Eckert v. City of Camden
| Decision Date | 09 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | A-2431-20 |
| Parties | ROBERT ECKERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CAMDEN, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Argued October 18, 2022
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Camden County, Docket No. L-0064-19.
Gregg L. Zeff argued the cause for appellant (Zeff Law Firm, LLC attorneys; Gregg L. Zeff, of counsel and on the briefs; Eva C. Zelson and Derek J. Demeri, on the briefs).
Francis X. Donnelly argued the cause for respondent (Turner, O'Mara, Donnelly &Petrycki, PC, attorneys; Francis X. Donnelly, of counsel and on the brief; Robert J. Gillispie, Jr., on the brief).
Before Judges Messano, Gilson and Rose.
On January 31, 2018, plaintiff Robert Eckert, a captain in the City of Camden's Fire Department (Department), was injured responding to a fire along with two "probationary firefighters," Achabe Quinones and Jose A. Berrios, both recently transferred to plaintiff's fire company. Quinones and Berrios were two of thirty-three probationary firefighters hired in May 2017. In July, the Chief of the Department, Michael Harper, assigned two probationary firefighters to each of eight companies including plaintiff's company.
Seventeen years earlier, the Deputy Chief of Operations for the Department, Joseph Gforer, sent a memorandum to all battalion chiefs stating, "[a]s a matter of safety . . . [c]hiefs will make every effort to avoid staffing any company with more than one probationary firefighter." Although what exactly occurred at the scene of the January 2018 fire is disputed, plaintiff suffered serious injuries when the metal coupling on a firehose that was connected to a "live" hydrant flew into the air, striking him in the head. Plaintiff contended the incident occurred when Quinones was left alone near a hydrant and improperly activated it as plaintiff carried or was in close proximity to the hose.
Relying largely on Gforer's memorandum as a statement of the Department's policy, plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Camden (Camden) alleging a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. Plaintiff named no individual defendant in the complaint.[1] Specifically, plaintiff alleged: 1) Camden violated his substantive due process rights to be free from any "state-created dangers"; and 2) Camden's "policies, practices and/or customs," including a failure to properly train its firefighters, deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Camden filed an answer, including an affirmative defense that the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146, barred plaintiff's suit. Discovery ensued, and Camden subsequently moved for summary judgment.
The parties argued their positions before the Law Division judge. In an oral opinion that immediately followed, the judge said the case presented nothing "other than a fairly garden[-]variety workers' compensation matter," and the "intentional wrong" exception to the WCA's exclusivity provision that bars negligence suits by employees against their employers did not apply. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 (excepting an employer's "intentional wrong" from the WCA's exclusive remedy); Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &Co., 101 N.J. 161, 178-79 (1985) (establishing a "two-step" analysis to determine if employer's conduct amounted to an intentional wrong). Without further explanation, the judge said plaintiff's "constitutional claims [we]re even weaker," and, if permitted to go forward, "would completely swallow up workers' comp[ensation] and everything else." He entered an order granting Camden summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Before us, plaintiff contends the judge incorrectly applied the WCA's exclusivity provision to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, and, even if the WCA applied to plaintiff's CRA claims, for purposes of defeating summary judgment, plaintiff established that Camden's conduct amounted to an intentional wrong under N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. Plaintiff also argues that he presented a prima facie case of a violation of the CRA, because the evidence supported a cause of action for a violation of his due process rights under the doctrine.
Having considered the arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles, we affirm for reasons other than those expressed by the motion judge. See, e.g., Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018) ().
We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo applying the same standard as the trial court. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (citations omitted). We "must 'consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the nonmoving party.'" Meade v. Twp. of Livingston, 249 N.J. 310, 327 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).
"Summary judgment should be granted, in particular, 'after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "The 'trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'" Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 92 (2013) (quoting Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
We start by accepting arguendo plaintiff's contention that the WCA's exclusivity bar does not apply to constitutional claims brought under the CRA. In Gormley v. Wood-El, which we discuss in greater detail below, the Court noted "that it is questionable whether the workers' compensation bar-a state statutory immunity-can overcome a federal civil-rights claim." 218 N.J. 72, 105 n.10 (2014) (). Recently, the Court stated more definitively, "[i]t is understood that state workers' compensation exclusivity provisions do not bar claims brought under federal civil rights laws." Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 542 n.4 (2021) (citing 9 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 100.03[1]).
In Perez v. Zagami, LLC, the Court explained that "the CRA was intended to provide New Jersey citizens with a state analogue to [§] 1983 actions." 218 N.J. 202, 215 (2014). We assume, therefore, for purposes of this opinion only that the WCA exclusivity provision does not bar plaintiff's CRA claims. As a result, we need not address plaintiff's argument that Camden's conduct amounted to an intentional wrong, and N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 did not foreclose his complaint.[2]
In addition to Gforer's 2000 memorandum, plaintiff marshalled additional evidence in opposition to summary judgment. The president of the fire officers' union and captains other than plaintiff complained to Chief Harper about assigning more than one probationary firefighter to a company.[3] Edward Glassman, a Deputy Chief of the Department who retired in 2020, certified that he was aware of Gforer's memorandum, and Chief Harper knew that captains and other officers in the Department were concerned that assigning two probationary firefighters to a company jeopardized the safety of other firefighters and the public. Glassman also asserted that probationary firefighters did not receive adequate training on "Camden-type hydrants."
Herbert Leary, a battalion chief, was Quinones' training officer at the fire academy in 2017. Leary found Quinones' deficiencies "to be a concern," which he voiced to others. After retraining, Leary certified that Quinones remained "deficient in water supply, hydrant operations, hose lines, [wa]s unable to follow simple tasks, and ha[d] no sense of urgency."
Plaintiff argues he presented a prima facie case of a violation of the CRA because the evidence supported a cause of action under the doctrine. We disagree.
"The legal principles governing the liability of a municipality under the CRA and § 1983 are essentially the same." Winberry Realty P'ship v. Borough of Rutherford, 247 N.J. 165, 190 (2021). "Section 1983 applies only to deprivations of federal rights, whereas [the CRA] applies not only to federal rights but also to substantive rights guaranteed by New Jersey's Constitution and laws." Gormley, 218 N.J. at 97. N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) provides a private cause of action for violations of constitutional or statutory rights by state actors.
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