Edgecomb v. Traverse City School Dist., 60

• Decision Date: 29 November 1954
• Docket Number: No. 60,60
• Citation: 341 Mich. 106,67 N.W.2d 87
• Parties: Cecil EDGECOMB, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. TRAVERSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 87

67 N.W.2d 87

341 Mich. 106

Cecil EDGECOMB, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. TRAVERSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Municipal Corporation Defendant and Appellant.

No. 60.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 29, 1954.

James R. Fredrickson, and Murchie, Calcutt & Griffin, Traverse City, for Cecil Edgecomb, plaintiff and appellee, Roscoe O. Bonisteel and Roscoe O. Bonisteel, Jr., Ann Arbor, of counsel, and appellee.

Harry T. Running, Traverse City, for Traverse City School Dist., appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Justice.

During the year 1945 defendant school district inaugurated as a part of its school curriculum a veterans' institute program. Beginning on July 1, 1948 plaintiff was employed under a written contract as a teacher in said institute. He did not hold a teachers' general certificate, but was issued a so-called special certificate authorizing him to teach certain agricultural courses. New certificates were issued and new contracts made for each of the years beginning July 1, 1949, and July 1, 1950.

Following the expiration of his contract and his certificate on June 30, 1951, plaintiff continued to teach in the veterans' institute as he had done during the prior three years. It is undisputed that a special certificate was granted to him, as above stated, on application duly made therefor, under date of August 3, 1951, said certificate authorizing the teaching of 'institutional on-farm training in veteran classes for the period July 1, 1951 to June 30 1952.' The parties also entered into a written contract covering plaintiff's services. The plaintiff claims that said contract was actually prepared and signed in September, after he had been working approximately two and one-half months of the school year. On behalf of defendant, testimony was introduced on the trial of the case in circuit court that the 'usual practice' was to send out contracts to teachers during May or June preceding the beginning of the school year covered by such contract. The trial court left the issue to the determination of the jury, which, as the verdict returned indicated, accepted plaintiff's claim as to when the contract was actually signed and filed. Such finding was supported by a preponderance of the testimony and must be accepted as conclusive.

After the signing of the contract plaintiff continued his work until some time in December, when he was apprised of facts indicating that his services were no longer required. It is a fair inference from the record that he was discharged because of a decrease in the number of students enrolled in the veterans' institute. He did not obtain other employment in the teaching profession but received a total of approximately $500 by way of commission as a real estate salesman, which commission, he testified, he might have earned had he continued teaching. Claiming that he was wrongfully discharged, plaintiff brought the present action in circuit court ot recover damages for breach of contract. At the conclusion of his proofs defendant moved for a directed verdict, decision on the motion being reserved. At the conclusion of the testimony the motion was renewed, and plaintiff made a similar motion for judgment in his favor. Each party reserved the right to have the issues in the case submitted to the jury in the event of a denial of his or its motion. Decision on the motions was reserved by the court and the case submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor for one-half of his contract salary for the year. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, and it has appealed.

On the trial in circuit court the defendant contended that the contract for the breach of which plaintiff sought to recover damages was invalid. Reliance was placed on C.L.1948 § 352.22, Stat.Ann. § 15.394, which contains the following provision:

'No contract with any person shall be valid unless such person shall hold a legal certificate of qualification at the time the contractual period shall begin * * *.'

On appeal emphasis is placed on the fact that the contract as written was dated July 1, 1951, and the claim is made, in effect, that such date must be regarded as the beginning of the contractual period. If such contract was actually signed and filed with defendant's superintendent in September, as the weight of the evidence indicates and as the jury found, it is obvious that defendant's representatives preparing the contract pre-dated it to the beginning of the school year. Possible reasons for such action do not require discussion in the instant controversy.

It is not disputed that during the period between the opening of the school year and the signing of the contract plaintiff performed his duties as a teacher and was regularly paid by the defendant for his services. As before noted, the certificate authorizing him to give instruction on certain subjects in the veterans' institute was issued August 3, 1951. The contract having been made after that date was not rendered invalid by the provision of the statute above quoted. It may not be assumed that defendant's representatives, in pre-dating the contract, intended to violate the statute or to vitiate the contract. It is significant also that after the signing of the contract, plaintiff continued in defendant's employ until the latter part of December. The defendant is scarcely in position now to claim that the contract was invalid for the reason urged. McLaughlin v. Board of Education, 255 Mich. 667, 239 N.W. 374. The period of employment under the contract in question began with its signing and filing with defendant. It may not be construed as covering services actually rendered and paid for before its execution. On the basis of the record before us, we conclude that defendant's claim as to the invalidity of the written contract is without merit.

Defendant further contends that plaintiff did not make reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages. That it was his duty to do so is not questioned. However, the burden of proof rested on defendant of showing that plaintiff might have secured other employment in the teaching profession if he had attempted in good faith to do so. It must be borne in mind in this connection, however, that the special certificate issued to him in terms merely authorized him to teach 'institutional on-farm training in veteran classes.' Defendant's superintendent testified as to the existence of a possible opening on a college farm, but whether plaintiff could have obtained such position and whether it was of such nature as to have been reasonably within the field of his work as a teacher does not appear. The jury, under the instruction of the court, concluded that defendant land not shown that plaintiff might have lessened or obviated the damages that he actually sustained because of the breach of contract.

This Court has in prior decisions considered questions analogous to those involved in the case at bar. In Smith v. School-District, 69 Mich. 589, 37 N.W. 567, 568, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant school district for employment for a period of nine months. Before the completion of such period the schoolhouse burned and plaintiff was notified that the school would not be continued. She did not obtain employment elsewhere, and apparently made no effort to do so. Defendant contested her right to recover damages on the theory of breach of contract on the ground that for a period of a month and a half after she entered on her work under the contract no copy of her teacher's certificate had been filed with the county board of school examiners, as required by statute then in force. In affirming a judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict, it was said:

'We do not consider it necessary to discuss this point, however. The plaintiff was paid by the school- district for the month and a half that she taught before the filing of her certificate, and for nearly four months after. During the time for which she seeks to recover she was a qualified teacher, under the strict terms of the statute, and she is as much entitled to her pay as she would have been had she actually taught until the end of her term. If she had actually taught the whole term, the school-district would not have been permitted to raise this technical point that her certificate was not filed until October 30, 1886. See Crane v. School-Dist. No. 6 , 28 N.W. 107. Neither will they be allowed to do so under the circumstances of this case. We do not think the plaintiff was bound to look up any other school, or endeavor to find other employment, during the remainder of her term. It was not her duty to find work not in her vocation, and it was out of the season to obtain a situation as a school-teacher.'

In Farrell v. School-District, 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053, 1054, the school board of the defendant at the opening of school refused to permit plaintiff to proceed under a contract...