Edmond v. Winters
| Decision Date | 22 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:16CV00309 JLH,4:16CV00309 JLH |
| Citation | 226 F.Supp.3d 914 |
| Parties | Roy Lee EDMOND, Plaintiff v. Jay WINTERS, Director, Arkansas Crime Information Center; Brad Cazort, Repository Administrator, Arkansas Sex Offender Registry; John Does 1–10, Employees and Officers, Arkansas Crime Information Center and/or Arkansas Sex Offender Registry; Kenton Buckner, Chief of Police, City of Little Rock; Stuart Thomas, Former Chief of Police, City of Little Rock; and Jane Does 1–10, Civilians, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Steven Ray Davis, Attorney at Law, North Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiff.
Amber R. Schubert, Arkansas Attorney General's Office, Amy Beckman Fields, Little Rock City Attorney's Office, Little Rock, AR, for Defendants.
Roy Lee Edmond moved to Arkansas from California in 1996. In 2001, he was directed to register in Arkansas as a sex offender and did so. He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated various protections of the United States Constitution by requiring him to register as a sex offender under the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 12–12–901 et seq. Edmond names as defendants Jay Winters, in his individual capacity as Director of the Arkansas Crime Information Center; Brad Cazort, in his individual capacity as Repository Administrator of the Arkansas Sex Offender Registry; Kenton Buckner, in his official and individual capacity as Chief of Police of Little Rock; Stuart Thomas, in his official and individual capacity as former Chief of Police of Little Rock; and John and Jane Does. Edmond's amended complaint alleges that because he completed his sentence before August 1, 1997, Arkansas law did not require him to register as a sex offender. See Ark. Code Ann. § 12–12–905(a)(1). He alleges that the defendants required him to register as a sex offender despite the fact that the law did not require him to do so. He also alleges that defendants violated the ex post facto clause of Article I, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the penumbral privacy protections recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).1
The defendants have filed separate motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Winters and Cazort have jointly filed a motion, and Buckner and Thomas have jointly filed a separate motion. In sum, the defendants argue that: (1) Edmond has not adequately alleged the violation of a constitutional right or protection, and, alternatively, (2) they are protected by qualified immunity. For the reasons explained below, the defendants' motions are granted. Documents # 22 and # 32.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the complaint must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Gorog v. Best Buy Co., Inc. , 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014). The complaint must contain more than labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, which means that the court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may not consider materials outside the pleadings other than matters that are incorporated by reference in the pleadings or matters that are subject to judicial notice, such as materials that are part of the public record. Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc. , 688 F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012).
In 1988, Edmond was convicted of a felony sexual offense under California Penal Code § 288a(b)(2). Document # 20 at ¶¶ 13, 14. A California Superior Court sentenced Edmond to ten months' imprisonment and five years of probation. Id. at ¶ 14. Edmond completed this sentence in 1993. Id. at ¶ 16. Even though his sentence was completed, California law required Edmond to register as a sex offender. See Cal. Penal Code § 290 et seq. In 1996, Edmond moved to Arkansas. Document # 20 at ¶ 17. The State of Arkansas passed the Sex and Child Registration Act in 1997, now renamed the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act. In 2001, Edmond was instructed that he had to register in Arkansas as a sex offender. Document # 20 at ¶ 23. On August 12, 2003, a California court granted Edmond relief under California Penal Code § 1203.4, which provides that a guilty verdict be set aside. Document # 20 at 17. Before the court set aside Edmond's guilty verdict, a California district attorney notified the court that on January 22, 1996, Edmond had been convicted of violating California Penal Code § 290, which requires any person convicted of a sex offense after July 1, 1944, to register as a sex offender. Document # 20 at 15.2 In April 2016, Edmond petitioned the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, to terminate his obligation to register as a sex offender. That court held that the Act, as applied to Edmond, violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Arkansas constitutions. The court, therefore, ordered that Edmond's obligation to register under the Act be terminated.
The Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act, enacted in 1997, mandates the registration of any person who:
Ark. Code Ann. § 12–12–905(a). Edmond asserts that because he was convicted before August 1, 1997, the Act did not apply to him, and the defendants should never have required him to register as a sex offender.
Edmond's argument overlooks another section of the Act. The Act also requires registration of "[a] sex offender who moves to or returns to this state from another jurisdiction and who would be required to register as a sex offender in the jurisdiction in which he or she was adjudicated guilty or delinquent of a sex offense." Ark. Code Ann. § 12–12–906(a)(2)(A). Edmond is covered under the plain language of section 906(a)(2)(A).3 Before moving to Arkansas, he was adjudicated guilty of a sex offense in California and would have been required to register as a sex offender in that state, so he was required to register in Arkansas as a sex offender. Cf. Williams v. State , 351 Ark. 229, 91 S.W.3d 68 (2002) ().
Edmond nevertheless contends that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him. He argues that (1) the Act's application to him constitutes an ex post facto law and a violation of the fourteenth amendment, and (2) section 906(a)(2)(A)'s application to him would violate the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. The defendants disagree on both points. In the alternative, they argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity insulates government officials from liability in their individual capacities so long as they have not violated clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Parrish v. Ball , 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010). "To overcome the defense of qualified immunity the plaintiff must show: (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Edmond is unable to make either showing.
Edmond has not shown that the facts, viewed favorably to him, demonstrate a deprivation of his rights. Edmond was convicted of a sex offense in California in 1996, and that conviction required his registration in California. He moved to Arkansas in 1996, before the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act was enacted. In 2001, he was directed to register under the Act. As already explained, Edmond's first claim—that the Act does not require his registration—overlooks section 906(a)(2)(A) of the Act. His alternative claim—that the Act violates the ex post facto clause, the fourteenth amendment, and the full faith and credit clause—is equally without merit.
Section 906(a)(2)(A) does not retroactively penalize Edmond for an act that was legal when committed....
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