Edelstein v. Duluth, M. & I.R. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 05 March 1948 |
| Docket Number | 34418-34420,34437-34439. |
| Citation | 31 N.W.2d 465,225 Minn. 508 |
| Parties | EDELSTEIN et al. v. DULUTH, M. & I.R. RY. CO. (System Federation No. 71 Railway Employes' Dept. American Federation of Labor, Intervenor). |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The theory upon which a case is tried becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to on appeal.
2. Seniority rights of employes to employment arise only out of contract or statute.
3. Where, as here, a system of seniority rights requires an employe to fill a position, the requirement conditions the employe's right to a job, and if he fails to take the job he loses his job rights.
4. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. ss 151, 152, vests in an employes' statutory bargaining representative Exclusive authority to contract prospectively with their railroad employer with reference to rates of pay, rules, and working conditions.
5. An employment contract between a railroad and its employes' statutory bargaining representative may include provisions for the establishment of a system of employes' seniority employment rights.
6. An employment contract between a railroad and its employes' statutory bargaining representative containing provisions for seniority rights of employes may by agreement operating prospectively not only be amended and interpreted but also entirely superseded.
7. A contract between a railroad and its employes' statutory bargaining representative is binding on all employes regardless of their affiliation with the bargaining representative or lack of it.
8. An individual contract between a railroad and an employe thereof in conflict with an employment contract between the railroad and its employes' statutory bargaining representative is void.
9. The courts have jurisdiction to determine the rights of an employe under a contract between a railroad and its employes' statutory bargaining representative even though statutory remedies under the Railway Labor Act have not been exhausted.
10. A point raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.
11. Parties may waive provisions of a contract by ignoring them and acting as if they had no application.
12. Where contract provides that employes who have ceased to be such shall not be entitled to vacation rights, an employe earning such rights but not taking them before the termination of his employment is not entitled to them.
Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; Martin Hughes Judge.
Franklin B. Stevens and William H. Crago, Jr., both of Duluth, for defendant-appellant-respondent.
Richard R. Lyman, of Toledo, Ohio, and Thomas Vennum, of Minneapolis (Mulholland, Robie & McEwen, of Toledo, Minneapolis, of counsel), for intervener-respondent-appellant. Minneapolis, of counsel), for intervenerrespondent-appellant.
James P. Crea, of Hibbing, for plaintiffs-respondents.
In these cases plaintiffs sued defendant railway company as their employer to recover damages for wrongfully discharging them in violation of employment contracts between the parties. Decision below was to the effect that the so-called discharge was void; that plaintiffs were employes of defendant by virtue of their seniority rights under two contracts of employment; that one of these was negotiated by the intervener, System Federation No. 71 of the Railway Employes' Department of the American Federation of Labor, as the bargaining representative of all defendant's employes; that the other was an individual contract between defendant and plaintiffs for seasonal employment; and that plaintiffs as defendant's employes were entitled to their wages so long as defendant failed to employ them at available work and to vacation pay provided for under the contract. Defendant and intervener appeal.
The questions raised on the appeal are: (1) Whether, where there is no allegation or admission that a railroad is engaged in interstate commerce, but there was evidence showing that its lines extend interstate and the parties have proceeded upon the assumption that their rights are governed by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. ss 151--188, this court should decide the appeal upon the theory on which it was decided below;
(2) Whether employes of a railroad have seniority rights except by contract;
(3) Whether the particular contract here involved providing for seniority rights made it mandatory for an employe in the operation of the seniority rights plan to accept employment at any point on the division where the employe was employed, and, if so, whether refusal of the employe to accept such employment involved as a consequence the loss of his right to work;
(4) Whether a labor organization as the statutory bargaining representative of the employes of a railroad may bargain as to seniority rights of employes;
(5) Whether, if the preceding question is answered in the affirmative, an employment contract entered into by a railroad and a labor organization as the statutory bargaining representative of the employes
(a) may be altered, amended, or interpreted by negotiation between the railroad and the statutory bargaining representative;
(b) is binding upon employes not shown to be members of the labor organization designated as statutory bargaining representative; and
(c) excludes individual contracts between the railroad and its employes inconsistent with the contract between the railroad and the statutory bargaining representative;
(6) Whether the courts have jurisdiction of an action brought by an employe to enforce rights under a contract entered into by a railroad and the statutory bargaining representative, where the employe has not exhausted the administrative procedures provided in the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. s 151 et seq.;
(7) Whether this court should consider for the first time on appeal the question not raised below whether an employe may maintain an action without first exhausting his remedies, if any, under the provisions of the contract relative to the settlement of grievances by negotiation between representatives of the railroad and the labor organization;
(8) Whether, where plaintiffs at the time they were notified that their service with defendant was automatically terminated because of their failure to accept jobs as required by the seniority plan made part of the contract of employment failed to invoke the protection and benefits of rule 22(f), requiring defendant to give employes notice of layoff, of rule 28(d), requiring defendant to grant employes a hearing in case of dismissal for cause, of rule 14, requiring defendant to bulletin open jobs, and of rules 109 and 112, requiring any interpretation of rules to be made by a representative of defendant and the general committee of the employes' statutory bargaining representative, and whether, where plaintiffs brought suit upon the theory that their services with defendant had been terminated, they can invoke the protection and benefit of those rules; and
(9) Whether plaintiffs after termination of their employment were entitled to vacations with pay or payment in lieu thereof, which they had earned, notwithstanding a provision in a supplemental contract that no employe shall be entitled to such an allowance if his employment 'has terminated prior to the taking of his vacation.'
Intervener as the statutory bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act of numerous railway crafts, including carmen, negotiated a contract with defendant effective July 1, 1939, governing hours of labor, pay, working conditions, seniority rights, settlement of disputes, and other matters. The provisions of the contract are referred to therein as 'rules,' which are numbered.
Rule 18 provides generally that employes may not absent themselves from work without the permission of their foreman or for certain causes.
The matter of seniority rights in employment received detailed and painstaking consideration. Prior to the effective date of the contract (July 1, 1939), defendant's employes had seniority upon a local or point basis. For example, employes at Hibbing, Proctor, and every other point had seniority where they worked without regard to defendant's employes at other points. At the instance of defendant's employes, seniority was changed from point to railroad-division basis by including in the contract rule 24, which expressly provides that seniority shall be upon a division basis. Defendant's lines consist of two divisions--the Missabe and the Iron Range. Under the contract, the seniority rules affect alike all employes on a division, regardless of the point where they may be employed. Employes at Hibbing, Proctor, and other points on the same division are governed by the same rules of seniority. An exception was made as to certain employes at outlying points who had acquired seniority rights at the effective date of the contract.
Rule 14, so far as here pertinent, provides that when new positions are created or vacancies occur seniority will govern in filling them; that the railroad shall post bulletins at least five days before filling a vacant position so as to enable employes receiving a lesser rate of pay to apply for it; that a copy of the application shall be given to the local chairman of the labor organization representing the craft to which the position belongs; that an employe exercising seniority rights shall lose such rights to the job he left that if he fails to qualify for a new position he will have to take whatever position in his craft is open; and that 'If no bids are received by the Railway Company on any positions bulletined under this rule, the junior employee of the craft or class Will be required to fill the position.' (Italics supplied.) A further provision requires employes to...
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