Edgar v. Southern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 October 1948 |
| Docket Number | 16137. |
| Parties | EDGAR v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court, of Union County; J. Woodrow Lewis, Judge.
Action by Mack Edgar against Southern Railway Company and others. Defendants demurred and moved to quash and set aside service of summons. From an adverse judgment defendants appeal.
Order of Judge Lewis follows:
The defendants noticed the various motions and demurrer, upon which this matter is before me, for hearing before me at Spartanburg, S. C., while presiding in the Seventh Circuit. By agreement of all parties the matter was marked heard and oral arguments thereon by agreement were heard by me at Darlington, S. C., on August 14, 1947, and my decision reserved.
The questions to be first decided arise under the motions of the defendants Order of Railway Conductors, of America (which will be referred to hereafter for convenience as the Order) and Order of Railway Conductors of America--Congress Division--No. 323 () to quash and set aside the attempted service on them of the Summons and Complaint herein, and the alternative motion of the defendant Congaree Division for a change of venue to Richland County.
This action was instituted in Union County, South Carolina, and the Summons and Complaint were served on the defendant B. J Coleman, at Columbia, S. C., in Richland County, as an individual defendant and also on him as the agent of the defendant's Order and Congaree Division.
Appearing solely for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the Court over it, the defendant Order moves to quash and set aside service of the Summons on it on the grounds (1) that the defendant B. J. Coleman was not and is not an agent of the said defendant upon whom service of process may be made (2) that the said defendant is not and was not at the time of the attempted service of process doing business within the State of South Carolina, so as to subject it to the jurisdiction of the Courts of this State, and (3) that the attempted service of process herein would deprive the said defendant of due process of law, the defendant being an unincorporated association and composed largely of non-resident members.
The defendant Congaree Division moves to quash service of process on it on the ground that such defendant is a voluntary unincorporated association and that the attempted service of process on it was had on its agent in Richland County, South Carolina, and under the provisions of the statutes relating to such associations it is not subject to suit except in the County in which process is served, to wit, Richland County. Failing in said motion to quash service, this defendant moves for a change of venue of the cause to Richland County on the ground that the defendant may not be sued except in Richland County where the attempted service of process was had.
It is admitted that both the defendant Order and the defendant Congaree Division are unincorporated associations.
It should be noted that the defendant B. J. Coleman does not challenge the jurisdiction of the Courts of Union County. Nor is any challenge made by the defendant Congaree Division to the general jurisdiction of the Courts of this State, but insists that it can only be sued in Richland County where attempted service was had on the defendant Coleman as its agent. Neither does the defendant Congaree Division challenge the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant B. J. Coleman was and is an agent of said defendant. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the defendant B. J. Coleman is also an agent of the defendant Order.
It is admitted that the defendant Coleman is a member of the defendant Order, but it is well established in this state that service of process on a member of an unincorporated association is insufficient to give jurisdiction over such association. Service of process must be made on an agent of the association. Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C. 498, 120 S.E. 830.
The defendant Order is governed by a constitution and statutes to which it is necessary to refer to determine whether the defendant Coleman is an agent of said Order on whom service of process may be had. The question is one of fact to be determined from the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in the cause.
The facts are that the defendant Order is a voluntary, unincorporated association of railway employees whose membership is limited to a particular class of railway employees, to wit, railroad conductors and other allied crafts or classes of employees of railroads, with its membership consisting of many thousands of individual members residing in the several states of the United States. It is a labor union and recognized as such under the Federal laws. Under the provisions of its constitution and statutes provision is made for Local Divisions and further provision is made as to the said subordinate or Local Division, the manner and method whereby such Local Division shall function and its officers.
The defendant Congaree Division is one of the Local Divisions of the defendant Order in the State of South Carolina.
The constitution and statutes of the defendant Order further provide, as an integral part of the Local Division, for a Local Committee of Adjustment and along the tracks of the defendant Southern Railway Company are situated, in the various states of the United States served by the Southern Railway, Local Divisions, and each Local Division having three or more members employed by the Southern Railway Company has a Local Committee of Adjustment, and the Chairman of each of the Local Committees of Adjustment constitute what is known as the General Committee of Adjustment. These committees have as their functions the handling of grievances in connection with the members of the defendant Order and their employer. In matters determined by these committees of Adjustment the right of appeal is given to the president of the Order.
The defendant Coleman was, at the time of the attempted service of process on him, the Local Chairman of the Local Committee of Adjustment of the defendant Congaree Division. He was, therefore, in such capacity automatically a member of the General Committee of Adjustment whose duties and functions are set forth in the constitution and statutes of the Order.
There can be little room for doubt that the Local Divisions are part of the defendant Order and representatives of it. The constitution and statutes of the defendant Order provide with meticulous care for the payment and collection of dues which are to be collected by the Local Treasurer and, under the penalties of the bond required by the defendant Order, required by the defendant Order to remit a portion of the dues to the home office of the Order. The constitution further provides that all general powers of the said Order are vested in the body known as the Grand Division and 'all powers necessary to enforce or carry into effect this constitution or any laws hereafter enacted repose in the Grand Division.' It is further provided that any Division failing to act upon and report on any question submitted to it by the Grand Division within sixty days from the date of its submission 'shall be subject to discipline therefor by the President and by the Grand Division'. No one can be an officer of the Grand Division unless he is a member of some Local Division of the Order. The president of the defendant Order is given the power to 'convene any Division anytime, preside therein, inspect its work, correct its errors, annul its illegal acts and require conformity to the regulations of the Order.' It is further provided that the president of the Order 'may remove from office any officer of any Division, officer of a General Committee,' etc. Upon a two-thirds favorable vote of the members of any line, the president is empowered to call a strike on such line of railway; and is given the power to declare a strike at an end. Insurance benefits are provided on conditions for the membership of the Order. (Above provisions from arts. 2 and 4 of the Constitution of the defendant Order.)
To further burden this order with citations and references from the constitution and statutes of the defendant Order would serve no useful purpose. From a careful reading of the laws governing the defendant Order the conclusion is inescapable that the defendant Congaree Division is a closely integrated part of the defendant Order, and the representative part and parcel of the Order; that the defendant Coleman, upon whom service of process was had, was at the time thereof an agent of the defendant Congaree Division and of the defendant Order; and was such an agent of an unincorporated association contemplated by the Statutes of this State Section 7797, 1942 Code, upon whom service of process may be had.
The defendant Order, when it, through its agents solicits membership in this State in its association, collects dues from its members in this state, sets up its committees for adjustment of dispute between its members and their employer, issues contracts of insurance to its members, and in all other respects prosecutes its activities in this State as a labor union, is doing business within this...
To continue reading
Request your trial