Edlin v. State, 57862
| Decision Date | 31 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 57862,57862 |
| Citation | 533 So.2d 403 |
| Parties | John Wayne EDLIN v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Guy M. Walker, Laurel, for appellant.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman and Mike Moore, Attys. Gen. by Deirdre D. McCrory, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and ZUCCARO, JJ.
John Wayne Edlin was tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Thomas K. Robinson. Edlin perfects this appeal from the Circuit Court of Jones County and alleges the following as error:
1. That the State seized the Defendant's car and obtained evidence therefrom without first obtaining warrant for the seizure of the car and without probable cause for the seizure of the car at a time when there were no extenuating circumstances. The evidence obtained therefrom should have been excluded;
2. The Court allowed the testimony of the break-up between the Defendant and Diane Sims into evidence when the same was too remote in time to be evidence of the present mental attitude of the Defendant or to be relevant and that such evidence was highly prejudicial;
3. The Court erred in restricting cross-examination of the State's witness, Mrs. Lovett, and excluding evidence of other boyfriends of Diane Sims, when the State's case and probable cause were based on the surviving witness's testimony that the driver of the vehicle that rammed the car was her ex-boyfriend;
4. The Court erred in restricting the cross-examination of the expert witness, Patricia Eddings;
5. The Court erred in denying the motion of defense counsel to exclude the trunk lid, being Exhibit 13, and the metal strip, being Exhibit 14, since no evidence connected the same in any way to the car of Mr. Edlin; and
6. The Court erred in excluding the testimony of the witness, Thomas Rogers about the same color of paint being applied to all General Motors cars.
The parties stipulated the testimony and evidence from a companion case, Edlin v. State, 523 So.2d 42 (Miss.1988), and it was made a part of this record for appeal. Since the facts are in all important respects identical the reader's attention is directed to the prior opinion.
THAT THE STATE SEIZED THE DEFENDANT'S CAR AND OBTAINED EVIDENCE THEREFROM WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A WARRANT FOR THE SEIZURE OF THE CAR AND WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEIZURE OF THE CAR AT A TIME WHEN THERE WERE NO EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES. THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED.
There is no merit to this assignment of error and the reader is directed to this Court's opinion in Edlin v. State, 523 So.2d 42 (Miss.1988), where the same seizure was addressed and we found that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. It existed there. It exists here.
THE COURT ALLOWED THE TESTIMONY OF THE BREAK-UP BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND DIANE SIMS INTO EVIDENCE WHEN THE SAME WAS TOO REMOTE IN TIME TO BE EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENT MENTAL ATTITUDE OF THE DEFENDANT OR TO BE RELEVANT AND THAT SUCH EVIDENCE WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL.
Here Edlin contests the admissibility of certain evidence offered to show that he and Sims had terminated their relationship on November 14, 1984. Edlin particularly challenges the evidence offered by the State to show that on that day he rammed a jeep he was driving into a car which Sims was driving and that he choked Sims. The prosecution contends that the evidence of Edlin's prior misdeeds was admissible under Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence to show motive. See Jackson v. State, 426 So.2d 405 (Miss.1983). The prosecution further argues that federal courts have held similar evidence relevant. See United States v. Naranjo, 710 F.2d 1465, 1467 (10th Cir.1983); United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.1979). Finally the prosecution argues that the question of remoteness is one for the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Naranjo, 710 F.2d 1465, 1468 (10th Cir.1983); May v. State, 524 So.2d 957, 965 (Miss.1988).
There are numerous allegations of bad acts committed by Edlin. The prosecution's first witness, Betty Stringer, testified as follows:
It was out at the Oyster Bar. He went over and grabbed her arm and they stopped and I was not close enough to hear anything that was said. All I can say is that she shook her head no a few times and she pulled her arm away from him and he had to be asked to leave by a couple of men that was there, I assume bouncers of the place.
--if the Court please, this statement that she made was made by another party in the presence of the defendant, which is admissible.
MR. BUCKLEY:
The problem is that she said she could not hear what was said.
MR. WALTERS:
That was as to what Diane said, as I understood.
Q. Go ahead, Ms. Stringer.
A. And he was asked to leave by the bouncer or the men there.
Constable Burnette testified about Edlin's conduct on November 14, 1985, as follows:
Q. All right, sir. What, if anything, did the defendant do when you stopped him?
A. Well, when he got out he was a little steamed and he said, "I am going to kill that girl some day."
Q. And who was he referring to?
We object.
MR. WALKER:
We object.
MR. BUCKLEY:
That's a conclusion on the part of the witness, Your Honor, and is asking--unless he has some explanation by name or reference or pointing or indication or something, it is not admissible.
Q. What did you say the defendant said?
A. He said, "I am going to kill that girl--"
MR. BUCKLEY:
--we object. That's not responsive to the question, Your Honor.
Q. All right. You can tell what he said.
A. He said, "I am going to kill that girl some day."
Q. Do you know who the defendant was referring to when he made that statement?
A. Yes, sir.
MR. BUCKLEY:
We object to that, Your Honor. That is still conclusion.
Well, let me ask you, how do you know?
--just a minute, Mr. Burnette.
Your Honor, I object to that. That's prejudicial in itself. He is testifying obviously to what somebody else said or told him.
Sustained.
Officer Harper testified about the alleged November 14, 1985, quarrel as follows:
--if the Court please, I object.
What is the objection on?
MR. WALKER:
It is too remote in time.
Also, is this what she is saying or what he is saying. I don't understand that.
Q. Who was relating this to you?
A. Mr. Edlin.
Q. And what did Mr. Edlin say was his intentions whenever, I believe you said Ms. Sims had gotten into her car and attempted to leave?
A. He stated that he was trying to stop her and finish talking to her. He hadn't finished what he was going to say to her. She wouldn't stop and listen to him so he had taken his Jeep and in her attempting to leave the complex had ran into the vehicle that she was travelling in.
* * *
A. Upon my arrival, I observed the vehicle sitting halfway in a parking space, the front end portion of the vehicle was sitting across the sidewalk up in the grass of the complex.
* * *
Q. All right, sir, and would you tell the jury what you found when you arrived at Ms. Sims's apartment?
A. I found the door to the apartment ajar.
Q. What do you mean by ajar?
--Your Honor, I object to that. That's not relevant to the issues in this case unless he can show some relationship between this defendant and that.
Q. You can continue.
A. Upon entering the apartment, Ms. Sims was there standing inside the apartment at the time I arrived.
Q. What did you observe of her condition?
A. Her condition?
Q. Yes, sir.
--Your Honor, that is hearsay and I object to it.
What he saw and observed?
MR. BUCKLEY:
Yes, sir, about the--as to the conclusion what caused it, yes, sir.
He hasn't said what caused it.
MR. BUCKLEY:
I realize that, but that's what the District--State's attorney is trying to imply. There is nothing to show what caused it.
* * *
Q. What was her physical condition that you observed?
I object to that, Your Honor, again that is attempting to prove something that cannot be shown to be relevant to this case unless he can show what caused it.
Overruled. If there is no connection in it, I will instruct the jury to disregard it.
Rule 404(b), M.R.E., provides as follows:
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,...
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