Echols v. State

• Decision Date: 30 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. CR 99-1060.,CR 99-1060.
• Parties: Damien Wayne ECHOLS v. STATE of Arkansas.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

127 S.W.3d 486

Damien Wayne ECHOLS v. STATE of Arkansas.

No. CR 99-1060.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

October 30, 2003.

Mandell & Wright, L.L.P. (Houston), by Edward A. Mallett, Houston; and Alvin Schay, Little Rock, for appellant.

Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by David R. Raupp, Senior Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

Appellant Damien Wayne Echols appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R.Crim. P. 37. His prior appeal of this matter was reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a written order in compliance with Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.5(i). See Echols v. State, 344 Ark. 513, 42 S.W.3d 467 (2001) (Echols II). The trial court has completed its written order, and the matter is now before us for a decision on the merits. We find no error and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The gruesome, disturbing facts of these crimes were set out in great detail in this court's opinion in Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996) (Echols I), and we see no reason to repeat them here. Suffice it to say that Echols was charged, along with Jason Baldwin and Jessie Misskelley, with the murders of three eight-year-old boys, Michael Moore, Steve Branch, and Christopher Byers, which occurred on May 5, 1993, in West Memphis. The boys' bodies were found submerged in water in a drainage ditch near their homes. The bodies were naked and they had their right hands tied to their right feet and their left hands tied to their left feet. The evidence showed that two of the boys, Moore and Branch, had multiple knife wounds, but ultimately died from drowning. The third boy, Byers, had been mutilated, such that the skin of his penis had been removed, and the scrotal sac and testes were missing. The evidence demonstrated that Byers had bled to death. The evidence further demonstrated that all three boys had been sexually abused.

Misskelley was the first of the three codefendants to be tried, and he was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment and a total of forty years' imprisonment, respectively. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences in Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702, cert, denied, 519 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 246, 136 L.Ed.2d 174 (1996). Echols and Baldwin were subsequently tried together and were each convicted of three counts of capital murder. Baldwin received life imprisonment without parole, while Echols was sentenced to death. This court affirmed their convictions and sentences in Echols I. Echols then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, but that petition was denied. See Echols v. Arkansas, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S.Ct. 1853,137 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1997).

Echols subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37. The trial court denied the petition, and Echols appealed. This court, in Echols II, remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of a written order in compliance with Rule 37.5(i).¹ Thereafter, the State filed a petition for rehearing, which this court denied. See Echols v. State, 344 Ark. 513, 522-A, 42 S.W.3d 467, 473 (2001) (per curiam). The trial court completed its written order on August 2, 2001, and the appeal was again scheduled before this court. Subsequently, Echols filed a motion to stay the appeal proceedings, so that he could pursue forensic DNA testing in the trial court, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-112-201 (Supp.2001). This court granted the motion in Echols v. State, 350 Ark. 42, 84 S.W.3d 424 (2002) (per curiam). The stay was extended several times by this court, with a final extension being issued on June 19, 2003. See Echols v. State, 353 Ark. 755, 120 S.W.3d 78 (2003) (per curiam). ²

The appeal from the postconviction ruling is now before us for resolution on the merits.

I. Trial Court's Findings

Echols first argues that the trial court erred on remand by adopting verbatim the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the State. He contends that this deprived him of due process. In support of this claim, Echols offers the proposed findings and conclusions submitted below. He also contends that the trial court's order does not comply with this court's directive in Echols II. He thus asks us to remand this matter a second time for the trial court to make further findings. We decline this invitation.

Echols has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's order is insufficient under the requirements of Rule 37.5(i). Rather, his chief complaint seems to be that the trial court did not break down its findings and conclusions into the 200 specific proposals offered by Echols on remand. Our directive in Echols II, however, required only that the trial court make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the issues that Echols chose to pursue on appeal:

In sum, because Echols has been sentenced to death, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of a written order in compliance with Rule 37.5(i) and this court's holding in Wooten [v. State, 338 Ark. 691, 1 S.W.3d 8 (1999)]. We limit, however, the trial court's duties on remand to making factual findings and legal conclusions only as to the issues raised by Echols on appeal, as all other claims raised below but not argued on appeal are considered abandoned. Thus, this remand should not be construed by Echols as an opportunity to reopen the evidence or to raise new issues. Additionally, to avoid any lengthy delay in this matter, the order is to be completed within sixty days from the date the mandate is issued. We will then consider the issues raised on appeal.

344 Ark. at 519, 42 S.W.3d at 470-71 (citations omitted). From our review of the order now before us, we are confident that the trial court fulfilled our instructions.

We thus reject Echols's argument that the order does not comply with Rule 37.5(i).

We likewise reject his argument that his due process rights were violated due to the lack of opportunity to object to the trial court's findings and conclusions. Indeed, this court previously rejected this argument on October 11, 2001.³ Though there were no reasons given for our denial at the time, we now hold that our directive in Echols II did not provide for any further hearing or other "due process." In fact, the trial court could have completed this task on its own, without any input from the parties. That the trial court allowed the parties to submit proposed findings does not change the limited nature of the directive for remand. Accordingly, Echols is entitled to no relief on this point.

II. Trial Counsel's Conflicts of Interest

Echols's next three points involve allegations that his trial counsel, Val Price⁴, was burdened by conflicts of interest, such that his representation of Echols was adversely affected. Generally, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional, errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). An exception to the rule that the defendant must show probable effect upon the outcome is where the assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding. Id. But only in "circumstances of that magnitude" is the defendant relieved of the burden to show that counsel's inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the verdict. Id. at 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, n. 26, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)). "`[C]ircumstances of that magnitude' may also arise when the defendant's attorney actively represented conflicting interests." Id. at 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237.

In Mickens, the defendant had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel had been violated, because one of his trial attorneys had previously represented the murder victim and the trial court failed to inquire into the potential conflict. He contended that this failure to inquire required an automatic reversal of his conviction, under the holdings in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), and Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981). The Court disagreed, holding that automatic reversal is only required where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over counsel's timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict.

The Court explained that absent an objection at trial, a defendant must demonstrate "an actual conflict of interest," which the Court defined as "a conflict that affected counsel's performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237. See also Townsend v. State, 350 Ark. 129, 85 S.W.3d 526 (2002). The Court explained that "a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)).

Based on the foregoing principles, the Mickens Court denied the defendant's habeas claim, holding:

Since this was not a case in which (as in Holloway) counsel protested his inability simultaneously to represent multiple defendants; and since the trial court's failure to make the Sullivan-mandated inquiry does not reduce the petitioner's burden of proof; it was at least necessary, to void the conviction, for petitioner to establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected his co...