Edgewater Drugs, Inc. v. Jax Drugs, Inc., C-395

• Decision Date: 13 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. C-395,C-395
• Parties: EDGEWATER DRUGS, INC., Appellant, v. JAX DRUGS, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 525

138 So.2d 525

EDGEWATER DRUGS, INC., Appellant, v. JAX DRUGS, INC., Appellee.

No. C-395.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 13, 1962.

Richard E. Conner, New Smyrna Beach, for appellant.

Ball & Pearl, Jacksonville, for appellee.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief Judge.

The defendant has appealed from an order and a final summary judgment entered against it by the Circuit Court for Duval County in an action for goods sold and delivered and for account stated.

The two main questions raised by the appellant on this appeal are whether the venue of the action was properly laid in Duval County and whether the trial court erred in entering the final summary judgment before the defendant had an opportunity under our rules to file its answer to the complaint.

The setting out of which these questions arise can be better understood by detailing the timetable of some of the events during the progress of this cause. On January 23, 1961, the defendant filed its motion to dismiss the complaint, assigning several grounds therefor but subsequently withdrawing all except the grounds of 'improper venue' and 'failure to state a cause of action.' On the same date the plaintiff filed an affidavit of good faith and a motion for summary judgment. Two days later the plaintiff filed an 'Affidavit in support of Summary Judgment and Venue' executed by the vice-president of the plaintiff corporation, stating, among other things, that the goods in question were sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant 'from Duval County,' that the orders for the goods were received in Duval County, and that credit billing and payment for the said goods have been extended and received in Duval County. On February 20th an affidavit of the defendant's president was filed by the defendant, stating that its principal and sole place of business is in Volusia County, Florida, that its resident agent for service of process is located in the said county, that the goods were purchased for resale in the said county and the unsold goods are still there, and that the merchandise was ordered by the defendant's agent in the said county.

The trial court on March 29th entered an order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and granting the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment, and entered the final summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Section 46.04, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides:

'Suits against domestic corporations shall be commenced only in the county (or justice's district) where such corporation shall have or usually keep an office for the transaction of its customary business, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located; and in the case of companies incorporated in other states or countries, and doing business in this state, suits shall be commenced in a county or justice's district wherein such company may have an agent or other representative, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is situated.'

Both parties to this cause are domestic corporations.

Under the quoted statute, the plaintiff had the right to sue the defendant in any county of the state where any one or more of the three conditions enumerated therein prevailed. In this case the trial court evidently concluded from the affidavit of the plaintiff's vice-president that the cause of action accrued in Duval County, and we hold that the court lawfully and properly so concluded. That court's order comes to us with the presumption of validity, and we further find that there was sufficient evidence before the court to support its conclusion. Hence, the trial court correctly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. The other ground of the motion--failure to state a cause of action--was without merit, the complaint following the official forms 1 and 15 approved under Rule 1.8 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A.

In the order appealed from the Circuit Court took three actions: denied a motion the defendant had filed to strike the affidavit of the plaintiff's vice-president, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, and granted the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment. The summary final judgment itself was entered simultaneously by the court. We assume that the court in entering the said order denied the defendant's said motions to strike and dismiss before considering and ruling upon the plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment, which was the orderly procedure in a matter of this kind. In determining the motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, the court was authorized to resolve the conflicts in the affidavits before him concerning venue, and its findings on this question, being supported by competent, substantial evidence, will not be disturbed by this court on appeal.

In this appeal both parties have cited and relied upon the case of M. A. Kite Company v. A. C. Samford, Inc., 130 So.2d 99 (Fla.App.1961), where, in an opinion written by Judge Wigginton, a holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934), was thus summarized:

'* * * that where a contract involves the payment of money and no place of payment in expressly agreed on, it may be implied that payment is to be made where the payee resides or has an established place of business, and where payment under the contract may be made. Where there is an express promise to pay, and no place of payment is stipulated, the debtor should seek the creditor unless otherwise provided or agreed. In such cases the cause of action accrues where the default occurred, though it be in the county where the plaintiff resides, and the action may be maintained in such county for the defendant's breach.'

This rule is applicable in the instant case, where the contract involves the payment of money and no place of payment is expressly agreed upon. Therefore, applying the rule here, it may be implied that payment is to be made where the payee, the plaintiff-appellee in this case, resides or has an established place of business--namely, Duval County, where the present action was filed. Application of this rule would itself justify the court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

As to the second question raised on this appeal, the appellant makes the persuasive and logical 'ad hominem' argument that the trial court should not have entered the summary judgment until the defendant had an opportunity to file its answer to the complaint, for until then 'it would be nigh impossible for the trial judge to determine whether or not there is a genuine...