Eckert v. State

• Decision Date: 07 September 2021
• Docket Number: WD 83749
• Citation: 633 S.W.3d 435
• Parties: Scott W. ECKERT, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

633 S.W.3d 435

Scott W. ECKERT, Appellant,

v.STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

WD 83749

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: September 7, 2021

Justin Ortiz, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Karen L. Kramer, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division Four: Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, Presiding, Gary D. Witt, Judge and Roy L. Richter, Special Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Scott William Eckert ("Eckert") appeals from a judgment denying his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. Eckert contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss three counts of victim tampering because he was not brought to trial within the time required by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law ("UMDDL").¹ Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background²

On December 2, 2011, the State filed a criminal complaint against Eckert alleging felony victim tampering, which included a probable cause statement and a warrant. When the complaint was filed, Eckert was already in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections serving a life sentence for his convictions of forcible rape, first-degree statutory rape, tampering with physical evidence, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child.

On October 15, 2013, Eckert filed an Inmate's Request for Disposition form ("Request for Disposition"), seeking a final disposition of three counts of felony victim tampering presumably set forth in the criminal complaint.³ Eckert appeared before the court on November 6, 2013, without counsel. His matter was then set for hearing on December 4, 2013. On December 4, 2013, the State filed an information formally charging Eckert with three counts of victim tampering. On the same date, Eckert appeared with an attorney and waived a preliminary hearing, and the matter was bound over for trial on December 10, 2013.

On December 10, 2013, Eckert waived formal arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty, and requested a continuance. Over the State's objection, the trial court continued the matter to January 14, 2014 for a plea or trial setting. On January 14, 2014, Eckert requested another continuance and the trial court scheduled a "Plea/Trial Setting" for January 28, 2014.

On January 27, 2014, the day before trial, Eckert's counsel filed a "Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Charge an Offense."⁴ The motion to dismiss questioned whether Eckert could be charged with victim tampering based on letters he wrote after he had already been convicted of crimes involving the victim. When the parties appeared for the trial setting on January 28, 2014, the State requested time to file a response to the motion to dismiss as follows:

[The State]: The motion came in yesterday, I've just reviewed it, and I think that rather than stand and give oral arguments I would prefer a brief and the Court to rule on the bench, and then if you -- if the Court requires further oral argument, I would not object to setting a new date, but I would like to brief the motion before it's argued, Your Honor.

[Eckert's counsel]: And I have no objection to that.

[Trial court]: ... So, do you have any objection to [the court] taking [judicial] notice of those [cases]?⁵

[Eckert's counsel]: I have no objection, Your Honor.

[Trial court]: All right. So[,] I'll take judicial notice of [those cases].... Everybody agreed on that?

[The State]: Yes.

[Eckert's counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

[Trial court]: And I believe you'd agreed -- did you have -- I notice in your motion that you ... accepted the facts in the Statement of Probable Cause for the purposes of the motion.

[Eckert's counsel]: For purpose of this hearing[,] we accept all the statements in the probable cause, Your Honor.

[Trial court]: All right. So[,] I'll take notice of that including the file. And then I will allow the parties -- do you agree we'll allow 30 days for briefing?

[Eckert's counsel]: I do.

[Trial court]: All right.

[The State]: I'm agreeable to the [30-day] response.

[Trial court]: All right. So[,] it's your motion; who's briefing first?

[The State]: Well[,] I'm going to brief first since I carry the burden.

[Trial court]: All right.

[The State]: Some of her brief, it's already present in her motion.

[Trial court]: Okay. So[,] I'll find the State will provide its brief within 30 days and then make a docket entry requiring the defendant to provide any brief that he wants to within 30 days after that.

[Eckert's counsel]: That would be fine with me, Your Honor.

[Trial court]: All right. Did you hear all of this, Mr. Eckert?

[Eckert]: Most of it.

