Eclipse Prop. Dev. LLC v. Ammari
| Decision Date | 21 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 109298,ED 109298 |
| Parties | ECLIPSE PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT LLC, Appellant, v. Fareed AMMARI, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
For Appellant: Phillip K. Gebhardt, 1720 N. Main St., DeSoto, MO 63020.
For Respondent - Northeast Public Sewer Dist.: Robert K. Sweeney, Allison M. Sweeney, 503 Main. St., Hillsboro, MO 63050.
For Respondents - Sharon A. Kost and Jefferson Cnty., Mo.: Jason L. Cordes, 729 Maple St., Hillsboro, MO 63050.
For Respondents - Fareed Ammari, Sahar Ammari, Andrew S. Baur, Southwest Bank of St. Louis, BMO Harris Bank, National Association, Citibank, NA, Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., Keramat Ataei: Pro se.
The issues presented on appeal address the validity and priority of unpaid sewer fees charged against property owners by a statutorily-created public sewer district. Eclipse Property Development, LLC ("Eclipse") appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Northeast Public Sewer District (the "District") ordering satisfaction of the District's lien for unpaid sewer fees on property purchased by Eclipse at a delinquent tax sale (the "Property"). Eclipse raises two points on appeal. Eclipse first challenges the trial court's judgment that it pay the sewer lien by characterizing the base user sewer fee as a tax subject to the voting approval requirements of the Hancock Amendment in the Missouri Constitution, Article X, Section 22(a). Eclipse next argues that the trial court erred because under Section 140.4201 the District's sewer lien is inferior to the general real estate tax lien and thus did not survive foreclosure of the general lien release when Eclipse obtained the collector's deed from Jefferson County (the "County"). Because the base user sewer fee is charged only to properties connected to the District's sewer service line, the District's base sewer fee is not an unconstitutional tax, and is properly charged to the Property. Because Section 249.255 gives the District's sewer liens special priority and enforcement status equal to state and county tax liens, the District's unrecorded lien was not extinguished by the County tax sale. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Our review of the summary-judgment record shows that Eclipse purchased the Property at a delinquent tax sale and obtained the collector's deed from the County in March 2018. In April 2018, Eclipse filed a petition seeking declaratory judgment to confirm the tax sale and to quiet title to the Property against various parties who either claimed to have an interest in the Property or who may possibly assert an interest in the Property. Eclipse also included a claim for ejectment in the petition. The District was not a named party to the petition.
The District is a statutorily-created public sewer district located in the County organized under Chapter 204. The District sent Eclipse a bill in January 2019 for unpaid sewer fees on the Property at a base user fee of $31.73 per month. The unpaid fees dated back to April 16, 2015, for a total of $2,343.68 in unpaid fees. The District explained that the base user fee is calculated to support and maintain the operation, administration, and infrastructure of the individual sewer lines and overall sewer system. The District charges the base fee only to properties that access the sewer service line. Not all properties within the District are connected to the sewer service line. A property owner may disconnect a property from the sewer service line. To do so, the District performs an inspection, which it provides free of charge, following which the District caps off the infrastructure connecting the property to the sewer line.
The Public Water Supply District No. 2 of the County terminated water service to the Property in March 2012. The Property has not used metered water service since that time. Correspondingly, Eclipse suggests, and there is no evidence to the contrary, that the Property has since not used sewer service. The Property was connected to the sewer service line in March 2012 and remained connected to the sewer service line throughout the period claimed for unpaid sewer fees.
After the District sent its bill for unpaid sewer fees, Eclipse amended its petition to add the District as a party-defendant. The District filed a lien against the Property for the unpaid sewer fees in the amount of $3,528.45. With regard to its declaratory-judgment claim, Eclipse noted that the District only recorded, noticed, and asserted any lien on the Property on March 15, 2019, eleven months after Eclipse filed the initial petition. The trial court granted Eclipse a default judgment and interlocutory order of default against all defendants except the District.
Eclipse then moved for partial summary judgment against the District on its claims for declaratory judgment and quiet title. The District cross-moved for summary judgment.2 The trial court entered an order and judgment granting the District's motion for summary judgment and denying Eclipse's motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court ordered Eclipse to pay the District's lien for unpaid sewer fees for the Property in the amount of $3,528.45. Eclipse now appeals.
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we first must determine whether we have jurisdiction. First Nat'l Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Prop. Owners’ Ass'n, Inc., 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 2017) (citing Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997) ). An appeal only lies from a final judgment resolving all issues in the case. See id. (internal citation omitted). However, Rule 74.01(b)3 authorizes a trial court to enter judgment on fewer than all claims and certify that judgment as a "final judgment" for purposes of appeal where there is no just reason for delay. Id. at 221–22. We apply the following four-factor test to determine whether Rule 74.01(b) certification for appeal is proper:
(1) whether the action remains pending in the trial court as to all parties; (2) whether similar relief can be awarded in each separate count; (3) whether determination of the claims pending in the trial court would moot the claim being appealed; and (4) whether the factual underpinnings of all the claims are intertwined.
Mo. Land Dev. I, LLC v. Raleigh Dev., LLC, 407 S.W.3d 676, 685 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (internal citation omitted).
"Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal." Behrick v. Konert Farms Homeowners’ Ass'n, 601 S.W.3d 567, 573 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). "Where, however, the material facts are undisputed and the merits of the denied cross-motion for summary judgment are inextricably intertwined with the issues raised in the granted motion for summary judgment, the merits of the denial of the cross-motion may be reviewed on appeal." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
In the matter before us, not all of the claims pending before the trial court were resolved with the trial court's judgment. Although the judgment disposed of all claims between Eclipse and the District related to tax sale confirmation, quiet title, and declaratory judgment, there remain unadjudicated claims for breach of deed and warranties of title against the County and its tax trustee. Those claims seek contribution from the County as a third-party defendant and do not directly affect the issues on appeal and cannot moot the appeal. See Bank of Birch Tree v. Am. Mod. Home Ins. Co., 561 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018) ().
Although Eclipse's claims against the County remain pending before the trial court, Eclipse maintains the trial court's judgment is final for purposes of appeal under Rule 74.01(b). The record is clear that the remaining claims in the trial court are not pending as to all parties but only to the County. Because similar relief cannot be awarded in each count, the remaining claims against the County would not moot this appeal. Because the factual underpinnings of Eclipse's claims against the County and the District are not inextricably intertwined, the trial court properly certified the judgment as a final judgment under Rule 74.01(b). See Mo. Land Dev. I, LLC, 407 S.W.3d at 685. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 221 (citing Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244 ).
Eclipse raises two points on appeal. Point One asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the District, denying partial summary judgment to Eclipse, and ordering Eclipse to pay the sewer lien because the unpaid sewer fees at the base charge of $31.73 monthly are invalid in that the fee is a disguised or hidden tax subject to the voter approval requirements of the Hancock Amendment. Point Two claims the trial court erred because under Section 140.420 the District's lien is inferior to the general real estate tax lien and thus did not survive the foreclosure on the general release tax lien when Eclipse obtained the collector's deed.
The standard of review on appeal regarding summary judgment is essentially de novo. York v. Horner, 564 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (internal citation omitted). We will uphold the trial court's ruling on summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Rule 74.04(c) ). "We review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, taking uncontradicted facts in support of the motion as true and...
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