id. (quoting In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997)).
To proceed under § 2241, two conditions must be met: (1) a prisoner must assert a claim of actual innocence because he is detained for conduct subsequently rendered non-criminal by an intervening Supreme Court precedent that, as found by the Third Circuit, applies retroactively in cases on collateral review; and (2) the prisoner must be barred from challenging the legality of his conviction under § 2255; in other words, the prisoner "'had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law may negate.'" Cordaro v. United States, --- F.3d---, 2019 WL 3542904, at *5 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 2019) (quoting In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 252.)
Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2082. Petitioner's conviction did not involve targeting drug dealers for the purpose of stealing drugs or drug proceeds. See Eccleston, 2020 WL 4557094 (D.N.M. July 28, 2020). Therefore, Petitioner cannot use the § 2255(e) safety valve to bring his claim under § 2241.
Petitioner also relies on Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) to bring a claim under § 2241. Petitioner pled guilty in May 1996; therefore, Bailey is not an intervening Supreme Court precedent.
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