Edmunds v. Chang
| Decision Date | 02 November 1973 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 73-3926. |
| Parties | John S. EDMUNDS, Petitioner, v. Robert Won Bae CHANG, Individually and in his capacity as Judge, First Circuit Court, State of Hawaii, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
David C. Schutter, Burnham H. Greeley, Padgett, Greeley, Marumoto & Steiner, Honolulu, Hawaii, for petitioner.
Robert P. Jaress, Deputy Atty. Gen., George Pai, Atty. Gen. of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, for respondent.
DECISION AND ORDER
Petitioner Edmunds is an attorney licensed in the State of Hawaii. Respondent Chang is a judge of the First Circuit Court of Hawaii. On January 23, 1973, Edmunds was representing a defendant in a criminal case before Judge Chang. During the course of the proceedings, he was found summarily to be in contempt of court. Later on the same day he was served with a written order and judgment of contempt, directing him to pay a fine of $25 within 48 hours.1 Before the expiration of that time, Edmunds moved the court to reconsider its judgment, or in the alternative, to stay the order through January 30, so that he could seek appellate review.2 On January 29, he was ordered to appear before Judge Chang four days later to show cause why he should not be held in further contempt for failure to comply with the original contempt order.
Direct appeal not being permitted,3 Edmunds then sought a writ of prohibition from the Hawaii Supreme Court, and that court restrained Judge Chang from proceeding further while it considered the writ. The writ of prohibition was ultimately denied, in a 3-2 decision, and Edmunds is now before this court applying for a writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Edmunds has exhausted his state remedies.
Still, the respondent argues that Edmunds cannot satisfy the requirements of § 22544 because "the sentence did not impose imprisonment."
The statute does not, on its face, require that there be a sentence of imprisonment before a federal court can assume habeas corpus jurisdiction. § 2254 refers simply to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court". The meaning of the custody requirement has been the subject of protracted debate, but there has been a tendency in the decided cases not to impose too rigid a limitation on the boundaries of federal jurisdiction. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963), the Supreme Court indicated that it "has generally looked to common-law usages and the history of habeas corpus both in England and in this country" to help determine availability of the writ. Jones emphasized the wide range of situations, extending even to child custody disputes, in which habeas corpus relief has been historically available. In this context, the Court concluded that the imposition of "restraints not shared by the public generally", and not only actual confinement, could justify issuance of the writ.
A steady trend toward liberalization of the custody requirement has followed Jones. A particularly important factor in many of these cases has been that of providing prompt adjudication of the petitioner's constitutional claims, one of the fundamental purposes of habeas corpus. See, e. g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968). Perhaps even more importantly, there has been an expansion in the spirit of the law, in the attitudes with which federal habeas corpus is to be considered. In Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969), the Court declared:
The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected. 394 U.S. 291, 89 S.Ct. 1086.
It is in this spirit that the Court has proceeded in its recent examination of the custody requirement. In Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968), the petitioner was a former state prisoner who had been released after the expiration of his sentence. Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 92 S.Ct. 1693, 32 L.Ed.2d 141 (1972) dealt with a military reservist on orders to report for active duty and seeking classification as a conscientious objector. He filed his petition in California, his home state; his "nominal custodian" was the commander of a personnel center in Indiana, where his records were kept. The petitioner "was never in Indiana or assigned there." Nevertheless, the Court found that "the concepts of `custody' and `custodian' are sufficiently broad" to provide a basis both for habeas corpus and for jurisdiction in California. Significantly, none of the other three dissenting Justices joined with Justice Rehnquist in the view that the petitioner was not in custody "at all."
The nature of the restraints to which the petitioner here is subjected are surely as severe as those in Strait. It is not merely the original contempt citation which is before this court; Edmunds has been ordered to show cause why he should not be held in further contempt for failing to pay the fine imposed upon him. The consequences of the pending action could be grave. An attorney's reputation is his principal professional asset; the success of his efforts often depends upon a delicate balance of harmony with the courts. A judgment of criminal contempt is something far more than a mere "moral restraint" to one who occupies the status of an officer of the court. Moreover, under Hawaii law there is at least the potential for disciplinary action being taken against an attorney who is found in contempt.5
Finally, Edmunds points to very similar cases in which Judge Chang has found attorneys in contempt and then placed them in custody pending the payment either of the fine he has summarily levied or of a cash bail he has imposed.6
The rationale employed by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973), finding "custody" where a habeas corpus petitioner has been released on his own recognizance, is just as compelling here:
Plainly, we would badly serve the purposes and the history of the writ to hold that under these circumstances the petitioner's failure to spend even 10 minutes in jail is enough to deprive the District Court of power to hear his constitutional claim. 411 U.S. 352-353, 93 S.Ct. 1575.
This steady widening of habeas corpus jurisdiction is underlined by the recent decision in Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir., 1973). In Weiss, an attorney was cited on five separate contempt charges during the course of a state criminal trial. He sought habeas corpus relief, but it was denied in the District Court. The Court of Appeals, however, noted that "the propriety of using a petition for habeas corpus to test the constitutionality of his convictions is unquestionable", despite the fact that he was sentenced merely to pay a fine on one of the counts.
Therefore, bearing in mind the spirit and the logic which higher courts have recently applied to habeas corpus, as well as the circumstances of this case, I find that the petitioner is sufficiently in custody for this court to consider the constitutionality of his conviction.
The events which led to petitioner's contempt citation are here set out in full:
The contempt judgment entered by Judge Chang7 recites that Edmunds "stood up and interrupted the proceedings and requested permission to approach the bench;" that permission was denied, and that Edmunds "failed to comply with the order of the court" which directed him to be seated. The nature of the proceeding which Edmunds is alleged to have interrupted is not stated; the judgment merely says that the court "was in the process of noting the presence of defendants sic, counsel, etc."
There is no question that the circuit courts of the state of Hawaii have statutory authority to punish some contempts summarily. Section 1077 of the state's recently adopted penal code8 merely restates a judicial power which Blackstone thought "as ancient as the laws themselves" 4 Blackstone Commentaries 286. It might be pointed out that both the necessity for summary exercise of the power, and the assumption of its historical basis in the English common law, have been subjected to searching examination. See, e. g., the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L. Ed.2d 672 (1958); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial...
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