Edgecombe v. Lowes Home Ctrs., L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 12 July 2019
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 19-60915-CIV-DIMITROULEAS
• Citation: 391 F.Supp.3d 1142
• Parties: Leslie EDGECOMBE, Gabriel Berry, and Mark Diab, Plaintiffs, v. LOWES HOME CENTERS, L.L.C., a North Carolina corporation qualified to do business in the State of Florida, and Paul Laurent, an individual, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

391 F.Supp.3d 1142

Leslie EDGECOMBE, Gabriel Berry, and Mark Diab, Plaintiffs,

v.LOWES HOME CENTERS, L.L.C., a North Carolina corporation qualified to do business in the State of Florida, and Paul Laurent, an individual, Defendants.

CASE NO. 19-60915-CIV-DIMITROULEAS

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed July 12, 2019

Chris Kleppin, Glasser & Kleppin, P.A., Plantation, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel Joseph Butler, Juan Carlos Enjamio, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT

WILLIAM P. DIMITROULEAS, United States District Judge

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand [DE 10], filed herein on May 7, 2019. The Court has carefully considered the Motion [DE 10], the Response [DE 13], the Reply [DE 15], the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised of the premises.

I. Background

On April 8, 2019, Defendants removed this case from the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. [DE 1]. On May 7, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Remand [DE 10]. The Court has considered the Motion to Remand [DE 10], the Response [DE 13], the Reply [DE 15], and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

According to the Complaint [DE 1-1], Plaintiffs in this case are Leslie Edgecombe ("Edgecombe"), Gabriel Berry ("Berry"), and Mark Diab ("Diab"). All are citizens of Florida. Defendants are Lowes Home Centers, L.L.C. ("Lowes"), a citizen of North Carolina qualified to do business in Florida, and Paul Laurent ("Laurent"), a citizen of Florida [DE 1-1].

Plaintiffs were all black males employed by Lowes in various management capacities and in various South Florida locations. [DE 1-1]. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants "together perpetrated a pattern or practice of discrimination with respect [to] employment decisions concerning black store managers and other managers in Broward County, as to which all of the Plaintiffs were victimized." Id. at ¶ 19.

There are twelve Lowes stores in the South Florida Market. Id. at ¶ 24. Of the twelve store managers in the market, four were black. Id. at ¶ 30. In 2013, Lowes replaced the presiding South Florida market manager, the district manager over the twelve South Florida stores, with Jerry Hair ("Hair"). Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiffs allege that Hair "simply did not like blacks and was obsessed with removing them from their leadership positions and ultimately from employment with [Lowes]." Id. at ¶ 33. Plaintiffs allege that Hair, with the support of Lowes, sought to "eliminate from employment as many black managers as he could in the South Florida market as quickly as he could by creating pretextual reasons for each of their respective terminations." Id. at ¶ 34.

Specifically, Hair began investigating, criticizing, and "writing-up" a black store manager at the Sunrise location. Id. at ¶¶ 37, 42. He asked her to voluntarily step down from her position, and when she did not, he eventually terminated her. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 47. Hair followed a similar protocol with other black managers in the area. The Coral Springs store had a black manager, Yvon Senat ("Senat"), and a black assistant manager, Gabriel Berry; Hair transferred Berry to the Sunrise store because Hair stated there were "too many black managers" in the Coral Springs Store. Id. at ¶ 103. Berry was eventually fired in September 2015 "for pretextual reasons." Id. at ¶ 180. Senat had a series of negative interactions with Hair and complained of racial discrimination to others within the company, and to the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR"); Senat was fired by Hair on April 16, 2014. Id. at ¶ 130.

Diab was hired in March 2014 as a Market Sales Manager for the entire market and filed a charge of discrimination against Lowes in July 2015. Id. at ¶ 209. He was terminated in October 2015 despite his high ranking by Lowes. Id. at ¶ 215.

