Edgeworth v. Family Chiropractic & Health

• Decision Date: 21 April 2006
• Docket Number: 1041653.
• Citation: 940 So.2d 1011
• Parties: Rhonda Sue EDGEWORTH v. FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC & HEALTH CENTER, P.C., et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

940 So.2d 1011

Rhonda Sue EDGEWORTH v. FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC & HEALTH CENTER, P.C., et al.

1041653.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 21, 2006.

Jack Shores of The Shores Law Firm, Fairhope, for appellant.

W. Boyd Reeves and Scott G. Brown of Armbrect Jackson, LLP, Mobile, for appellee.

HARWOOD, Justice.

Rhonda Sue Edgeworth, the plaintiff in the underlying medical-malpractice action against Family Chiropractic & Health Center, P.C., Kenneth A. Robinson, D.C., and Gregory A. Kuhlmann, D.C. ("the defendants"), appeals from the April 19, 2005, judgment entered in favor of the defendants, in response to the verdict of the jury.

On appeal, Edgeworth complains only about the content of the trial court's instructions to the jury concerning the burden of proof applicable to a medical-malpractice action. Accordingly, the facts forming the basis of Edgeworth's claims against the defendants are not pertinent to the issues on appeal, and we therefore do not discuss them.

Edgeworth asserts as her first issue on appeal that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that, because this was a medical-malpractice case, her burden of proof was higher than it would be in a normal civil case. The portion of the instruction at issue was as follows:

"If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the defendants complied with the standard set by the learning, skill, and care ordinarily possessed and practiced at the time in question by other chiropractors in the same general line of practice, under similar circumstances as shown by the expert chiropractic evidence in this case, then you should return a verdict for the defendants.

"....

"Now, I've stated before that the burden of proof in this case is upon the plaintiff. The burden of proof is something that we hear about a lot of times on TV and other cases in which you may have served as a juror. In this case, which is a medical malpractice case, the burden of proof is a little different. Okay? In a medical malpractice case, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to reasonably satisfy you by substantial evidence of the truthfulness of the matters and things claimed by her before she would be entitled to recover.

"All right. Now, normally in a civil case, and this is a civil case, normally the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to only reasonably satisfy you of the evidence. So this being a malpractice case, it bumps it up some.

"Now, we've all heard the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest burden of proof we have and that burden of proof is only in criminal cases. So that burden of proof would be up here. The normal civil case is to prove to your reasonable satisfaction the truth of material averments contained in their complaint.

"In a medical malpractice case, it's somewhere in between, not as high as beyond a reasonable doubt, but it's higher than to your reasonable satisfaction. Again, the burden is to prove to the jury's reasonable satisfaction by substantial evidence the truth of the matters and things claimed by her before the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.

"Now, normally in a civil case when the parties walk through the doors, and in this case also, when they walk through the doors of the courtroom, the scales of justice are equal. No one has an advantage and they're equal.

"In a civil case, normal civil case, if you weigh out that evidence, if it's weighted slightly or heavily in favor of the plaintiff, then you should rule in favor of the plaintiff. If it's weighted slightly or heavily in favor of the defendant, you should rule in favor of the defendant. This being a medical malpractice case, that burden of proof is up a little bit from that. So it's got to be more than slightly over 50 percent to slightly over 49 percent. It's got to be more.

"And I'll explain to you more. I'll go ahead now. Substantial evidence is that character of admissible evidence that would convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the facts to which the evidence is directed.

"That's the definition of substantial evidence. I'll read that to you again.

"Substantial evidence is that character of admissible evidence that would convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the facts to which the evidence is directed.

"Okay. So it's a little different burden of proof in this case because it is a medical malpractice case."

The objection Edgeworth interposed to the trial court's instruction on the burden of proof was as follows:

"[T]he plaintiff would except to the definition of the burden of proof. The suggestion was that the burden of proof is different in this case than in any other civil case. I believe that the statute says that the evidence to be considered by the jury is of a higher character or a higher quality, but that the burden of proof remains the same, that they be reasonably satisfied by a[sic] substantial evidence in this case, as opposed to reasonably satisfied by the evidence than [sic] in any other civil case."

