Edler v. Frazier
| Decision Date | 10 February 1916 |
| Docket Number | 30714 |
| Citation | 156 N.W. 182,174 Iowa 46 |
| Parties | F. H. EDLER, et al., Appellees, v. MATILDA FRAZIER et al., Appellees; CRAIL & CRAIL, Interveners, Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jefferson District Court.--SENECA CORNELL, Judge.
SUIT in equity for partition in which Crail & Crail intervened setting up a claim or lien upon the property sought to be partitioned. There was a decree below ordering the partition as prayed, and dismissing the petition of the interveners who prosecute this appeal. The material facts are stated in the opinion.--Reversed and Remanded.
Reversed and Remanded.
John F Ready and Crail & Crail, for appellants.
E. F. Simmons, for appellees.
F. C. Edler, a resident of Jefferson County, died February 24, 1906, leaving a will by which he sought to dispose of his estate, the principal item of which was 310 acres of land. He left surviving him his wife and seven children: F. H. (or Henry) Edler, Matilda Frazier, John L. Edler, L. G. (or Lew) Edler, William P. (or Peter) Edler, David Edler and Frank H. Edler, all of them being of adult age. The will was filed for probate but, its terms not being satisfactory to at least some of the family, a contest was contemplated; later, the will was withdrawn and the estate settled by agreement. About the same time, the children, or some of them, were considering also the matter of applying to the court for the appointment of a guardian to take charge of the property of their mother. One of the heirs, Henry Edler, applied to the interveners, Crail & Crail, then engaged in the practice of law at Fairfield, for advice, and proposed to employ them on behalf of the heirs on the basis of a contingent fee. After some talk, the parties separated, with the understanding that Henry would get the other heirs to come with him to the office of the Crails for further consideration of the subject of employment. Later, a written agreement was drawn, by which it was stipulated that the heirs employ Crail & Crail to look after and protect their interests as prospective heirs of the estate of their mother and procure for them their respective shares therein after their mother's death, and especially their shares in a certain described tract of land, and that, as compensation for such services, Crail & Crail were to receive a sum equal to 20 per cent of the value of the property so to be received by the heirs through their mother at her death, and that such claim for compensation should be a lien upon their respective interests in said land. This agreement was signed by all the heirs except John Edler. Though not expressed in the writing, Crail & Crail admit that, as a part of the consideration therefor, they were to appear for and protect the interests of the heirs in the matter of the contest of their father's will then contemplated, and to secure a satisfactory settlement and division of his estate. It is the theory of Crail & Crail that, under the terms of the will of F. C. Edler, the wife would have been left practically nothing and that some of the children were devised less and others more than their fair share in the estate, and that, through their services as attorneys under said agreement, they secured and had set apart to the widow as dower 110 acres of the land, and that, by bringing about a compromise and settlement effected by proper conveyances between the heirs, they secured also a satisfactory settlement and division of all the rest of said estate. It is also their further claim that, the mother being of advanced age and showing a tendency to squander her property, the heirs were apprehensive that she might waste it or might be influenced to make an unwise or unfair disposition thereof by deed or will, and they desired to have a guardian appointed to protect her and her prospective heirs against such contingency, and that, proceeding under the contract in question, said attorneys did bring the necessary action and obtained the appointment of a guardian, who continued to serve as such until the death of his ward in the year 1914, with the result that, through inheritance from her, said tract of 110 acres of land descended in equal shares to her seven children. After the mother's death and, as it is claimed, upon agreement with at least part of the heirs, Crail & Crail, now residents of California, with their local counsel, J. F. Ready, began an action for the partition of said land, and in the petition therefor, the lien of Crail & Crail, pursuant to said contract, was recognized. Later, the heirs appear to have resorted to other counsel, under whose advice they filed a dismissal of said action and brought another, the one now before us, for the same relief, except that they therein ignored the claim of Crail & Crail until the latter came into the case by intervention.
In answer to the petition of intervention, the heirs, except John and Frank, united in an answer denying the claim of Crail & Crail and their right to any lien upon the proceeds of the partition sale. Further answering, they say that if they signed the alleged contract they "were not fully advised of its meaning and purport and did not understand or know what they were signing", and deny that they are bound thereby. They further say that they have little or no education and "some of them" cannot read or write the English language, and those who can read or write do so with difficulty, and "some of them" cannot write their own names. They further say that they were solicited by Crail & Crail and were persuaded by them that it was necessary that they have legal counsel to protect their interests and that such attorneys would attend to such duties and that their fee would be light and would come out of the property after the death of their mother, but they neglected and failed to explain to defendants the meaning of "twenty per centum" and intentionally withheld such explanation, whereby they deceived and misled defendants into signing such contract. They further allege that the action in partition has proceeded to such stage that the land has been sold for about $ 9,000. It is otherwise made to appear that a portion of the selling price has, by order of said court, been withheld from distribution to await final adjudication of the claim of the interveners.
Upon hearing the evidence, the trial court dismissed the petition of the interveners, suggesting in a written opinion that the decision was based upon the theory that the contract between the interveners and the Edler heirs was made between counsel and client, and that the burden was therefore upon the former to show that the agreement was fair in its terms, was influenced by no misrepresentations, and fully explained to the clients, and that this burden had not been fully met by the interveners. The court further suggested that it seemed apparent that the compensation agreed upon was exorbitant.
I. The somewhat unusual character of this case has led us to examine the evidence as to this contract and the circumstances of its making with considerable care, and we are strongly impressed with the view that the conclusion reached by the trial court cannot be sustained.
If it were clear that the compensation provided for in the contract was so unreasonable or extravagant as to suggest the thought of fraud in its procurement, the court would be justified in viewing the entire deal with suspicion; but in our judgment, such is not the case. In the first place, no practicing lawyer has undertaken to testify that the compensation contracted for was unreasonable or unusual. The question is, moreover, to be viewed from the standpoint of the facts as they then existed. It is shown in evidence, without dispute, that the value of this tract of land at the date of this contract was not to exceed about $ 4,000. Under the contract, if the contingent fee had then been presently payable, it would have been one fifth of six sevenths of $ 4,000, or about $ 685. But it was not presently payable. The widow continued to live seven years or more after the service was performed and, had her lease of life then been known and interveners had desired to discount their claim at 6 per cent, they would have realized therefrom about $ 480--certainly not a very extravagant fee. The fact that increase in the value of the land has operated to substantially increase such compensation ought not to cast any taint of suspicion upon the good faith of the interveners. Had the market value of the property decreased, they would have been compelled to accept a proportionally decreased figure.
Assuming, as we think we must, that there is nothing upon the face of the contract to stamp it as unreasonable or oppressive, we have next to consider whether the relation between the parties at the date of the contract was such as to cast upon interveners the burden of negativing a presumption of fraud or undue advantage in obtaining it. If the relation of attorney and client had been established before this agreement was entered into, it may be admitted that interveners would be required to make clear showing of their good faith in the transaction; but, generally speaking this rule does not apply with the same stringency to contracts by which that relation is inaugurated. Mr. Page, in his work on Contracts, after stating the general rule on which appellees here rely, says, "Its proper application is to contracts between attorney and client after they have entered upon their confidential relations". Or, as stated by the Illinois court, "Before the attorney undertakes the business of his client, he may contract with reference to his services because no confidential relation then exists and ...
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