Eckliff v. Walters
| Decision Date | 15 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005-L-082.,2005-L-082. |
| Citation | 861 N.E.2d 843,2006 Ohio 4817,168 Ohio App.3d 727 |
| Parties | ECKLIFF, Appellant, v. WALTERS, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
McNamara, Hanrahan, Callender & Loxterman and Patrick R. Hanrahan, Mentor, for appellant.
Karen D. Lawson Co., L.P.A., and Karen D. Lawson, for appellee.
{¶ 1} This appeal originated from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. Appellant, Jamie L. Eckliff, the biological mother, appeals from an April 29, 2005 judgment entry in which the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and ordered that appellee, Timothy J. Walters, the biological father, did not owe any child support arrearages.
{¶ 2} On September 8, 2003, Lake County Department of Jobs and Family Services ("LCDJFS") filed a complaint for child support against appellee for the parties' minor child, Alexis, who was born in 1996.1 On October 7, 1997, appellee was ordered to pay $232.20 per month, plus processing fees, in child support for the child.
{¶ 3} On June 5, 2003, appellant's husband adopted the minor child, with appellee's written consent. At the time of the adoption, appellee owed $14,861.02 in back child support.
{¶ 4} On September 8, 2003, LCDJFS filed a complaint for child support and reimbursement against appellee for support of the minor child up to the date the adoption was finalized.
{¶ 5} The trial court held a hearing on the matter on September 2, 2004, before a magistrate. The parties stipulated that the amount of arrearages appellant owed was $14,861.02. The magistrate issued her decision on September 22, 2004, which the trial court adopted on April 29, 2005. It is from this judgment that appellant appeals, raising the following three assignments of error:
{¶ 6} "[1] The trial court committed an abuse of discretion and erred to the prejudice of appellant by prohibiting * * * testimony from appellee as to whether or not he understood whether the past due child support could be waived.
{¶ 7} "[2] The trial court committed an abuse of discretion and erred to the prejudice of [appellant] by finding that an alleged oral contract existed whereby appellant waived all child support arrearage in exchange for appellee signing the consent to adoption.
{¶ 8} "[3] The trial court committed an abuse of discretion and erred to the prejudice of appellant by allowing a past due support amount of $14,861.02 to be reduced to zero when the evidence was clear that [appellee] had failed to visit with the minor child or pay support for the minor child for over one year prior to an adoption proceeding regarding the minor child being filed in Lake County Probate Court."
{¶ 9} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it sustained appellee's objections with regard to whether he believed that back support could legally be waived. We disagree.
{¶ 10} A trial court's admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Anthony, 11th Dist. No. 2002-A-0096, 2003-Ohio-5712, 2003 WL 22429035, at ¶ 25. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment, but rather a finding that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we may not merely substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748.
{¶ 11} At the hearing, appellee was asked on cross-examination, "[I]s it your testimony that my client actually told you that if you sign this form, that she would waive any future or past support?" He responded that it was. However, when asked if those were her exact words, he said, "While we were discussing this, I asked her if I would pay any future or past support and her answer was no." Appellant's attorney then stated, "And so she is kind of giving you legal advice; isn't she?" At that point, appellee's attorney objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Appellant's attorney then inquired, "And did you ever ask an attorney for an attorney's advice on that issue?" Again, appellee's attorney objected, and the trial court sustained it. Finally, appellee was asked if he "ever talk[ed] to anybody about whether or not that was an accurate statement, that you could waive your past support?" Appellee's attorney objected once more, and the trial court sustained the objection for the third time.
{¶ 12} Appellant claims that when appellee said, "I asked her if I would pay any future or past support," he revealed that he did not know whether the agreement was legal. We disagree. Appellee's response could be interpreted to mean that when she asked him to sign the consent, and he responded by asking her if he would still have to pay future and past support, he was asking her if she would agree to that, not whether it was legal.
{¶ 13} Moreover, we agree with appellee's contention that "[a]n agreement between biological parents to exchange a consent to adoption for forgiveness of arrearages in current child support is an enforceable agreement," citing Tressler v. Tressler (1972), 32 Ohio App.2d 79, 61 O.O.2d 85, 288 N.E.2d 339, in support of this proposition.2
{¶ 14} In Nelson v. Nelson (1990), 65 Ohio App.3d 800, 804, 585 N.E.2d 502, this court disagreed with the rationale of Tressler, stating:
{¶ 15} (Citations omitted.)
{¶ 16} Despite disagreeing with the rationale of Tressler, we further reasoned:
{¶ 18} Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow appellant to question appellee regarding whether he believed that a waiver of back support was legal, since it is legal to waive back support. Thus, it was irrelevant as to what his belief was. Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶ 19} In his second assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court erred by finding that an oral agreement existed between the parties. After a thorough review of the record, we disagree.
{¶ 20} In Dinunzio v. Murray, 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-213, 2005-Ohio-4047, 2005 WL 1861966, at ¶ 31, this court stated:
{¶ 21}
{¶ 22} "It has long been held that if the parties voluntarily enter into [an agreement], * * * the agreement becomes a valid and binding contract between the parties." Phillips v. Phillips, 5th Dist. Nos. 2004CA00105 and 2004CA00005, 2005-Ohio-231, 2005 WL 121657, at ¶ 22. It is also well settled that a settlement agreement may be either written or oral and may be entered into prior to a hearing. Id. at ¶ 26. In effect, a settlement agreement is a contract designed to terminate a claim by preventing or ending litigation, and such agreements are valid and enforceable by either party. Brown v. Dillinger, 9th Dist. No. 05CA0040-M, 2006-Ohio-1307, at ¶ 10, quoting Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 501, 502, 660 N.E.2d 431.
{¶ 23} The necessary elements of a valid contract include "`an offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained for legal benefit and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of consideration.'" Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, at ¶ 16, quoting Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc. (N.D.Ohio 1976), 436 F.Supp. 409, 414. It is imperative that there was a "meeting of the minds" as to the essential terms of the agreement. Kostelnik, id. Although it is preferable to memorialize a settlement in writing, "an oral settlement agreement may be enforceable if there is sufficient particularity to form a binding contract." Id. at ¶ 15. This is because "`people must be held to the promises they make.'" Id. at ¶ 17, quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts (Perillo Rev.Ed.1993) 530, Section 4.1.
{¶ 24} Essentially, appellant argues that the testimony establishes that there was never a meeting of the minds between the parties. Appellant contends that "[w]hen...
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