Previous discussions among the court and the parties contained in the record make it clear that "the statute" to which Edgeworth is referring is the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, as codified at § 6-5-541 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, and as amended through the date of trial ("the AMLA").

In 1987, the Alabama Legislature enacted a 10-bill package of "tort reform" legislation. Robert D. Hunter,¹ Alabama's 1987 Tort Reform Legislation, 18 Cumb. L.Rev. 281, 282 (1988). Included within that package was Act No. 87-184, Ala. Acts 1987, codified as § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975, abolishing "the `scintilla rule,' requiring, instead, that `[i]n all civil actions brought in any court of the State of Alabama, proof by substantial evidence shall be required to submit an issue of fact to the trier of the facts.' § 12-21-12(a)." Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 330 (Ala.2000).

In many respects the AMLA traveled a course quite distinct from the remainder of the tort-reform package, although it was at all times inseparable from the entire package. (Hunter, p. 308.) As introduced in the House of Representatives, the AMLA contained no definition of "substantial evidence," and when a definition of that term was added by amendment in the Senate, the definition used in the "general" substantial-evidence bill, Act No. 87-184, was passed over in favor of a definition developed by the Supreme Court of Washington. (Hunter, p. 283.) "Substantial evidence" was defined in Act No. 87-184, codified as § 12-21-12(d), as "evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions as to the existence of the facts sought to be proved." In Hojem v. Kelly, 93 Wash.2d 143, 145, 606 P.2d 275, 276 (1980), the Washington Supreme Court, repeating a definition used by it in cases stretching back to Thomson v. Virginia Mason Hospital, 152 Wash. 297, 301, 277 P. 691, 692 (1929), stated that substantial evidence was that character of evidence "`which would convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed.'" (Thomson simply stated that definition without attribution or citation to any prior case or other source.) As codified, that definition appears in the AMLA as § 6-5-542(5): "Substantial evidence is that character of admissible evidence which would convince an unprejudiced thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed."

In explaining its subsequent construction of the general definition of substantial evidence appearing in § 12-21-12(d) and comparing that definition to the definition at § 6-5-542(5), this Court stated in Clements v. Dr. John Alvan Stewart, P.C., 595 So.2d 858, 860-61 (Ala.1992):

"The wording of the statements of the quality and weight of the evidence necessary to submit an issue of fact to the trier of fact differs. However, with the judicial interpretation of § 12-21-12(d) in West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989) (`substantial evidence' was there defined as `evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved'), we cannot find that plaintiffs in actions against health care providers have a higher burden of proof under § 6-5-542 (which defines `substantial evidence' as `admissible evidence which would convince an unprejudiced thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed') than under § 12-21-12(d), which the plaintiff describes as the `general law.' This is a difference without a distinction."

In Campbell v. Williams, 638 So.2d 804, 817 (Ala.1994), we pointed out that

"this Court has held that the difference between the definition of `substantial evidence' given in § 6-5-542(5) and the definition of the same term given in § 12-21-12(d) is a `difference without distinction,' Clements, supra, 595 So.2d at 862."

As amended in 1992, the Workers' Compensation Act provided that a judgment based on pure findings of fact by the circuit court should not be reversed on appeal if supported by "substantial evidence." § 25-5-81(e)(2), Ala.Code 1975. The Workers' Compensation Act provided no definition for "substantial evidence," and this Court adopted as a definition for that term the definition as restated by this Court in West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). Stating that "[w]e need look no further [than West] for an adequate definition," the Court in Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 269 (Ala. 1996), went on to state: "See, also, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-542(5); and Clements v. Dr. John Alvan Stewart, P.C., 595 So.2d 858, 861 (Ala.1992)(quoted with approval in Campbell v. Williams, 638 So.2d 804 (Ala. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868, 115 S.Ct. 188, 130 L.Ed.2d...