Edens v. Bellini

• Decision Date: 01 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 3815.,3815.
• Citation: 359 S.C. 433,597 S.E.2d 863
• Parties: Susan EDENS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher Edens, deceased, Appellant, v. Loris BELLINI, S.p.a., Camel Robot S.r.i., Symtec, Inc., IDEA, Inc., Milliken & Company, Kelvin Statom, Kevin Gingerich and Dale Coy, Defendants, Of whom Milliken & Company, Kelvin Statom, Kevin Gingerich and Dale Coy are the Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

359 S.C. 433

597 S.E.2d 863

Susan EDENS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Christopher Edens, deceased, Appellant, v. Loris BELLINI, S.p.a., Camel Robot S.r.i., Symtec, Inc., IDEA, Inc., Milliken & Company, Kelvin Statom, Kevin Gingerich and Dale Coy, Defendants, Of whom Milliken & Company, Kelvin Statom, Kevin Gingerich and Dale Coy are the Respondents.

No. 3815.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted May 12, 2004.

Decided June 1, 2004.

Stephen R.H. Lewis and Karen Creech, both of Greenville, for Appellant.

Mark W. Bakker and Henry L. Parr, Jr., both of Greenville, for Respondents.

ANDERSON, J.:

Susan Edens, personal representative of the Estate of Christopher Edens (the Estate), filed wrongful death and survival actions against Milliken & Company, and three of its employees, Kelvin Statom, Kevin Gingerich, and Dale Coy (collectively, Respondents). The trial judge dismissed the claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 56 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm.¹

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 10, 1998, during the course of his employment as a subcontractor at Milliken's Abbeville plant, Christopher Edens was struck and crushed to death by a piece of machinery. Edens' employer, Sanders Brothers, Inc., had assigned him to the Abbeville plant where he assisted Milliken employees in various plant-related projects for about a year prior to his fatal on-the-job accident. During the morning and early afternoon on the day of the accident, Edens had been assisting Milliken employees install a cylinder on the door of a dye vat in the robotic shuttle area.

The area of the plant where the accident occurred had a massive robotic shuttle which moved back and forth on tracks to transport wool to and from dye vats where the wool was dyed. Along with other safety devices, pressure-sensitive "safety mats" were positioned on the floor between the dye vats. Once stepped upon, these mats would automatically stop the shuttle's movement.

Depositions of several Milliken employees revealed that, on the morning of the accident, Statom, the shuttle operator, had become "aggravated" because the safety mats were repeatedly stepped upon, stopping the robotic shuttle. As a result, Gingerich, acting on his own volition, disconnected the safety mats in his particular area of the plant floor. After disconnecting the mats, Gingerich warned Statom that Sanders Brothers employees would be working in that area and instructed him not to send the shuttle there. On the few occasions when the robotic shuttle approached the portion of the tracks where the employees were working on the dye vat project, the individuals working there were asked to leave the pathway of the shuttle so that it could pass through.

After work on the dye vat in this area was completed, both the Milliken employees and subcontractors dispersed. However, the safety mats were not reconnected. Later in the day, Edens returned to this dye vat area to check whether there was any leakage. The Milliken shuttle operator, unaware anyone was in the vicinity, activated the robotic shuttle in the dye vat area. The shuttle pinned Edens against a dye vat. He ultimately died from his injuries.

The Estate filed a Workers' Compensation suit against Edens' employer, Sanders Brothers, Inc., a mechanical contracting firm. The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded the Estate benefits for Edens' accidental death. On August 5, 1999, the Estate filed wrongful death and survival actions against various manufacturers and distributors of the allegedly defective machinery, averring negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. On August 17, 2001, during the discovery process, the Estate moved to amend the complaints to include Milliken and individual Milliken employees, Statom, Gingerich, and Coy,² as defendants with regard to a negligence cause of action.³ The motion to amend was granted.

Respondents moved to dismiss the claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56, SCRCP. The Circuit judge granted the motion to dismiss pursuant to (1) Rule 12(b)(1) holding the court "lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction because of the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act⁴ when there is no evidence that [Respondents] deliberately or specifically intended the injury to occur" and (2) Rule 56 "because the statute of limitations expired before [the Estate]'s causes of action against the [Respondents] were asserted in this Court." The trial judge then entered judgment for Respondents pursuant to Rule 54(b), SCRCP.

