Edmonds v. Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 14 April 1953
• Citation: 40 Cal.2d 642,255 P.2d 772
• Parties: EDMONDS et al. v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al. L. A. 21915.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 772

255 P.2d 772

40 Cal.2d 642

EDMONDS et al. v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al.

L. A. 21915.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

April 14, 1953.

Rehearing Denied May 14, 1953.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel and Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Richard Richards, Los Angeles, for respondents.

SPENCE, Justice.

Plaintiff sought a declaration of their claimed right under a zoning ordinance to maintain a trailer court as a nonconforming use of their residentially zoned property. The trial court held that they were entitled to continue with their operation of a trailer court to the extent of twenty trailers, and from the portion of the judgment so declaring, defendants appeal. It is defendants' contention that plaintiffs' right to make any use of their property for trailer court purposes no longer exists as the result of the parties' agreement limiting such use to a three-year period, which has long since expired. The record sustains defendants' position.

Prior to November 9, 1945, plaintiffs maintained a trailer court for twenty trailers on their property, consisting of five lots in an area zoned as C-3, wherein trailer courts were permitted. They first started their trailer court operations on two lots and then expanded their business to include three more lots, all conducted as a single unit in accommodating twenty trailers under permits from the state and licenses from the county. On the mentioned date the property was rezoned to R-4, restricting it to residential use only. The rezoning had no retroactive effect upon plaintiffs' business or property, and they were expressly entitled thereunder to twenty years within which to liquidate their 'particular existing use' a twenty-trailer court operating on five lots.

Plaintiffs' business increased during the post-war period, and by mid-July, 1946, they had forty-eight trailers on their five lots, despite the fact that they had permits and sanitary facilities for only twenty. In short, as of that time, plaintiffs were maintaining their trailer court in flagrant disregard of both local and state laws: violating the local zoning ordinance in exceeding the permitted nonconforming use of their property; and violating the state law in operating with more than twice the number of trailer spaces permitted by their existing state permits and without the required increased sanitary facilities. Plaintiffs then undertook to legalize their illegal operation, and they applied to the Division of Housing of the State Department of Industrial Relations for a permit for thirty additional trailers. They were informed that they would have to secure a clearance from the local zoning authorities. They then went to the Regional Planning Commission with a 'Petition for Zone Exception,' seeking an outright exception for a trailer camp without mention of any limitation as to number of authorized trailer spaces, and applying for permission to install certain plumbing fixtures. In their petition it is stated: 'This property has been continuously used as a trailer camp for over four years. It now becomes necessary to construct certain sanitary facilities to comply with the state law for housing and this zoning exception is sought for the purpose of bringing an existing, non-conforming installation within the scope of the regulation governing he same.'

The previously obtained state permits, one in 1941 and one in 1942, authorized respectively the operation of 'ten camp spaces' and 'ten additional camp spaces.' These permits made particular reference to the sanitary facilities required by state law, Health and Safety Code, sec. 18460 et seq., but actual building permits were required from the local authorities. However, what plaintiffs were seeking in their 1946 applications to the authorities was not a mere incidental permit to construct additional sanitary facilities, but rather a permit from the state to maintain a larger trailer court and an exception from the local planning commission to permit them to operate with more trailer spaces than were involved in the permitted pre-existing use under the zoning ordinance.

In response to plaintiffs' petition, the Regional Planning Commission recommended a one-year exception, provided that plaintiffs would abandon the entire non-conforming use at the end of that time. Plaintiffs were dissatisfied and took an appeal to the Board of Supervisors. The latter, after a controversial hearing on October 15, 1946, granted plaintiffs an exception on condition that they abandon the entire nonconforming use of their property for trailer court purposes at the end of three years. The trial court found that plaintiffs did not accept this condition but the undisputed facts show that this finding is not supported by the evidence.

The conditional exception was granted at a public meeting of the board. Plaintiff Francis Edmonds was present in person and by his counsel. When the matter was first considered, the inclination of the board was to grant the exception subject to the one-year limitation as recommended by the planning commission. Plaintiffs' counsel then suggested a three-year conditional exception and urged Edmonds to accept it if the board would indicate a willingness to agree thereto. But Edmonds refused, claiming that a five-year exception was necessary in order to permit time for the completion of his planned construction of multiple residential units on the property in conformity with existing zoning regulations. However, at one place in his argument Edmonds said: 'I would be willing to take whatever conditions are necessary,' After considerable discussion of the debated point, the board offered the exception subject to a three-year limitation. It was emphasized that at the end of that time the entire nonconforming use would have to be abandoned. Edmonds again refused. Thereupon it was explained to him that if he persisted in his refusal, he would be granted no exception and would be limited to twenty trailers. He was urged to 'reconsider' as a 'last chance' and he replied: 'I would reconsider on my attorney's advice.' Apparently some of the members of the audience attending the meeting and not understood the whole proceeding, and the situation was summarized by one of the board members as follows: 'Mr. Edmonds has said on advice of his attorney he would reconsider and comply with the provisions as we have made them. Is that right, Mr. Edmonds?' The latter's reply was: 'That is right.' Another member of the board further clarified the situation by immediately restating the main condition of the exception in these words: 'That all that property be cleared of trailers three years from today.' Thereupon a vote was taken on the motion to grant the conditional exception; and in the presence of Edmonds and his counsel, it was passed by the board three to one. A partial transcript of the hearing was introduced in evidence as an exhibit and in quoted below. ¹

Formal notification of the board's action was transmitted to plaintiffs by letter from the Regional Planning Commission. In so noting approval of plaintiffs' application for a zone exception and the main condition that plaintiffs cease the use of their property as a trailer court after three years, the commission referred to the board's further proviso that a faithful performance bond be filed and that an agreement to comply be executed. Plaintiffs failed to fulfill these latter two conditions, and apparently because of such failure the trial court found that the exception was never accepted.

Shortly after the granting of the conditional exception by the local authorities, plaintiffs again applied to the Division of Housing for a permit to increase their trailer court by thirty spaces. Their application was granted buy only after checking plaintiffs' clearance with the Planning Commission. Plaintiffs also applied to the Department of Building and Safety for a permit to construct the necessary sanitary facilities, and approval of that application likewise followed the department's ascertainment that the conditional exception had been granted. Plaintiffs do not dispute the uncontradicted evidence showing that neither of these permits would have been issued in the absence of the granting of the above mentioned conditional exception.

Plaintiffs contend that they never accepted the conditional exception offered by the board, but a reading of the quoted transcript of the hearing negatives the force of their position. The only construction which can reasonably be placed upon Edmonds' action at those proceedings is that he finally expressed a willingness to follow the advice of his counsel and that he orally accepted the three-year conditional exception so as to obtain the board's favorable action on his application. Any possible ambiguity in any single statement becomes entirely clear by reading such statement in context. Edmonds' failure to execute a written agreement or to file a faithful performance bond could not alter the binding effect of Edmonds' verbal acceptance of the conditional exception in the proceedings before the board. See Thompson v. Schurman, 65 Cal.App.2d 432, 440, 150 P.2d 509.

Nor is there merit to plaintiffs' further contention that throughout they have acted in conformity with their belief that they are unlimited as to the number of trailers which they may maintain in their trailer court. At no time prior to the commencement of this action were any agents of defendants informed of any such claim by plaintiffs. Never once during the entire proceedings culminating in the granting of the conditional exception did plaintiffs assert a claim to a nonconforming use unrestricted as to the number of trailers. On the contrary, it undeniably appears that plaintiffs throughout have acted in entire conformity with the conditional exception. They accepted all benefits bestowed on them, securing their state and local permits on the...