Edmonds v. Com.

• Decision Date: 03 July 1979
• Citation: 586 S.W.2d 24
• Parties: Albert C. EDMONDS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 24

586 S.W.2d 24

Albert C. EDMONDS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

July 3, 1979.

Jack E. Farley, Public Advocate, Kevin M. McNally, C. Thomas Hectus, Asst. Public Advocates, Com. Ky., Frankfort, for appellant.

Robert F. Stephens, Atty. Gen., C. David Clauss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Com. Ky., Frankfort, for appellee.

STERNBERG, Justice.

The appellant, Albert C. Edmonds, was indicted on June 12, 1975, by the Grand Jury of Pike County, Kentucky, for the June 1, 1975, murder of Betty Renfro. KRS 507.020(1)(a). On August 29, 1975, the appellant filed notice of his intention to rely on the defense of insanity. KRS 504.050(1). On November 7, 1975, at the request and by agreement of counsel for appellant and the Commonwealth, the trial court ordered the appellant to undergo a medical and psychiatric examination by Dr. John Corcella to determine both his competency to stand trial and his condition at the time Betty Renfro was shot to death. On July 9, 1976, the appellant was ordered to the Pikeville Methodist Hospital for a neurological examination by Dr. R. H. Mortara. On September 17, 1976, the trial court, pursuant to the request of the Commonwealth, ordered appellant to submit to a follow-up psychiatric examination by Dr. Corcella, which was done. A six-day trial commencing December 15, 1976, resulted in a jury verdict finding the appellant guilty of murder and fixing his punishment at life imprisonment. Thus, this appeal.

The appellant charges that the trial court erred in the following instances:

I. The appellant was denied due process of law by the trial court's murder instruction which omitted an essential element of the offense and by the refusal to instruct on first degree manslaughter.

II. The trial court committed reversible error and denied the appellant's constitutional right to a fair trial by permitting the Commonwealth's Attorney to testify as a witness and to participate in the trial as the prosecutor.

III. The trial court committed reversible error and denied the appellant's constitutional right to a fair trial by permitting the Commonwealth to engage in improper conduct during trial and closing argument.

IV. The trial court erred and denied appellant due process of law in refusing to give a curative instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity after an erroneous view of the law was given by the prosecutor.

V. The failure of the trial court to make a determination of competency and to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law and appellant's trial while incompetent denied him due process of law.

VI. The trial court committed reversible error and appellant was denied due process of law and a fair trial when he was tried, convicted and sentenced while incompetent.

VII. The trial court erred to appellant's substantial prejudice in refusing to admit certain of his V.A. medical records, and unduly depreciated his constitutional right to present a defense.

VIII. The trial court committed reversible error and denied appellant due process of law and his rights to present a defense and to confront the witnesses against him by improperly limiting defense questions.

IX. The trial court erred in refusing to suppress appellant's statement both because he was insane at the time of the statement, and because the Commonwealth's Attorney destroyed the tape recording of the statement.

X. The trial court committed reversible error and denied appellant due process of law by refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal.

XI. The trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt denied appellant due process of law.

XII. Appellant's judgment must be vacated because of the failure of the court below to follow the mandatory sentencing procedures of KRS 532.050 and because the trial court abused its discretion and denied appellant due process of law in refusing to order a presentence psychiatric examination as authorized by KRS 532.050(3).

The appellant was 55 years of age and a successful insurance salesman. He had been married for fourteen years and lived with his wife on Jay Street in Pikeville, Kentucky. Betty Renfro was a 23-year-old widow who, with her two children, lived in a house trailer in Ray's Trailer Court, Pikeville. Her brother, Danny Hardin, and his wife Debbie lived in the same trailer court. The appellant was infatuated with Betty and spent much of his time with her and her children. The children referred to him as "Dad," and he often took all of them out for entertainment. The appellant was jealous of Betty and on this fateful afternoon was laboring under the impression that she was going out with another man. On the morning of June 1, Betty, her two children, and her brother and his wife attended a family reunion picnic. The appellant followed them and drove by the picnic grounds several times without stopping. Later in the day, after Betty and her children had returned home, the appellant was seen chasing Betty in the trailer park and she was screaming. Witnesses saw the appellant take a pistol out of his pocket and shoot Betty. She fell to the ground and appellant ran for help. He and other persons put Betty in an automobile and took her to the hospital. The appellant sat in the back seat, holding Betty in his arms. He encouraged the driver to hurry to the hospital and continually assured Betty that she wouldn't die. Alas, she did.

The appellant served in the United States Army and, both while in the service and after his discharge, had on several occasions been hospitalized for a psychoneurotic condition. Prior to the time he shot Betty, the appellant had been taking a self-prescribed and self-compounded medication mixture of alcohol and sodium bromide or alcohol and potassium bromide for headaches and nervousness. The medication would sometimes cause him to "blank out." While taking this medication, the appellant would act in a bizarre manner. For example, he once asked his wife to accompany him into space. He opened the front door and talked as if there were someone at the door when, as a matter of fact, no one was there.

We will first concern ourselves with whether the trial court, in instructing the jury on murder, erroneously failed to include absence of extreme emotional disturbance and erroneously failed to instruct on first-degree manslaughter.

Murder is defined as follows:

"A person is guilty of murder when:

(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. However, nothing contained in this section shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for or preclude a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime; * * *"

The trial court instructed the jury as follows:

"Murder You will find the defendant guilty under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:

(a) That in this county on or about June 1, 1975, and before the finding of the indictment herein, he killed Betty Renfro by shooting her with a pistol; and

(b) That in so doing he intended to cause Betty Renfro's death.

If you find the defendant guilty under this instruction, you will fix his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for not less than 20 years or at life, in your discretion."

It is noticeable that the instruction given by the court contained no reference to the absence or presence of extreme emotional disturbance. In other words, the instruction given to the jury by the trial court did not require the jury to find absence of extreme emotional disturbance in order to convict the appellant of the offense of murder. It should have. A failure to act under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance is an element of the offense of murder, and if the evidence...