Eddins v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Decision Date05 December 1993
Docket NumberNo. 3:93-CV-754.,3:93-CV-754.
Citation877 F. Supp. 413
PartiesJerome Scott EDDINS, Plaintiff, v. GENEVA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Perry H. Windle, III and David A. Burkhalter of Burkhalter & Windle, PC, Knoxville, TN, for plaintiff Jerome S. Eddins.

Robert N. Townsend of Arnett, Draper & Hagood, Knoxville, TN, for defendant Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PHILLIPS, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), by consent of the parties and by order of the Honorable Leon Jordan, United States District Judge Doc. 14. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment Doc. 9, as amended Doc. 11, and supported by memorandum Doc. 10. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment Doc. 17, and defendant has filed a reply to plaintiff's response and objection to defendant's motion for summary judgment Doc. 18.

Defendant asserts that it is entitled to entry of summary judgment in its favor on the ground that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff's claim against it is based solely upon allegations that he was terminated from his employment as a result of his service on jury duty and, defendant asserts, the undisputed record reflects that plaintiff's employment was terminated for reasons unrelated to his jury service. Defendant further asserts that plaintiff has failed to establish that his jury service was a substantial factor motivating his discharge and has likewise failed to establish a demonstrable causal relationship between termination of his employment and his jury service. Accordingly, defendant argues, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under applicable Tennessee law. Since defendant asserts that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and since plaintiff has failed to establish he was discharged for jury service, defendant concludes that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the event the court does not grant summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims, defendant further asserts that plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages entitling defendant to partial summary judgment limiting any possible recovery of plaintiff should this case go to trial and plaintiff prevails Docs. 9, 11. Defendant relies upon the entire record, including, but not limited to, depositions of plaintiff, Carl Davis, and Sharon Jones, excerpts of which are attached to defendant's motion for summary judgment, as well as affidavits of Brenda Headrick, Ron Sanders and Greg Chambers, defendant's responses to plaintiff's interrogatories Nos. 9, 4, and 1, and defendant's response to plaintiff's document request No. 2 Doc. 10, w/attachments.

In her affidavit filed in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment, Brenda Headrick relates that she has been employed by Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Geneva, since April 1985 and her direct supervisor is Carl Davis. Mr. Davis was also the supervisor for Jerome Scott Eddins prior to termination of Mr. Eddins' employment, Ms. Headrick states, and during the period of time when she worked at Geneva under Mr. Davis, there has always been a lot of joking back and forth between employees and Mr. Davis as well as joking among employees themselves. In this connection, Mrs. Headrick relates, that prior to Mr. Eddins' termination of employment and while he was serving on jury duty, she recalled Mr. Davis making some comments to Mr. Eddins to the effect that, "I don't know why I'm paying you for a week's work, you're only working two days," but that these comments were always made in a joking manner and she always took them that way Doc. 9, Headrick Aff. attached.

Ron Sanders relates in his affidavit that he has been employed by Geneva since 1983 and his direct supervisor is Carl Davis, who was also the supervisor for Jerome Scott Eddins prior to termination of Mr. Eddins' employment. Mr. Sanders relates that while he has worked at Geneva under Mr. Davis there has always been a lot of joking back and forth between employees and Mr. Davis, as well as joking among employees themselves. In that connection, prior to Mr. Eddins' termination of employment and while he was serving on jury duty, Mr. Sanders recalls Mr. Davis making some comments to Mr. Eddins regarding jury service and his pay, but he does not recall the exact words, but he believes that these comments were always made in a joking manner and he always took them that way. While he cannot state specifically how Mr. Eddins viewed those remarks, Mr. Sanders never heard anything from Mr. Eddins indicating that he was offended by any of those comments Doc. 9, Sanders Aff. attached.

In his affidavit filed in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment, Greg Chambers relates that he has been employed by Geneva since 1986 and his direct supervisor is Carl Davis, who was also the supervisor for Jerome Scott Eddins prior to his termination. During the period of time he has worked at Geneva under Mr. Davis, Mr. Chambers relates that there has always been a lot of joking back and forth between employees and Mr. Davis, as well as joking among employees themselves. In that connection, prior to Mr. Eddins' termination of employment and while he was serving on jury duty, Mr. Chambers recalls Mr. Davis making some comments to Mr. Eddins regarding jury service and his pay, that he does not recall the exact words, but states that these comments were always made in a joking manner and he always took them that way. While he cannot state specifically how Mr. Eddins viewed these remarks, Mr. Chambers relates that he never heard anything from Mr. Eddins indicating that he was offended by any of those comments Doc. 9, Chambers Aff. attached.