Edgecombe had been a store manager for about eight years before Hair arrived and began harassing Edgecombe. Id. at ¶ 142. Edgecombe filed a charge of discrimination in January 2015. Id. at ¶ 176. In August 2015, Hair was transferred out of the South Florida market and replaced by Laurent who continued the same discriminatory practices until terminating Edgecombe in September 2016. Id. at ¶¶ 182, 201.

Each of these plaintiffs allege discrimination and infliction of emotional distress by Lowes, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). Florida Statutes § 760.01 et seq. ; [DE 1-1] at ¶ 286. Additionally, they all allege retaliation by Lowes under the FCRA for engaging in the protected activity of complaining about unlawful racial discrimination. Id. at ¶ 291. Edgecombe alone alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") against Lowes and Laurent. Id. at ¶ 299. All Plaintiffs assert a claim of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") against Lowes, and Edgecombe asserts this claim against Laurent, as well. Id. at ¶ 305. Finally, Edgecombe asserts a claim against all Defendants alleging he was not paid the minimum wage to which he was entitled for the extra hours he worked, Id. at ¶¶ 311-314, and was retaliated against for his complaints about these wage violations, Id. at ¶ 318. The Complaint sets forth no specific calculation of damages, but only the following general list of damages:

compensation for past pecuniary losses, including back pay with pre-judgment interest and lost benefits, in amounts to be proven at trial; compensation for future pecuniary losses, including front pay, in amounts to be proven at trial; compensation for non-pecuniary losses, including emotional pain, suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment at work, and humiliation, in amounts to be proven at trial; punitive damages for Defendants' malicious and/or reckless conduct, in amounts to be proven at trial; compensation for lost future earnings capacity; attorneys' fees and costs in this action.

See Id. at p. 39-53.

Defendants removed to Federal Court alleging diversity jurisdiction. Defendants assert that complete diversity exists based on Edgecombe's alleged fraudulent joinder of Laurent. [DE 1]. Further, they argue that the amount in controversy is exceeded for each plaintiff individually. [DE 1] at ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Remand [DE 10] arguing that the federal court does not have diversity jurisdiction, as there was no fraudulent joinder and the amount in controversy has not been proven to exceed $75,000. See Williams v. Best Buy Co. , 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11^th Cir. 2001) ("The burden of proving jurisdiction lies with the removing defendant."). Based on the following, the Court finds that Defendants' statements as to the amount in controversy are sufficient, but that fraudulent joinder is not established as to Defendant Laurent. Therefore, complete diversity does not exist and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand [DE 10] is granted.

II. Standard of Review

Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ; Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co. , 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11^th Cir. 1994). District courts have an obligation to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction does not exist arises, Cheffer v. Reno , 55 F.3d 1517, 1523 (11^th Cir. 1995), and must dismiss an action where it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). "[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and should itself raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction arises." Smith v. GTE Corp. , 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11^th Cir. 2001).

Under § 1332(a), federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states and where the amount in controversy "exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). "Where a plaintiff fails to specify the total amount of damages demanded...a defendant seeking removal based on diversity jurisdiction must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement." Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car , 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11^th Cir. 2002). Uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand. Petigny v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. , No. 18-23762-CIV, 2018 WL 5983506, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2018) (citing Diaz v. Sheppard , 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11^th Cir. 1996) ).

To establish fraudulent joinder on the part of Edgecombe, Defendants must show: (1) there is no possibility Edgecombe can establish a cause of action against Laurent; (2) Edgecombe has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts; or (3) that there is no joint, several, or alternative liability between the diverse and non-diverse defendants and that the claims against the diverse defendants have no real connection to the claim against Laurent. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc. , 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11^th Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that:

The standard for evaluating whether the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident defendant is very lenient: federal courts are not to weigh the merits of a plaintiff's claim beyond determining whether it is an arguable one under state law. If there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.

Johnson v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 594 F. App'x 953, 956 (11^th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2895, 192 L. Ed. 2d 927 (2015) (...