Smith v. Bridgestone/Firestone

• Decision Date: 23 February 1999
• Docket Number: 9803-CV-00146
• Citation: 2 S.W.3d 197
• Parties: ALLEN SCOTT SMITH, PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, v. BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. AppealTennessee Court of Appeals
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

ALLEN SCOTT SMITH, PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT v BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC., DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

Appeal No. 01-A-01-9803-CV-00146

Tennessee Court of Appeals

February 23, 1999

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR RUTHERFORD COUNTY AT MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE

Rutherford Circuit No. 35343

THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. CORLEW, JUDGE

Mary A. Parker Stephen C. Crofford Douglas B. Janney, III 209 10th Avenue South, Suite 511 Nashville, Tennessee 37203 Attorneys For Plaintiff/appellant

Robert E. Boston Stephen W. Grace Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis 511 Union Street, Suite 2100 Nashville City Center Nashville, Tennessee 37219 Attorneys For Defendant/appellee

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

The opinion of the court was delivered by: William B. Cain, Judge

OPINION

Plaintiff, Allen Scott Smith, filed suit against his former employer Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. for retaliatory discharge for the prior filing of a worker's compensation complaint. Plaintiff sought " . . . actual damages including back pay, reinstatement, front pay if plaintiff is not reinstated, damages for embarrassment and humiliation, and punitive damages." *fn1

On April 24, 1997, following discovery plaintiff filed an amended complaint with a second count charging failure of the defendant to notify the State of Tennessee of worker's compensation injury in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(a). Damages sought were essentially the same as in the original complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant from February 1988 until October 7, 1994 at its Laverne, Tennessee plant. He suffered a work-related injury on September 12, 1994 but was required to continue work on a restricted work status.

On October 1, 1994, the security guard at the entrance to the Bridgestone plant grounds reported that Mr. Smith had left the plant grounds in a vehicle. Plaintiff's supervisor began a search for Mr. Smith in the plant. Mr. Smith was located on the plant grounds some four hours after the security guard's initial report; Smith asserted that he had never left the plant grounds. At a meeting on October 4, 1994 between management personnel, union repre-sentatives and Mr. Smith; defendant's labor relations manager Mr. Davenport decided to discharge plaintiff for leaving plant premises and filing an inaccurate work time card.

On October 7, 1994, plaintiff filed a grievance under the Union Management Collective Bargaining Agreement whereunder "union protest unjust discharge of Scott Smith. Request he be reinstated his record clear and be made whole for all loss of earnings benefits etc."[sic] *fn2 The defendant rejected the grievance.

On March 25, 1996, following a meeting between the plaintiff, union representatives and Mr. Davenport and another management employee, Mr. Smith was reinstated with all seniority restored, vacation pay restored and all insurance and fringe benefits restored. Back pay was denied and both plaintiff and the union agreed to this settlement of Smith's contract grievance.

The trial Judge granted summary judgment to the defendant on all issues holding:

As the Court understands the law, when such an issue is raised, it is first the duty of the Plaintiff to show to the Court the proof, prima facie, that discrimination has occurred which is unlawful, or that the violation has occurred. It appears to the Court for purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Plaintiff has satisfied this burden. When the burden is so satisfied, the burden then shifts to the Defendant to advance a non-discriminatory basis for the actions which occurred, in this case the termination of the Plaintiff. Again, it appears to the Court that the Defendant has satisfied this burden. The burden then again shifts to the Plaintiff to rebut the defense presented by the defendant, and it appears to the Court that it is in this particular that the Plaintiff has been unable to come forward with further proof, prima facie, so that the case should go forward. * * *

Having so decided, it may be unnecessary that the Court further consider the issue as to whether the action by the Plaintiff is now barred by what perhaps might amount to an accord and satisfaction. The evidence has been presented, and perhaps is not in controversy, showing that after the Plaintiff's termination, the matter was presented to an arbitration through a procedure developed between the union of which the Plaintiff is a member and the management of the Defendant. It has been shown that the results of the arbitration, whether by agreement or by enforceable order, were that the Plaintiff was in fact reinstated without back pay, but with some back benefits. The Plaintiff accepted the decision, as did the Defendant. Having so accepted the decision, it appears to the Court additionally that further action by the Plaintiff is now barred. *fn3

The oft repeated standard for considering summary judgment applicable in both trial and appellate courts provides:

"[2, 3] In determining whether or not a genuine issue of material fact exists for purposes of summary judgment, courts in this state have indicated that the question should be considered in the same manner as a motion for directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiff's proof, i.e., the trial court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn.1991); Poore, 666 S.W.2d at 49; Dunn, 833 S.W.2d at 80; Wyatt v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tenn. App. 1977); Taylor, 573 S.W.2d at 480. Then, if there is a dispute as to any material fact or any doubt as to the Conclusions to be drawn from that fact, the motion must be denied. Poore, 666 S.W.2d at 49 ("[I]f the mind of the court entertains any doubt whether or not a genuine issue exists as to any material fact it is its duty to overrule the motion."); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn.App.1990). The court is not to "weigh" the evidence when evaluating a motion for summary judgment." Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Tenn.1993).

Little has changed since the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and Justice Harbison's early observations remain valid to this day:

" [7, 8] In concluding this opinion we feel it proper to comment upon the procedure which was followed in the trial of this case. Summary judgment proceedings in this state were authorized for the first time by Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. This new procedure was designed to fill a vacancy or void which had existed in prior practice and to provide a procedural step which had heretofore not existed. Under previous practice, in both the circuit and chancery courts, there had been no satisfactory intermediate step between the demurrer, which dealt only with the contents of pleadings, and a full-scale trial of a case upon the merits. The summary judgment procedure was designed to provide a quick, inexpensive means of concluding cases, in whole or in part, upon issues as to which there is no dispute regarding the material facts. Where there does exist a dispute as to facts which are deemed material by the trial court, however, or where there is uncertainty as to whether there may be such a dispute, the duty of the trial court is clear. He is to overrule any motion for summary judgment in such cases, because summary judgment proceedings are not in any sense to be viewed as a substitute for a trial of disputed factual issues." Evco Corporation v. Ross, 528 S.W.2d 20, 24-25 (Tenn.1975) (emphasis added).

There seems to be little dispute between the parties as to the applicable law relative to retaliatory discharge claims. Tennessee follows McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The burden rests first upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. Eddins v. Geneva Pharmacy, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 413, 423 (E.D.Tenn.1993). After such a showing the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tenn.App.1993).

At this point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the proffered reasons offered by the defendant are pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

In sustaining defendant's motion for summary judgment the trial court held that plaintiff Smith had carried his burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The court then held that the defendant had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection as a matter of law and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The question for our determination is whether or not the plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the "pretext" question.

Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), the avenues for proving "pretext" were varied. Until that time, the high court's controlling decisions in McDonnell Douglas, supra, and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), left lower courts, federal and state, to their own devices in determining what was necessary to prove pretext.

Three distinct approaches emerged. These have been referred to as:

" 1. "Pretext Only"

2. "Permissive Pretext Only" and

3. "Pretext Plus"" Kline v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 128 F.3d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1997).

Of these approaches, the sixth circuit had adopted "pretext plus" whereby the plaintiff must not only demonstrate that the employer's asserted reasons are pretextual but must introduce additional evidence of discrimination. Gagne v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314 (...