ISSUE

Did the Circuit Court err in concluding the Estate's action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act depends on the existence of an employment relationship. McDowell v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S.C. 173, 41 S.E.2d 872 (1947); see also Gray v. Club Group, Ltd., 339 S.C. 173, 184, 528 S.E.2d 435, 441 (Ct.App.2000)

("Before provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act can apply, an employer-employee relationship must exist; this is an initial fact to be established."). Workers' Compensation awards are authorized only if an employer-employee relationship exists at the time of the injury. Dawkins v. Jordan, 341 S.C. 434, 534 S.E.2d 700 (2000).

Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists is a jurisdictional question. Nelson v. Yellow Cab Co., 349 S.C. 589, 564 S.E.2d 110 (2002); South Carolina Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Ray Covington Realtors, Inc., 318 S.C. 546, 459 S.E.2d 302 (1995); see also Lake v. Reeder Constr. Co., 330 S.C. 242, 498 S.E.2d 650 (Ct.App.1998)

(existence of employer-employee relationship is jurisdictional question; injured worker's employment status, as it affects jurisdiction, is matter of law for decision by court and includes findings of fact which relate to jurisdiction). The determination of whether a worker is a statutory employee is jurisdictional and therefore the question on appeal is one of law. Harrell v. Pineland Plantation, Ltd., 337 S.C. 313, 523 S.E.2d 766 (1999); Glass v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 S.C. 198, 482 S.E.2d 49 (1997). As a result, this Court has the power and duty to review the entire record and decide the jurisdictional facts in accord with the preponderance of the evidence. Harrell, 337 S.C. at 320,

523 S.E.2d at 769; Glass, 325 S.C. at 202,

482 S.E.2d at 51; see also Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1, 132 S.E.2d 18 (1963),

overruled in part on other grounds by Sabb v. South Carolina State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 567 S.E.2d 231 (2002) (existence or absence of employment relationship is jurisdictional fact which court must determine based on review of all evidence in record).

Where the issue involves jurisdiction, the appellate court can take its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Nelson, 349 S.C. at 594, 564 S.E.2d at 112. It is South Carolina's policy to resolve jurisdictional doubts in favor of the inclusion of employers and employees under the Workers' Compensation Act. Dawkins, 341 S.C. at 439, 534 S.E.2d at 703.

The court may consider affidavits on a question of law in a jurisdictional motion without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 511 S.E.2d 69 (1999). The proper procedure for raising lack of subject matter jurisdiction prior to trial is to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), SCRCP, rather than a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP. Woodard v. Westvaco Corp., 319 S.C. 240, 460 S.E.2d 392 (1995),overruled on other grounds by Sabb v. South Carolina State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 567 S.E.2d 231 (2002). If a party files a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court should treat the motion as if it were a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Exclusivity Provision of the Workers' Compensation Act

The Estate argues the trial judge erred in finding the Estate's action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). We disagree.

The Act contains an "exclusivity provision." See Sabb v. South Carolina State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 422, 567 S.E.2d 231, 234 (2002)

("Because Sabb's claims, as employee of University, arose out of and in the course of her employment, the Workers' Compensation Act ... provides the exclusive remedy for her."). This exclusivity provision is found at section 42-1-540:

The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.

S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-540 (1985) (emphasis added).

The Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy against an employer for an employee's work-related accident or injury. Fuller v. Blanchard, 358 S.C. 536, 595 S.E.2d 831, 833 (2004); see also Strickland v. Galloway, 348 S.C. 644, 646, 560 S.E.2d 448, 449 (Ct.App.2002)

("In circumstances in which the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act covers an employee's work-related accident, the Act provides the exclusive remedy against the employer."). The exclusivity provision of the Act precludes an employee from maintaining a tort action against an employer where the employee sustains a work-related injury. Tatum v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina, 346 S.C. 194, 552 S.E.2d 18 (2001).

"The exclusive remedy doctrine was enacted to balance the relative ease with which the employee can recover under the Act: the employee gets swift, sure compensation, and the employer receives immunity from tort actions by the employee." St...