Plaintiff has responded in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment arguing that clearly there are genuine issues of material facts as to whether plaintiff's grand jury service was a substantial factor in his termination from employment and that the issues of credibility are for the jury to decide. In addition, plaintiff asserts that there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff has made reasonable and good faith efforts to mitigate his damages and that this issue is likewise inappropriate for summary judgment and, accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied Doc. 17. Plaintiff has filed in support of his response to defendant's motion excerpts from the depositions of plaintiff, Jerome Scott Eddins, warehouse supervisor Carl Davis, distribution manager Sharon Jones, Greg Chambers, Ron Sanders, and Brenda Headrick Doc. 17, Collective ex. 1, as well as plaintiff's summons for jury service Doc. 17, ex. 2, section 22-4-108, Tennessee Code Annotated Doc. 17, ex. 3, plaintiff's response to defendant's first set of interrogatories and requests to produce Doc. 17, ex. 4, claimant's statement Doc. 17, ex. 5, disciplinary action report Doc. 17, ex. 6, and a psychological evaluation by Dr. Diana L. McCoy Doc. 17, ex. 7.

In its reply to plaintiff's response and objection to defendant's motion for summary judgment, defendant takes issue with some of the facts set forth by plaintiff in its response and argues, once again, that plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, that the record in this case fails to support plaintiff's claim that he was discharged for service on jury duty, and that defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Statement of Facts

Plaintiff began his employment with Geneva in December 1986. He was employed at the Knoxville distribution warehouse and his job duties consisted of checking to make sure lot numbers were correct according to the order, pulling, packing, and shipping drugs (Eddins Dep., pp. 56-57). Carl Davis, the warehouse supervisor, was plaintiff's supervisor and Mr. Davis reported to the distribution manager, Sharon Jones (Eddins Dep., p. 58; Jones Dep., pp. 4-5; Davis Dep., pp. 9-10). Plaintiff received a summons from Knox County Criminal Court to serve on jury duty beginning July 6, 1993, and the next work day plaintiff presented the summons to his supervisor, Carl Davis (Eddins Dep., p. 87; Doc. 17, ex. 2 attached).

When plaintiff reported for jury duty on July 6, 1993, he was informed that he would be serving on the grand jury which met on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday of each week for a period of four (4) months (Eddins Dep., p. 95). Plaintiff advised his supervisor that he would be required to serve on the grand jury and provided his supervisor with a copy of section 22-4-108, Tennessee Code Annotated, the statutory provision governing jury duty in the state of Tennessee (Eddins Dep., p. 96, ex. 3 attached). Mr. Davis advised plaintiff that he would be required to work from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. prior to serving on jury duty, but when plaintiff complained to Davis and Jones that he did not have time to come to work and then find a place to park for jury duty, he was no longer requested to report to work for the hour prior to jury service (Eddins Dep., pp. 91-93).

When Mr. Davis told Ms. Jones about Mr. Eddins jury duty, her response was, "What, another one?" (Davis Dep., p. 56). Ms. Jones also stated that, "I think they are going to summons everyone that works at Geneva sooner or later." (Jones, p. 34). Plaintiff asserts that approximately three (3) weeks after the start of his jury duty, Davis began making derogatory comments concerning Eddins jury service. Davis handed plaintiff his paycheck and told him, "I don't feel that you deserve to get this paycheck since your only working two days a week." (Eddins Dep., p. 168). Plaintiff further asserts that...

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3 cases
  • Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., No. 34272 (W.Va. 3/27/2009)
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 27, 2009
    ...Thus, reinstatement has evolved into an accepted remedy for the tort of retaliatory discharge. See, e.g., Eddins v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 413, 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) ("The Tennessee Supreme Court has clearly recognized the tort action of retaliatory discharge . . . and has furth......
  • Peters v. Rivers Edge Min., Inc.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 4, 2009
    ...Thus, reinstatement has evolved into an accepted remedy for the tort of retaliatory discharge. See, e.g., Eddins v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 877 F.Supp. 413, 421 (E.D.Tenn.1994) ("The Tennessee Supreme Court has clearly recognized the tort action of retaliatory discharge ... and has further he......
  • Smith v. Bridgestone/Firestone
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • February 23, 1999
    ...802 (1973). The burden rests first upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Eddins v. Geneva Pharmacy, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 413, 423 (E.D.Tenn.1993). After such a showing the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for......

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