[Trial court]: Okay, here's what's going on, I'll recap.... I'm going to take [the motion to dismiss] under -- well it's not really under advisement yet because I'm going to allow briefing, and I'm going to allow the State 30 days to submit its brief, then I'll allow your attorney another 30 days after that to submit your brief, and then after that it will then be under advisement, and I'll take it into consideration after I receive both of those briefs. Or[,] if either party decides to waive briefing, just let us know, and at that point I'll consider it under advisement and move ahead. Do you have any questions, Mr. Eckert?

[Eckert]: No, sir, I don't.

Following the hearing, the trial court reflected the parties’ agreement with the following docket entry:

... Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is called up for hearing. Parties agree [the] court may take judicial notice of this file, [Eckert's underlying criminal case, and his pending post-conviction claim relating to that case]. Parties agree that [the court] will issue [a] facts of probable cause statement (for purposes of this motion only). [The] State may submit [a] brief within 30 days; and Defendant 30 days thereafter.

On March 17, 2014, the State filed its brief opposing the motion to dismiss. On April 25, 2014, Eckert filed a response to the State's brief. On May 23, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying Eckert's motion to dismiss, which stated:

On January 28, 2014, [the] State appeared by [Prosecuting Attorney]; Defendant appeared by polycom video appearance and in the Livingston County Courtroom by his [attorney]; the Court took up for hearing the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; and allowed the parties additional time to brief the issues. Briefing was completed on April 25, 2014.

Having considered the Motion, arguments, and briefs of the parties, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is overruled and denied.

The trial court also directed the parties to appear on June 10, 2014, and on that date, a trial setting was discussed:

[Eckert's counsel]: We'd like to set this for jury trial.

[Trial court]: All right. How long do you think it will take to try?

[The State]: One day, Your Honor.

[Trial court]: All right. How far out do you wish to set it?

[The State]: Well, Your Honor, we need to set it quickly. This is a case that has had a writ, and although there has been a pending motion that was ruled upon this last month, I think there were some delays in getting it set.

[Trial court]: All right. So sooner rather than later?

[Eckert's counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

[The State]: I really do think we need to set it in July.

[Eckert's counsel]: I think it's within less -- I believe we have less than 60 days left.

[Trial court]: All right. How about July the 18th?

[The State]: Got it.

[Eckert's counsel]: Yes.

The State filed an amended information on June 18, 2014. The amended information alleged that Eckert committed three counts of felony victim tampering in violation of section 575.270. On July 18, 2014, following a jury trial, Eckert was convicted on all three counts of victim tampering. Eckert's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Eckert , 491 S.W.3d 228 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016).

Eckert filed a timely pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15.⁶ Appointed counsel filed an untimely amended motion ("Amended Motion"). The motion court denied the claims in the Amended Motion by judgment dated September 19, 2018. In Eckert v. State , 591 S.W.3d 903, 905-07 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019), this Court reversed the motion court's judgment, and remanded for an independent inquiry into whether Eckert was abandoned by appointed counsel. On remand, the motion court determined that Eckert had been abandoned by appointed counsel, and that the merits of the untimely filed Amended Motion should therefore be considered.

Eckert's Amended Motion argued, inter alia , that trial counsel was ineffective for failing "to move to dismiss the charges against [Eckert], because the [State] brought [Eckert] to trial 31 days after the 180-day time period concluded after [Eckert's] filing demanding a trial under the [UMDDL]." Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court entered its judgment ("Judgment"), which included findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying all of the claims in Eckert's Amended Motion.⁷ With respect to the claim that is at issue in this appeal, the motion court found:

The review of the request for disposition on detainers appears before this court without being raised before. [Eckert] filed his request on October 15, 2013. The trial of [Eckert] was held July 18, 2014. Both Movant and trial counsel [ ] testified and the court finds that the trial was delayed for several defense requested matters including [Eckert's] request for appointed counsel [Docket entry 11/06/2013] and [Eckert's] motion to dismiss [Docket entry 1/27/2014]. The docket reflects and the Court finds that the Movant made at least one request for continuance in order to be adequately prepared for trial which was objected to by the State [Docket entry 12/10/2013].

(internal citations omitted). The motion court concluded that Eckert had not established that trial counsel's failure to seek dismissal of his charges fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, "nor was [the claim] supported by fact or law" because "Movant...